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This thesis concerns the impact of global political economic dynamics on the evolution of 
regional political integration. Specifically, the thesis examines the impact of one 
manifestation of globalisation - Japanese foreign direct investment - on the European 
Community. A working hypothesis of this study is that the recent evolution of the EC has 
been determined as much by external dynamics as endogenous design. The thesis argues that 
the dominant emphasis on endogenous developments in the literature on European integration 
is increasingly inadequate in an era of transformation in the global political economy.
The research project began by approaching the relationship between the European Community 
and Japan in an ‘international relations’ paradigm. However, preliminary findings led to a 
shift in focus. Economic diplomacy between the Community and Japan since the Treaty of 
Rome has evolved into a major, although specialised, link in the global system. In this 
configuration, Japan is one of the many ‘external relations’ of the Community. The literature 
review below suggests that a bilateral paradigm was indeed fruitfully applied to the analysis 
of the relationship in earlier times. Chapter V of this thesis in some ways constitutes a 
microcosm of such an approach. But the traditional means of examining EC-Japan relations 
is no longer sufficient. The evolution away from a bi-lateral approach towards a systemic 
research question, involved both a narrowing of the empirical research and a broadening of 
the theoretical questions. The interaction between regional political integration and global 
economic integration emerged as the most important theoretical nexus in the analysis of EC- 
Japan affairs, 1985-93.
The European Community is both a structure and a strategy. The EC’s constitutional 
reconstruction around the SEA and the ’92 Programme was essentially a political and de jure 
strategy. Although processes of regional economic integration are present in western Europe, 
and although these may overlap with, and be mutually influenced by political integration; 
regional economic integration can take place in the absence of a centralised political authority. 
The regional European integration treated in this thesis is normally termed ‘political 
integration’ but may more accurately be termed ‘political economic’ integration. The term 
‘regional’ as used here, refers to continental regions (eg. the European region) rather than 
regions of the EC member states which are referred to as sub-states or sub-state regions (eg.
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Alsace).
The constitutional and competitiveness-enhancement projects of the EC during the 1980s, 
were launched in an environment of rapid systemic change. Such change was by no means 
de jure. In fact the period witnessed a distinct absence of credible global political economic 
regulation. Globalisation is understood as an organic, de facto mode of trans-territorial 
integration. The principal agent for such globalisation during the period was foreign direct 
investment.
The European Community’s most important external relationship is with the United States of 
America. Relations with other European states are also important. Japan has dramatically 
grown in importance on the global political economic stage - her technological capability and 
strong presence in high value-added sectors underlining trends visible in trade and FDI 
volume. Japan thus constitutes one of the most important external relations of the EC. This 
thesis investigates the extent to which an (initial) externality can have an impact on the 
otherwise internal, de jure evolution of regional political integration. One area in which this 
dynamic is examined is in the role of Japanese firms in the evolution of the ‘blueprint’ for 
the single European market. The ability of the EC Commission to maintain ‘internal’ control 
of the market and establish itself as gatekeeper to that market is examined. The impact of 
FDI on the internal/external geopolitical makeup of the Community itself is then analysed.
Relations between the EC and Japan are predominantly economic. Despite mutual 
consideration of salient issues such as UN reform and joint aid programmes, the greater part 
of the EC-Japan agenda concerns economic issues. During the mid-1980s EC-Japan relations 
underwent a profound quantitative and qualitative transformation. The period of accelerated 
global FDI and the inception of a single European market was markedly different from the 
preceding era of EC-Japan affairs. While the preceding period (1973-C.1985) was dominated 
by trade, the new era was one of trade plus investment. Such a shift had fundamental 
political implications for the evolution of the European Community. This thesis explains why 
the advent of FDI was such an important determinant of the course of the Single Market 
Programme and of European integration itself.
The analysis primarily concerns the rise and consequences of inward Japanese manufacturing 
investment in the EC. Manufacturing investment presents an opportunity to evaluate 
important aspects of the EC raison d ’être; external trade relations; internal political economic 
philosophy; and strategies for competitiveness and employment enhancement. Manufacturing 
FDI is also more immobile than financial investment. As such, manufacturing locational 
decisions are a significant external evaluation of the Community and its constituent parts.
From commencing as a study of structural and diplomatic elements in the relationship 
between the EC and Japan, the analysis came to focus on the impact of systemic change on 
the constitutional evolution of the Community. The advent of FDI as a major new dynamic 
in EC-Japan relations focuses attention on the role of Japanese firms as agents of Japan’s 
contact with Europe. This distinguishes EC-Japan relations from those between the U.S. and 
Japan, where the role of the Security Treaty must be considered as a vital government-to- 
government strand, influencing commercial as well as ‘salient’ relations. Such a dimension 
is non-existent in EC-Japan affairs.
The evolution from bilateral relations to a complex multi-leveled systemic analysis, implied 
consideration of multiple actors. These were: the EC-level, the member states, the EC sub­
states and Japanese firms. The reader may be surprised by the prominence given to sub-state 
regions here, however this is justified given the front-line status of sub-states in FDI matters. 
A detailed treatment of sub-state dispositions and activities [Ch.III], when juxtaposed with a 
treatment of EC member state roles [IV] leads to a more contextual evaluation of the role of 
the EC institutions [V] in this important aspect of EC-Japan affairs. On the European side 
therefore, it is the EC in its constitutional entirety which is analysed. Many of the 
conclusions of this research could perhaps be applied to the impact of FDI from any source, 
but the EC-Japan framework has been retained since the regionalisation/globalisation dynamic 
is at the heart of the relationship, and because Japanese FDI constituted a ‘leading-edge’ 
position in global FDI during the period.
Fundamental changes in the nature of the EC-Japan relationship came about in response to 
developments within the Community (increased awareness of deficit ‘problems’, anti­
dumping, the SEA, the ’92 Programme) and changes in the global political economic
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environment (the ‘take-off of FDI, liberalisation of capital mobility, enhanced information 
technology). This shift produced a move away from a stage in which the actors were 
separated by ‘trading distance’ to one where the interests, agendas and even identities of 
actors became increasingly difficult to distinguish. The thesis examines the different 
strategies of political authorities in this changed political economic environment. Complex 
bargains between actors implied a difficulty in defining the interests of the Community. The 
concept of regional ‘competitiveness’ which so influenced the inception of the SEA was 
becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. Between negotiation of the SEA and the coming 
into effect of the ’92 programme, FDI had proliferated and posited a new défi, not to the state
- but to the ability of regional political integration to enhance competitiveness. The advent 
of FDI challenged the ‘traditional’ political economic geography of EC-Japan relations.
The shift from relatively easy actor-identification to a complex overlapping and inter-meshing 
of interests, alliances and bargains also influenced the methodological and theoretical 
framework of this thesis. Two sub-disciplines of political science which probe the evolution 
of systemic realities in a particularly prescient manner were utilised. These are international 
political economy (IPE) and the post-Cold War revitalised field of geopolitics (neo­
geopolitics). IPE has, for about two decades, stressed the importance of economic phenomena 
in international affairs, and has stressed the need to include non-state actors in the analysis 
of systemic realities. Geopolitics, a traditional field of study which was largely dormant 
throughout the perceived ‘static’ Cold War era, has undergone a revival since 1989. These 
two sub-disciplines share much in common, and have determined the structure and the course 
of this research project.
Within this broader methodological framework, insights came from two sets of theoretical 
literature; theories of European integration and theories of globalisation. The former includes 
functionalism, neofunctionalism, intergovemmentalism and writings on federalism. The latter 
includes traditional literature on ‘world-economies’, theories of the growth of big business, 
and the more recent theories of globalisation. These theories are introduced and evaluated 
in the following chapter.
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by a decline in such new stocks in the early 1990s. This is a strong factor in the 
determination of periodisation for this research. It is argued that Japanese FD1 can be 
analysed as an phenomenon which provides an opportunity to examine both the impact of 
globalisation on the evolution of the EC; and the EC itself as revealed in its actions and 
reactions towards the manifestation of such globalisation.
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CHAPTER I THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter outlines a methodological framework for the analysis of the multifaceted 
relationship between the European Community and Japan, and evaluates theories which may 
be fruitful for such an analysis. Relations between the EC and Japan have largely been 
economic, but have more specifically concerned multi-leveled political economic interaction. 
A purely economic approach would not therefore accommodate many of the essential facets 
of the relationship. EC-Japan affairs also have a strong legalistic character which is 
particularly evident in the application of anti-dumping measures by the Community; in the 
Commission’s attempts to extend trade measures to cover FDI regulation; and in Japan’s 
maintenance of various legal and quasi-legal instruments to regulate investment access and 
imports. However focussing entirely on the legal regime would omit the paramount political 
control which is exercised over legal instruments, particularly in relation to EC external 
commercial relations.
The term ‘international relations’ is adequate for the sub-discipline of political science to 
which it pertains. However, in recent times consideration of international or inter-state 
relations has become increasingly problematic. Apart from difficulty with its application to 
the European Community as a systemic actor, a traditional international relations approach 
is also problematic when applied to an analysis of firms and European sub-state regions in 
EC-Japan affairs. ‘Realities’ is perhaps more accurate than ‘relations’ since structures and 
endogenous elements are frequently as important as ‘relational’ considerations.
12 I n te r n a t io n a l p o l i t i c a l  econ om y and n e o -g e o p o lit ic s
This research project benefits from the insights of two sub-disciplines within political science 
which have posed particularly probing questions regarding dynamic change in the global 
political economic system. International political economy (IPE) and post-Cold War revived 
geopolitics (here termed ‘neo-geopolitics’) share many theoretical concerns. This thesis
attempts to bring these two schools together in a framework for analysis of EC-Japan affairs.
The distinct field of international political economy (IPE) is a relatively recent sub-discipline 
which provides important linkages between political science and economics. This literature 
attempts to overcome the deficiencies both of international relations and of international 
economics and seeks to move political economic realities closer to the centre of the analysis 
of systemic political phenomena.
While Galbraith, Bhagwati and Dunning for example, have all made essentially ‘political
economic’ contributions to knowledge - these writers come from the ‘nests’ of economic
philosophy, economics and international business respectively. The pioneers of the specific
field of IPE are Shonfield and Strange.1 Andrew Shonfield began to redefine scholarship on
the emerging political economic landscape during the 1960s:
The truth is that in most Western societies, although the Government possesses plenty 
of means which it can use - if it has the will - to bully or to cajole big private firms, 
it also has to be ready on occasion to bargain and to compromise with their 
independent wishes.2
Susan Strange developed the emergent problématiques into the coherent field of IPE.3 
Strange’s particular areas of concern have been the implications for the international system 
of the increasing power and mobility of capital and the proliferation and implications of state- 
firm bargaining. Strange writes that "..the complexity of firm-state bargaining suggests that 
the political character of enterprises - which may differ in practice just as widely as the 
political character of states - is an important variable in the determination of outcomes for
8
1 Robert Gilpin, Stephen Gill and Ronen Pal an are part of this tradition. Richard Higgott 
provides a comprehensive overview; ‘International Political Economy’ in Groom, A.J.R. and 
Margot Light Contemporary International Relations: a guide to theory, Pinter, London, 1994.
2 Shonfield, Andrew Modem Capitalism: the changing balance of public and private 
power, Oxford University Press, [1965] 1970. p.380.
3 Especially in Strange, Susan Casino Capitalism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986. States and 
Markets, Pinter, London, [1988] 1994. Rival States, Rival Firms, with John Stopford, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991. On methodology see: ‘Wake up, Krasner! the world has 
changed’ Review o f International Political Economy, 1:2 Summer, 1994. pp.209-219. For 
an overview see Morgan, Roger et al (eds.) New Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: 
essays for Susan Strange, Macmillan, London, 1993.
individuals, regions, countries, continents, classes, genders and generations."4 This 
multivariate emphasis was distinct from the inter-state emphasis of the PIER (politics of 
international economic relations) approach.5
Robert Gilpin, another major contributor to this genre, identifies his contribution as "..part of 
an expanding body of scholarship on the political economy of international relations; it 
assumes that an understanding of the issues of trade, monetary affairs, and economic 
development requires the integration of the theoretical insights of the disciplines of economics 
and political science."6 The principal difference between Shonfield and Strange on one hand, 
and Gilpin on the other, is that while the former concentrate on systemic and global concerns; 
Gilpin tends to keep to an ‘Ameri-centric’ perspective. Robin Brown identifies three central 
aspects of IPE:
Firstly, the recognition that the state is as much an economic actor as a military one 
means that it will act to preserve national interests in a number of ways. Secondly, 
the above suggests that insecurity can be used to explain international outcomes that 
go beyond military threats. Thirdly, this change of perspective has important 
consequences for the concept of power.7
The IPE agenda stressed multivariate, interconnected dynamics (including the role of non-state
9
4 Strange, Susan ‘Territory, State, Authority and Economy: a new realist ontology of 
global political economy.’ Symposium Paper POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND TERRITORIALITY, 
European University Institute, Fiesole, November 1992. p.23. The ‘actor’ significance of 
multi-national firms has also been highlighted by J.L. Mucchielli: "While the position of the 
country in the hierarchy of nations is determined by its commercial trade and the nature of 
its bilateral trade, "its" multinational firms also play an important role in determining and 
changing this rank.” ‘French and Japanese Multinational Firms and the hierarchy of Nations’, 
Discussion paper series, Institute for Economic Research, Washington, 1986. p.l Following 
Strange and Stopford; Murphy and Tooze state that "governments have had, increasingly, to 
bargain with firms." Murphy, Craig N. and Roger Tooze (eds.) The-New International 
Political Economy, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1991. p.43.
5 Joan Edelman Spero The Politics of International Economic Relations, George Allen & 
Unwin, London, 1977.
6 Gilpin, Robert with Jean M. Gilpin The Political Economy of International Relations, 
Princeton University Press, 1987. p.3.
7 Brown, Robin ‘Towards a new synthesis of international relations’, introduction to From 
Cold War to Collapse: theory and world politics in the 1980s, Bowker, Mike and Robin 
Brown (eds.) Cambridge University Press, 1993. p.8.
actors) in the global system, more quickly than economists or international relations 
scholars.8
The probing questions of the IPE agenda can be supplemented with the reviving geopolitical 
tradition in international studies. Since the demise of the Cold War, a number of scholars 
from the fields of political science, geography and economics have increasingly considered 
spatio-temporal dimensions in the evolution of the global political economic system as a 
means of understanding international relations and systemic change. Here these are identified 
as the neo-geopolitical school.9
This thesis does nor treat the full lineage of geopolitical approaches. The new geopolitical 
scholarship is distinct from earlier geopolitical approaches of Mackinder and others, which 
flourished in the early years of the century.10 One author whose writings influenced the 
methodology of the more recent geopolitical approach, is Fernand Braudel.11 Following an 
evaluation of the methodological importance of Braudel’s work; the value of his approach will 
be assessed in its applicability to contemporary political economic phenomena - as distinct 
from the more distant past with which Braudel was concerned. It will be shown that the 
concerns of the IPE scholars discussed above, and the post-1989 neo-geopolitical scholars
10
8 Some however, have suggested that the ‘boundaries’ between politics and economics 
need to be strengthened. Caporaso and Levine write: "In our view, a main difficulty of 
political economy, common to different approaches, lies in a tendency to gloss over the 
separateness of the two spheres of the economic and the political, absorbing one into the 
other." Caporaso, James A. and David P. Levine Theories o f Political Economy, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992. p.6.
9 This term, is coined specifically for the purposes of this argument. It is not claimed that 
such a ‘school’ actually exists - nor that the authors concerned (Barnes, Ledebur, Gipouloux, 
Smith, Demko, Wood and others) would consent to such categorisation. However it is argued 
that this group of authors seek an understanding of the global system in a manner which is 
close to (and frequently directly accredits) the approach of Fernand Braudel [6io.fh.ll].
10 For a treatment of the historical evolution of this discipline see the introduction to 
Demko, George J. and William B. Wood (eds.) Reordering the World, Westview, Boulder, 
1994.
11 This French historian [1902-1985] authored, among other works; The Mediterranean 
and the Mediterranean World in the Age o f Philip II (1949), and Capitalism and Material 
Life, 1400-1800 (1967-1979).
influenced by Braudel (discussed below), possess incisive methodological tools for the 
analysis of contemporary systemic realities.
To Braudel, the global political economic system was by definition, multifaceted and 
interconnected. Any analysis of such a system embraced phenomena which were economic, 
political, geographic, legal and social, as a matter of course. Braudel’s method was to place 
the problématique at the heart of the synthesis and to at least consider all potential elements 
which impinge upon the problématique as potentially relevant to the synthesis.
Aside from methodological considerations, another reason for recognising the value of 
Braudel’s approach is the importance which he attached to what is now known as 
‘globalisation’.12 Here the term requires immediate qualification. Although not using the 
term ‘globalisation’ in the sense which has emerged in the 1980s and ’90s,13 Braudel was 
closely concerned with the systemic - rarely if ever recognising the territorial boundedness of 
the phenomena being analysed; constantly referring back to the geographical base, the socio­
economic context and immediate events and their dynamics. A rigid exogenous-endogenous 
division (based on states for example) would be artificial in this methodology. As such, 
Braudel’s writing - even about the distant past has a curiously modern feel. He writes of a 
world long gone, but the vivid power of his association of phenomena in the exposition and 
investigation of vastly complex realities is of such compulsion that his methodology (here 
augmented by IPE) can form a framework for analysis of international relations at the close 
of the 20th century.
In his Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, a series of lectures delivered at 
the Johns Hopkins University in 1976, Fernand Braudel reflected on his earlier work and 
(albeit in an historical context) addressed systemic issues which have become central among 
the concerns of international political economists. Many of the issues which concerned
11
12 This discussion of ‘proto-globalisation’ only focuses on Braudel. For a full discussion 
of the longer lineage of ‘global’ concepts see Roland Robertson Globalization: social theory 
and global culture, Sage, London, 1992. Especially Ch.3 ‘Mapping the Global Condition’. 
(Recent concepts of globalisation are treated at 1.5 below.)
13 To this writer’s knowledge he did not use the term in any context.
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Braudel in this analysis were directly related to the extent to which a ‘global’ system existed
and the extent to which such a typology as ‘global’ was useful.
...it is clear that from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century the area forming the lively 
world of the market economy steadily increased. The harbinger and proof of this is 
the dominolike variation in market prices across the globe. For prices fluctuated 
throughout the entire world: in Japan and China, in India and throughout the Islamic 
world (for example, in the Turkish Empire), and in those parts of America where gold 
and silver played a role at an early date - that is, in New Spain, Brazil, and Peru.14
What concerns us here is not so much the subject of analysis, but the way in which 
precedence is given to dynamics, effects, exchanges and motion - rather than static elements. 
The relationship between Japan and the European Community, 1985-93, primarily concerns 
relations between Japanese firms in their global activities and the regional construction of a 
western European competitive space. Braudel identified what are now largely referred to as 
‘globalisation’ and ‘regional integration’ in the terms; economy of the world and world- 
economy.
By economy of the world I mean the world economy as a whole, the "market of the 
universe," as Sismondi called it. By world-economy - a word I forged on the pattern 
of the German word Weltwirtschaft - 1 mean the economy of only one portion of our 
planet, to the degree that it forms an economic whole. Long ago I wrote that the 
Mediterranean of the sixteenth century was in itself a Weltwirtschaft, a world- 
economy, or, to use another German expression, "eine Welt fur sich," a world unto 
itself.15
Braudel goes on to state that such world-economies have three facets: they occupy a "given 
geographic space"; they always have a pole or a center; and they have different zones • 
central, intermediate and peripheral.16 This research project will attempt to assess the role 
and ‘actor integrity’ of the EC (a de jure ‘world-economy ’) in the globalising economy of the 
world. Specifically, it attempts to assess the extent to which regional political integration is 
challenged by globalisation. This juxtaposition of regional and global: world economy and 
economy o f the world, when combined with the non-state emphasis of IPE, facilitates analysis 
of the complex issues of.EC-Japan relations to a far greater extent than traditional
14 Braudel, Fernand Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, trans. Patricia 
M. Ranum. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977. p.42.




It is noted that the ‘world-economy’ Braudel was referring to was not a politically driven, de 
jure, economic space. It was an organic whole such as the Mediterranean ‘world’ or today’s 
off-shore Chinese economy. This conception of world-economy is thus more an ‘area’ than 
a ‘region’.17 Braudel treated with some considerable sophistication, systemic questions 
which are familiar to international relations and IPE scholars. His writing was so tuned to 
the mechanics of the evolving global political economic system, that certain ‘indicators’ in 
his work can be taken up as a basis for the synthesis of more modern realities.
One of the principal features of late 20th century global finance and production is its relative 
freedom from territorial constraints. Braudel notes that "...at the whim of circumstance there 
will always be one position more advantageous to adopt than the rest, one sector more 
profitable to exploit."18 It is this sense of potentiality which characterises Japanese firms’ 
advances into Europe in the 1980s. It is also this kind of ‘position more advantageous’ which 
represents a sharp challenge to the link between integration and competitiveness, foreseen in 
the legalistic and territorial model of integration in western Europe. The empirical analysis 
presented below attempts to use these concepts of outreach and potentiality - analysing the 
power of such outreach by Japanese firms and its impact on the territorial logic of de jure 
integration in western Europe.
Another intuitive ‘indicator’ which is found in Braudel’s writing, concerns the impact of 
externalities on endogenous developments. Again, the empirical sections of this thesis will 
evaluate the extent to which this may still obtain.19 In his celebrated address to the Collège
17 For a debate on these terms as applied to both Asia and Europe see the writer’s 
conference report ‘Europe in the Asia/Pacific Region: involvements, challenges, policy roles’, 
European University Institute, Fiesole, April, 1994.
18 Braudel, Fernand Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800, trans. Miriam Kochan, 
Fontana, [1967] 1974. p.445.
19 Braudel writes: "I have even come to believe that every world-economy is on many 
occasions manipulated from without The great historical events of Europe proclaim this 
insistently.." Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, trans. Patricia M. Ranum. 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977. pp.93-94.
14
de France in 1950, Braudel illustrated the interconnectedness of phenomena and the challenge
which this posed for synthesis. He illustrated this with reference to a recession in early
modem Florence and its potential impact in East Asia. This passage is reproduced for its
value as a methodological statement:
Endless tasks rear up and demand our attention, if we are to deal with even the 
simplest realities of these collective lives, such as, for instance, the short-lived 
economic rhythms of a particular conjuncture. Look, for example, at the fairly severe 
recession which led to a clearly identifiable crisis in Florence between 1580 and 1585, 
a recession which quickly grew in strength and which as quickly disappeared. 
Researches in and around Florence offer indications of it by such sure signs as the 
repatriation of the Florentine merchants who left France and Germany at that time, and 
who sometimes, even more significantly, sold their shops in order to buy land in 
Tuscany... but immediately the question arises whether the crisis was peculiar to 
Tuscany, or whether it was in fact a general crisis. Quickly we find traces of it in 
Venice, and without much difficulty in Ferrara. But just how far afield did it make 
itself felt? Without knowing its exact scope, we are unable to define its nature. Does 
this mean that the historian must set off to search every archive in Europe, seeking 
out series of prices which scholarship usually overlooks? It is an endless journey! 
The whole task still lies before him. And to top it all, a historian interested in China 
and India and believing that the Far East dominated the circulation of precious metals, 
and thus the rhythm of economic life throughout the world in the sixteenth century, 
will soon note that there were years of instability in the Far East for the trade in 
pepper and spices corresponding almost exactly to these years of difficulty in 
Florence.20
Application of this interconnected methodology to the analysis of EC-Japan affairs demands
that the complex bargains between Japanese firms, EC member states and sub-states cannot
be ignored in favour of Commission-MITI dialogues. Having identified a problématique,
Braudel’s ‘open-ended’ method was to pursue its manifestations wherever they were to be
found. It is important to stress that the genre of international political economy (IPE) has
already developed in a manner which in effect, applies Braudelian method to systemic
analysis. Andrew Shonfield, one of the IPE pioneers, outlined his approach as follows:
What I conceive myself to be doing is rather to tease out of a variegated mass of 
factual data some general indications of a trend in the institutional behaviour of the 
advanced industrial societies clustered around the North Atlantic area. If the 
conclusions that are suggested by this exercise lack the inevitability and force that they 
would have if they emerged from a systematic theoretical structure, that is one of the
20 Braudel, Fernand ‘The Situation of History in 1950.’ Inaugural lecture given to the 
Collège de France, 1 December 1950. In Fernand Braudel On History, trans. Sarah Matthews, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1981. p. 13.
consequences of the method of investigation.21
While it has been argued that IPE "is conceived as a renewed discipline of IR, integrating and 
superseding it"22 - a more comprehensive mapping of disciplinal trends would perhaps tend 
toward the view that IPE has come about as a response to myopic developments in 
international relations theorising and econometrics. IPE seeks to understand dynamic and 
complex change in a complex political economy of the world.
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F ig .1 Evolution  of IPE and neo-geopolitics
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NEO-GEOPOLITICS -  INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY [IPE]
(n eo-Bra u d eu a n  m ethodolo gy)
Since the demise of the Cold War a number of writers have revived the geopolitical approach. 
These scholars come from a number of backgrounds including political science, economics 
and geography.23 Such scholars have increasingly begun to analyse international relations 
problématiques, tending to stress the importance of spatial and temporal elements. A clear
21 Andrew Shonfield Modem Capitalism: the changing balance of public and private 
power, Oxford University Press, [1965] 1970, xiii. Braudel was familiar with Shonfield’s 
work. See Fernand Braudel Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, trans. 
Patricia M. Ranum. The Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore, 1977. pp.45-6.
22 Guzzini et al ‘New Ideas for a Strange World’ in Morgan, Roger et al (eds.) New 
Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World: essays for Susan Strange, Macmillan, London, 1993. 
p.9.
23 Denis Wood, in the volume which accompanied the 1992-93 Cooper-Hewitt Museum 
exhibition ‘The Power of Maps’ builds on a deep and varied discourse concerning political 
and other assumptions behind the making of maps, illustrating a long-held sensitivity to 
political matters among geographers and cartographers. Especially, Ch.Two ‘Maps are 
embedded in a History they help construct’, The Power of Maps, Guilford Press, New York,
1992.
overview of the post-Cold War revival of geopolitical approaches is offered by Demko and 
Wood:
...many of the new [post-Cold War] "global issues" were inherently geographic or had 
significant geographic dimensions... we maintain the firm belief that political 
geographic analyses of current international issues - now more than ever - can provide 
both useful insight for policy-makers and an exciting area of research and discussion 
for students and scholars... Applied political geography - the new geopolitics or 
geopolinomics - is emerging rapidly and vigorously.24
In 1991 Barnes and Ledebur argued that metropolitan-centered economic spaces were more 
‘real’ than national economies.25 An exciting new study of the determinants of 
régionalisation in Asia (and implications for Euro-Asian relations), by François Gipouloux 
also adopts a consciously Braudelian methodology.26 Michael Smith points to the difficulty 
of assuming that economic spaces are bounded by state territory: "..it is difficult to discern 
the boundaries of so-called ‘national’ economies."27 This is a useful contribution to 
understanding the nature of de facto regional integration as distinct from the ‘space’ of the 
state or the ‘space’ of the politically integrating unit. The complex overlapping of states, sub­
states and supra-state activities can cause policy dilemmas for territorial administrators. Such 
complex, but unavoidable realities require open, multifaceted analysis.28 John Agnew has
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24 Demko, George J. and William B. Wood (eds.) Reordering the World, Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1994. pp.vii & 13.
25 Barnes, W.R. and L.C. Ledebur ‘Toward a new political economy of metropolitan 
regions’ in Environment and Planning C.: Government and Policy, 1991, vol. 9. pp.127-141.
26 Gipouloux, François ‘Globalization and Regionalization in East Asia: stakes and 
strategies’ in François Gipouloux (ed.) Regional Economic Strategies in East Asia: a 
comparative perspective, la Maison Franco-Japonaise, Tokyo, 1994.
27 Michael Smith ‘The United States and the European Single Market: federalism and 
diplomacy in a changing political economy’ in Hocking, Brian (ed.) Foreign Relations and 
Federal States, Leicester University Press, 1993. p.260.
28 Braudel speaks of the need to avoid being "..condemned to the study of well-walled 
gardens" in his volume On History, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1980. p.4. In EC 
studies an encouraging start has been made by the editors of a recent university text. Artis 
and Lee state that although their work is primarily about the economic activities of the EU 
”..a knowledge of the wider context - historical, political, and institutional is essential to an 
understanding of the economic activities." Artis, Mike and Norman Lee The Economics of the 
European Union, Oxford University Press, 1994. p.4. This can be compared with Keohane 
and Hoffmann’s 1991 mixture of theoretical approaches. Keohane, Robert O. and Stanley
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charted some distinctions between the new geopolitics and IR theory:
By means of three geographical assumptions, the territorial nation state has come to 
provide the foundation for conventional international relations theories - realist, 
neorealist, and idealist. The first of these is the assumption of the territorial state as 
existing prior to and as a container of society. The second is the division of the 
domestic from the international. The third, and most fundamental, is the reification 
of national spaces as fixed units of secure sovereign space. Each of these geographical 
assumptions is increasingly problematic.29
This is precisely the kind of critique which IPE scholars have been making during the past
decade. While the neo-geopolitical approach thus supports the major research questions
already raised by IPE, its novelty is to stress the geographical dimension in the analysis of
complex systemic realities. The IPE/neo-geopolitical framework is reflected in this thesis
by the inclusion of sub-states and firms as units of analysis alongside the traditional EC
Commission and member state actors.
13 Theories and concepts of regional integration and globalisation
The subject of this research concerns the political impact of Japanese direct investment on the 
European Community between 1985 and 1993; and the nature of the European Community 
as revealed by Japanese direct investment during this period. A major theme throughout this 
synthesis is the tension between the European Community and globalising firms. This 
however, is not a state-firm tension. Rather, it is a tension between firms which seek to 
extend their influence trans-nationally, and emergent schemes to improve state (and bloc) 
competitiveness through political economic integration. Both states and firms might be seen 
to attempt to ‘integrate’ trans-territorially.
An important distinction needs to be introduced. There are two dominant usages of the term
Hoffmann, ‘Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s’ in Keohane and Hoffmann (eds.) The 
New European Community: decisionmaking and institutional change, Westview, Boulder,
1991.
29 John A. Agnew ‘Timeless Space and State-Centrism: the geographical assumptions of 
international relations theory’ in Rosow, Stephen J. et al (eds.) The Global Economy as 
Political Space, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1994. p.106.
‘integration’. The first refers primarily to economic phenomena such as ‘market integration’, 
or the integration of parts of the world which may be driven by commerce or other organic 
links. This form of integration is normally neither territorial nor legalistic (although it could 
support, overlap with, or even pose difficulties for integration reliant on these). The second 
kind of integration is that which is most commonly found in literature on the European 
Communities - that is ‘political integration.’ Such integration is primarily driven by states. 
A more accurate term for this form of integration - particularly since the Single European Act
- would be ‘political economic integration.’
Panic addresses the distinction between different kinds of integration when he writes that "..de 
jure integration is not the same thing as de facto integration."30 He traces the latter usage 
of the term ‘integration’ to the early 1970s and concludes that "Unlike the institutional 
attempts to integrate different economies, spontaneous integration is prompted by what the 
enterprises involved believe to be their corporate interest, not by considerations of national 
political and economic gains.”31 This thesis implicitly evaluates the relative efficiency of 
these two modes of integration.
Because the problématique focuses on the impact of a global phenomenon (direct investment), 
upon a regional construct (the European Community), some examination must be made of two 
sets of theoretical literature: on European integration, and on globalisation. The usage of both 
‘integration’ and ‘globalisation’ is of comparatively recent origin. Both imply a process32 
and both envisage destinations, such as a ‘federal Europe’ or a ‘borderless world.’ Although 
useful towards an understanding of phenomena which are quite new; these terms do not, 
without qualification, describe actualities. The caution here is that, should integration or 
globalisation not materialise according to certain projections, the analysis of recent phenomena
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30 Panic, Milivoje National Management o f the International Economy, Macmillan, 
London, 1988, p.4.
31 ibid. p.5
32 Such a process is also implied by their root nouns. George Yannopolous has used the 
careful but slightly inert term ‘integration bloc’ in ‘Foreign Direct Investment and European 
Integration: the evidence from the formative years of the European Community’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, VoKXXVIII, No.3, March 1990, p.255.
may be skewed by expectations of ‘process’. In the conclusion, the extents of integration and 
globalisation will be assessed.
1.4 Integration theory
This section argues that among theoretical approaches, integration theory is unique - not due 
to its merits or demerits - but because of its important place in the history of the EC and the 
ideologies which have accompanied the evolution of the Communities. Some of the analysis 
of ‘Europe’ over the past several decades has given exaggerated weight to the phenomenon 
of integration in the overall evolution of the continent.33 This is not only problematic 
because the EC constitutes just one part of Europe. Even in scholarship on western Europe, 
the phenomenon of integration often appears as the paramount factor in theoretical and 
historical studies.
Ultimately, only a wide-ranging context can account for the multiple strands which led to the 
creation and evolution of the European Communities. If one categorisation of the 
phenomenon of ‘integration’ were to be sought, it would be that the establishment and 
evolution of the EC, its evolution and present course are an historical event. The desire to 
secure peaceful coexistence in Europe, lessons from the inter-war era, customs union and 
ECSC bargaining, aspirations to improve material welfare and ‘external’ conditions such as 
the Cold War, all played important roles in leading to the establishment of the 
Communities.34
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33 Reginald Harrison wrote: "The analysts [of European integration] with whom this work 
is concerned, with few exceptions, take twentieth century conditions as an obvious starting 
point, assume their existence in the explanatory hypotheses, and often appear to derive a 
personal commitment to integration from a conviction that it is an answer to some of the 
problems of this century." Europe in Question: theories of regional international integration, 
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1974. p .ll. Amitai Etzioni expressed a similar view: "There 
are many observers who accept uncritically the EEC myth and who expect this time to be one 
of accelerated unification; a United Europe or Europa is frequently mentioned." Political 
Unification, Krieger, Huntington, 2nd ed., 1974. p.277.
34 Many of these factors continue to influence the development of the EC/EU. Jonathan 
Story stresses bargains and the importance of ‘men and ideas’ in the launching of the EMS. 
(Such an approach is similar to that of James Joll.) ‘The Launching of the EMS: an analysis
Ideas such as federalism, had within them some theoretical components. For the most part, 
immediate post-war visions or dogmas aimed at constructing a ‘new Europe’ belong to the 
history of ideas - rather than the theoretical literature on EC integration. However, there is 
considerable overlap between theory and ideas - particularly in functionalism, but also in 
neofunctionalist theory. The distinction offered here is that the early architects of the 
Community, including Monnet and Schuman were historical participants whose prescriptions 
belong to the history of ideas; while analysts such as Haas and Lindberg were seeking to 
explain what had happened, and what was happening.
The admixture of theory and ideas in EC writing tends to emphasise the ‘process’ of 
integration in Europe’s recent and contemporary dynamics. De Gaulle’s stance toward the 
Community led to a crisis in the perceived ‘process’ orientation of integration theory. Such 
was the neglect of potential counter-integrative forces in an early work, that Ernst Haas 
revised his position saying that: "..something is missing in the exploration of the integrative 
process presented in The Uniting of Europe... De Gaulle has proved us wrong. But how 
wrong?"35
The Community touches upon many aspects of European life, but it is too simplistic to 
identify the development of the Community as the paramount strand in the recent history and 
contemporary life of the continent. This presumption, which runs through much of the 
theoretical writing on the Community, can distort understanding of modem Europe and its 
relationship with the rest of the world.36 Theories and explanations of the development of 
the European Community also go through phases of influence, and are frequently (though
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of change in foreign economic policy’ Political Studies, Vol.XXXVI, No.3, September, 1988, 
pp.397-412.
35 Haas, Erast B. The Uniting of Europe, 2nd. ed., Stanford University Press, 1968. 
p.xxiii. Paul Taylor faulted neofunctionalism thus: "Neo-functionalism, precisely because of 
its striving after scientific rigour in the sense of the modern social sciences, became 
vulnerable to the short-term challenge of events." Introduction to David Mitrany The 
Functional Theory of Politics, Robertson for LSE, London, 1975. p.xix.
36 Herbert Butterfield cautioned against the inclusion of assumptions of progress in 
synthesis in his influential The Whig Interpretation of History, [1931] Penguin ed., London,
seldom admittedly) a part of the greater context which they attempt to explain.
This discussion now turns to some specific theoretical approaches to European integration.
These are functionalism, neofunctionalism, intergovemmentalism and federalism.37 Paul
Taylor has explained functionalism thus:
The major principles of functionalism are that man can be weaned away from his 
loyalty to the nation state by the experience of fruitful international co-operation... 
From small beginnings, in Professor Mitrany’s view, the functional approach could 
eventually enmesh national governments in a dense network of inter-locking co­
operative ventures.38
The concept of functionalism was largely developed by David Mitrany and was distinct from 
but influenced by, economic liberalism.39 Haas finds important similarities between Smith, 
Bentham, Mill and the functionalists who "..share the basic preference of classical Liberals 
for "society". Mitrany like Mill regards the state and government as something suspect, and 
elevates society to the place of honor in the hierarchy of human institutions."40
Liberal internationalists felt that free trade would promote peace between peoples. This 
doctrine still has much momentum, having fed into modem perceptions of free trade. Mitrany 
was aware of the inheritance of liberalism. But he did not shy from criticising its lack of 
potential to create permanent structures: "Whatever the reasons, the period of free trade and 
cultural internationalism passed without coagulating into some common international system, 
leaving the twentieth century to face that imperative task.""'1 Mitrany regarded his designs
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37 The last of these is not strictly a ‘theory’ as discussed later in this section.
38 Taylor, Paul ‘Introduction’ to David Mitrany The Functional Theory of Politics, 
Robertson for LSE, London, 1975. p.x.
39 Lindberg and Scheinberg, writing in 1970, state that "Free trade was, of course, the 
method of the classical economic liberals of the nineteenth century. Economic integration, 
on the other hand, was based on the creation among the participating states of a single 
market..." Lindberg, Leon N. and Stuart A. Scheingold Europe's Would-Be Polity, Prentice 
Hall, New Jersey, 1970. p.8.
40 Haas, Ernst B. Beyond the Nation-State: functionalism and international organization, 
Stanford University Press, 1964. p.32.
\4itrany, David The Functional Theory of Politics, Robertson for LSE, London, 1975.
p.244.
for structures to support peace, as being similar to those of the liberal internationalists, but
repeatedly stressed the concrete utility of his idea:
In every case action has been guided by need not by ideological drift, and in every 
case was organised to fit the particular need. ‘Form follows function’ has been the 
natural tenet in all that progress.42
Functionalism implies an almost ‘natural’ progression of integration, emphasising economic
forces and the ways in which they require management by governments and international
organisations. Neofunctionalism places greater emphasis on political decision-making in a
process of integration. Ernst Haas sought a greater understanding of the ‘how?’ question in
structured international cooperation, and was largely responsible for developing
neofunctionalism. In Lindberg & Scheingold’s definition:
Neofunctionalism differs from traditional functionalism in that it establishes some 
prerequisites to effective problem-solving which involve a partial but direct threat to 
the autonomy of the nation-state. Specifically, it is argued that one must begin with 
a real delegation of decision-making authority to a supranational agency. In addition, 
it envisages a cumulative and expansive process whereby the supranational agency 
slowly extends its authority so as to progressively undermine the independence of the 
nation-state.43
Sub-state and other actors were also perceived to contribute to such a dynamic. The concept 
of neofunctionalism has frequently been used to explain the evolution of the European 
Community.44 Haas, the originator of neofunctionalism, stressed the consciously managed 
elements of sovereignty surrender: "My application of Functionalism thus discards any belief 
in the immanence of progress as flowing from a natural harmony of economic interests, and 
minimizes the possibility of relying on man’s free will to change the sluggish law of group- 
based interest perception."45 The concept of ‘spillover’ was central to Haas’s explanation. 
Lindberg has defined this as "a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal,
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42 ibid. p.249
43 Lindberg, Leon N. and Stuart A. Scheingold Europe’s Would-be Polity, Prentice Hall, 
New Jersey, 1970. p.7.
44 RJ. Harrison writes: "The neo-functionalist conception of international organization 
finds direct expression in the European Community." ‘Neo-functionalism’ in Groom, AJ.R. 
and P. Taylor Frameworks for International Co-operation, Pinter, London, 1990. p.139.
45 Haas, Ernst B. Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford, 2nd ed., 1968, p.35. (emphasis 
added.)
creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, 
which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action and so forth."46
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A problem however, arises with differing visions of progress. Haas admits the shortcomings 
of his early framework in its inability to explain the actions and indeed the very existence of 
a phenomenon such as de Gaulle - who had a very different idea of progress from that offered 
by the European Commission. Taylor, Mitrany’s principal interpreter, criticised neofunctional 
theory as potentially leading to a European superstate. Such would "simply recreate, on a 
larger scale, all the traditional problems of international society."47 The exclusionary nature 
of focusing entirely on integration processes, common to both functionalism and 
neofunctionalism • underestimated other forces (including external actors and internal sub­
states) which helped determine the evolution of the EC.48
Federalism has as many emotive connotations as the idea of free trade. In Etzioni’s 
definition: "Federalism is largely concerned with the conditions under which diverse social 
units find their place in one political community".49 In the initial stages of the Community, 
federalism became quickly overshadowed, in Haas’ view, by functional motivations:
..the decision to follow the gospel of Jean Monnet rather than that of the federalists -
46 Lindberg, Leon N. The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, Stanford, 
2nd ed., 1968. p.10. Martin Holland has cast doubt on the concept of spillover: "The initial 
expectations associated with the Community institutions were largely unfulfilled and spillover 
and progressive integration did not seem to be occurring; rather, the persistence of national 
self-interest indicated that the Community was closer to an intergovernmental grouping than 
any putative federation." European Community Integration, Pinter, London, 1993. p.17.
47 Taylor, Paul ‘Introduction’ to David Mitrany The Functional Theory of Politics, 
Robertson for LSE, London, 1975. p.xiv. See also Taylor’s article ‘Functionalism: the 
approach of David Mitrany’ in Groom, AJ.R. and P.Taylor, Frameworks for International 
Co-operation. Pinter, London, 1990.
48 Baldwin and Lyons of Columbia University have recently explored the extent to which 
‘Euro-euphoria’ might become self-fulfilling. Although eschewing any policy conclusions, 
the authors write: "..the shift from Euro-pessimism to Euro-euphoria might in and of itself 
help ameliorate the European unemployment problem." Baldwin, Richard and Richard Lyons 
‘External Economies and European Integration: the potential for self-fulfilling expectations’ 
Discussion Paper No.471, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 1990. p.iii.
49 Etzioni, Amitai Political Unification, Krieger, Huntington, 2nd ed., 1974. p.xi.
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which was "political" in a pure sense - rested on a political commitment to realize 
peace and welfare by way of European unification. The statesmen who wrote the 
treaties of the European Communities and who guided them through their national 
parliaments were committed to the gradual, the indirect, the functional path toward 
political unity.50
Federalism is not so much a tool of scholarly analysis as an idea, whose application was (and 
still is) meant to achieve concrete results for Europe’s future.
In the early and mid-1990s, intergovemmentalism reemerged with strong explanatory 
potential.51 Intergovemmentalism in scholarship on the European Community, stresses inter­
state diplomacy within the context of the Community.52 Keohane and Hoffmann emphasise 
that "Without the original Franco-German accord, neither the European Coal and Steel 
Community nor the Common Market would have ever existed."53 Recent scholarship across 
disciplines, has stressed the powerful role of states in the European Community. Inter- 
governmentalism in EC studies is not distant from the realist and neo-realist traditions of 
international relations theory. Kenneth Waltz depicted "international politics as a competitive 
realm", stressing the importance of states in a mostly unchanging structure, which tended 
towards balance rather than the maximisation of power.54 Waltz’s neo-realism has been
50 Haas, Ernst B. The Uniting of Europe, 2nd ed., Stanford, 1968.p.xx. For a full 
discussion of Monnet’s ‘federal credentials’ see Holland, M. European Community 
Integration, Pinter, London, 1993. p.13.
51 Particularly in the work of Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 
Routledge, London, 1992 and Susan Strange ‘The Power Gap: member states and the world 
economy’ in Brouwer, Frank et al. (eds.) Economic Policy Making and the European Union, 
Federal Trust, London, 1994.
52 A writer in The Economist has described intergrovemmentalism as "..the practice of 
leaving tricky decisions for agreement among individual member governments..." 22 October 
1994, p.16. Williams notes that "The political organization of the EC is unique although, in 
essence, it is a form of intergovemmentalism." Williams, Allan M. The European Community: 
the contradictions o f integration, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991. p .ll.
53 Keohane, Robert O. and Stanley Hoffmann ‘Institutional Change in Europe in the 
1980s’ in Keohane, Robert O. and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.) The New European Community, 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1991. p.17.
54 Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics, Random House, New York, 1979. 
p.126.
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criticised for being ahistorical55 and for tending towards the status quo.56 Waltz introduces 
economic features to his earlier formulation of realism - but essentially does not depart from 
an inter-state scheme. Both international political economy, and neo-geopolitics (writings 
influenced by Fernand Braudel) go outside of international relations theoretical frameworks 
to examine dynamic systemic change. For international political economy, such dynamics 
cannot be solely explained by inter-state theorising; for the Braudelian tradition, world- 
economies and the economy of the world have a geo-historical dynamic which is distinct from 
inter-state relations. Economic phenomena therefore sit uncomfortably with purely ‘political’ 
explanations. The distinction between political integration and economic integration - and the 
uneven geopolitical ‘fit’ between these - is profoundly important.
Alan Milward and Andrew Moravcsik, an economic historian and a political scientist, have 
come to similar conclusions about the nature of the European Community as revealed by a 
closer examination of state actions and bargains.57 Milward, in answering the canon of 
integration theory, creates a ‘theoretical antithesis’ rather than a traditional history. Although 
accurate in many of his specific conclusions, Milward underestimates important changes over 
time in the actions of states, which are different from the static model he proposes. This ties 
him to the theory that the EC has ‘rescued the nation state’. Further, Milward’s conclusion 
does not recognise that the EC system has, like markets, the power to influence the course 
of action of states themselves. Moravcsik strongly emphasises the role of states in the
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55 Little, Richard ‘International relations and large-scale historical change’ in Groom, 
A.J.R. and Margot Light Contemporary International Relations: a guide to theory, Pinter, 
London, 1994. pp.17-18.
56 Susan Strange writes that neo-realism "tends to exclude hidden agendas and to leave 
unheard or unheeded complaints, whether they come from the underprivileged, the 
disenfranchised or the unborn, about the way the system works." ‘Cave! Hie Dragones: A 
critique of regime analysis’ in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1983; quoted in George, Jim Discourses of Global Politics: A critical 
(re)introduction to international relations, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1994. p.134.
57 Milward, Alan S. The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Routledge, London, 1992. 
Moravcsik, Andrew ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: a liberal 
intergovemmentalist approach’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.31, No.4, December
1993.
evolution of the Single European Act38 positing that "..the EC can be analysed as a 
successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through 
negotiated policy co-ordination... An understanding of the preferences and power of its 
Member States is a logical starting point for analysis."39
This thesis argues that European integration theory, has overemphasised endogenous factors 
in the evolution of the European Communities. The relationship between the European 
Community and Japan is closely shadowed by issues of regional integration and the 
globalisation of business. The organisation of the empirical chapters below reflects an attempt 
to analyse the evolution of the EC system through its relations with one important externality. 
The results of this analysis are then applied to a reconsideration of European integration 
theory and the evolution of the European Community itself.
1.5 G lobalisation theory
Although the term ‘globalisation’ frequently refers to a general phenomenon of closer global 
interconnectedness,60 this discussion predominantly treats the most important agent of 
globalisation - firm commercial activity. Braudel’s treatment of historical ‘global’ concepts 
has been treated above. This section treats two further systemic-level approaches with a view 
to evaluating the impact of global political economic forces on the European Community.
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38 Moravcsik, Andrew ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and 
conventional statecraft in the European Community,’ International Organization, 45, 1, 
Winter 1991.
59 Moravcsik, Andrew ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: a liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach,’ Journal o f Common Market Studies, Volume 31, No.4, 
December 1993. p.474.
60 Despite Joan Spero’s definition that "Interdependence is a relatively symmetrical 
relationship; dependence is an asymmetrical relationship" - the term ‘interdependence’ has 
become more value-laden than the neutral ‘interconnectedness’ used here. See Spero, Joan 
Edleman The Politics o f International Economic Relations, George Allen & Unwin, London, 
1977. p.14.
The first of these consists of literature on the development of big business61 and the second 
discusses recent attempts to treat systematically, the concept of globalisation and its systemic 
effects.
One specific area in which the logic of global reach has been discussed for some time has 
been the literature on the evolution of large business organisations. Business and 
organizational historians and economic historians have long analysed the potential for, and 
nature of, trans-territorial activities. Such literature differs from the more recent 
‘globalisation’ literature in that it seldom adopted a systemic perspective, only occasionally 
referring to the structural impact of business activities - one of the principal concerns of the 
more recent ‘globalisation’ approach.
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Alfred D. Chandler Jr. has written extensively on the organisational origins, growth and
structure of big business.
These industries [late 19th century metals, machinery, chemicals &c.] quickly became 
dominated by a small number of large firms that almost immediately moved abroad 
to compete vigorously in international markets. National governments played little 
role in the creation of these global enterprises beyond setting protective tariffs for their 
domestic markets and encouraging (in the United States) or discouraging (in European 
countries) competition between firms.62
The emphasis in this literature is largely endogenous to the firm - even as the firm becomes 
trans-national. Authors such as Hertner and Jones have stressed that "MNEs have been 
around a long time".63 This is a useful corrective to the view that globalisation is entirely
61 ‘Big Business’ - an American usage - has been current for some time. It is arguably 
more accurate than ‘the firm’ or ‘the company’. Increasingly, ‘the firm’ needs to imply not 
only structure and tangible assets - but firm networks, legal bargains, VERAs, alliances &c. 
‘Big Business’ (or ‘Global Business’) embraces such phenomena and activities by definition.
62 Chandler, Alfred D. Jr. ‘Big Business and the Global Coordination of Functional 
Activities’ pre-conference paper, European University Institute, Fiesole, 1992. Published in 
Proceedings of the Eleventh International Economic History Congress, Università Bocconi, 
Milan, 1994. pp.161-2.
63 Hertner, Peter and Geoffrey Jones ‘Multinationals: theory and history’ in Hertner and 
Jones (eds.) Multinationals: theory and history, Gower, Aldershot, 1986. p .l. Elsewhere, John 
H. Dunning writes: "Studies published in the last twenty or so years suggest that earlier 
scholars considerably underestimated the role of the MNE as an entrepreneur and as a transfer
new.64 The expansion of business which Chandler analyses was given a plausible theoretical 
explanation in the 1930s by Ronald Coase who stressed the importance of transaction 
costs.65 Coase treated reasons for transactions being made internal to the firm, rather than 
being conducted through the broader market. His concept of internalization was later applied 
to analysis of the trans-national activities of firms.66 This concept may be relevant not only 
to the development of firms. The analysis below will examine the extent to which 
internalisation might be applied to international relations. More specifically, the concept will 
be applied to EC-Japan affairs: a relationship which is essentially political economic - in 
which firms are the most important manifestation of the relationship on one side.
The proliferation of big business networks is the most tangible manifestation of global reach 
in the late 20th century, and it is perhaps unsurprising that the literature on the history and 
organizational development of firms is rich in insights which help introduce the more recently 
formulated concept of globalisation. Aside from the activities of firms, factors which have 
spurred an interest in globalisation include: technological and media advances, nuclear 
capability, global environmental problems and issues of ‘new world order’. Concepts of 
globalisation pertain more to analysis of the system than Chandler’s ‘Big Business’ or 
Braudel’s ‘world-economy’.
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of intangible assets in the forty years prior to the First World War." ‘Changes in the level and 
structure of international production: the last one hundred years’ in Wilkins, M. (ed.) The 
Growth of Multinationals, Elgar, Aldershot, 1991. p.91.
64 Susan Strange stresses that "..it is not international business which is new. It is the 
extent of international business." ‘Wake up, Krasner! The world has changed’ Review of 
International Political Economy 1:2 Summer 1994, p.210. Such is the proliferation of the 
discussion of A/NEs, that the term ‘uni-national firms’ has now appeared. See Cox, Howard 
et al (eds.) The growth of global business, Routledge, London, 1993.
65 Coase, Ronald H. ‘The Nature of the Firm’ Economica, Vol.4, London, 1937. pp.386- 
405.
66 Coase outlined the evolution of the 1937 article in his Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture 
of December 1991, published as ‘The Institutional Structure of Production’, Chapter 1 of 
Coase, R.H. Essays on Economics and Economists, University of Chicago Press, 1994. p.8. 
Alan Rugman gives an overview of the evolution and application of the concept of 
internalization in ‘Internalization as a General Theory of Foreign Direct Investment: a re­
appraisal of the literature’ in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv./Review o f World Economics. 116, 
1980, No.2. pp.365-379.
For the most part, theories of globalisation are still at an early stage of evolution.67 Both
Oman and Ruggie stress the microeconomic driving forces of globalisation. Oman writes:
From a policy perspective, globalisation is more usefully understood - notwithstanding 
the considerable impact of financial globalisation at the macroeconomic level - as a 
microeconomic phenomenon, one that is driven by the strategies and behaviour of 
firms.68
Ruggie states that "Globalization today is assuming various microeconomic forms of 
increasingly extensive, diverse, and integrated institutional webs forged within markets and 
among firms across the globe."69 Michael Biddiss states that interdependence has become 
"markedly more dense in texture, more continuous in time and more widespread in 
geographical ambit."70 Increased globalisation has also been recognised by government 
officials. Robert Reich for example, has argued that ownership of production (whether 
domestic or foreign) is secondary to the issue of a well-trained, flexible work-force, which 
makes the greater contribution to productivity.71 One of the principal manifestations of this 
globalisation is the increase in foreign direct investment.72 Whilst writers such as DeAnne
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67 Apart from the important contributions of Chandler, Braudel, Wallerstein and many 
historians; the earliest usage with a similar sense to recent ‘globalisation’ is McLuhan’s 
concept of ‘global village’.
68 Oman, Charles Globalisation and Régionalisation: the challenge for developing 
countries, OECD, Paris, 1994. p.13.
69 Ruggie, John Gerard, ‘At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: international liberalization 
and domestic stability in the new world economy’. Jean Monnet Lecture Paper, European 
University Institute, Fiesole, 1995. p.28.
70 Biddiss, Michael ‘Global interdependence and the study of modern world history’ in 
Parry, Geraint (ed.) Politics in an Interdependent World: essays presented to Ghita lonescu, 
Elgar, Aldershot, 1994.
71 Reich, Robert B. ‘Who is Us?’ Harvard Business Review, January-February 1990, 
pp.53-64. Mark Mason and Dennis Encamation (eds.) have also treated this issue in ‘Does 
Ownership matter?: Japanese multinationals in Europe. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994.
72 Erich Gundlach and Peter Nunnenkamp write that "In 1982-92, worldwide FDI flows 
grew 3.3 times faster than international trade flows." ‘The European Union in the Era of 
Globalisation; competitive challenges, structural unemployment, and policy responses.’ Kiel 
Institute of World Economics, Working Paper No.650, 1994. p.4. See also, U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, Multinationals and the U.S. Technology Base, OTA-ITE- 
162, Washington, DC, 1994. p.iii.
Julius have examined the consequences of massively increased FDI for states, this research 
project examines the implications for the European Community.73
Literature on globalisation in the 1990s has broadened from that on big business, both to 
examine the systemic consequences of global firm activity and the globalisation of the system 
itself. This recent literature on globalisation includes authors who are cautiously exploring 
greater global interconnectedness; those who exaggerate the impact of globalisation; and also 
some dissenting voices. Roland Robertson calls for a tighter definition of the term and more 
caution with regard to ‘global complexity’.74
The extent of ‘globalisation’ of both firms and the world economy has been debated. Sir 
Michael Butler, until 1985 the UK representative to the EC, has argued that the strategy of 
firms is answerable only to their headquarters and has cautioned against the view that firms 
lose their national identities when producing abroad.75 David Gordon seriously questions 
the extent to which globalisation is actually occurring in the world economy76; while 
Robertson’s ‘uncertainty phase’77 echoes Galbraith.78
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73 Julius, DeAnne Global Companies and Public Policy, Pinter for RIIA, London, 1990. 
Especially Chapter 5.
74 He writes: "While there is rapidly growing interest in the issue of globalization, much 
of it is expressed very diffusely. It has become a widely used term in a number of 
theoretical, empirical and applied areas of intellectual inquiry, including the various ‘policy 
sciences,’ such as business studies and strategic studies. There is also a danger that 
‘globalization’ will become an intellectual ‘play zone,’ a site for the expression of residual 
social-theoretical interests, interpretive indulgence, or the display of world-ideological 
preferences.” Robertson, Roland Globalization: social theory and global culture, Sage, 
London, 1992. p.49.
75 Butler, Sir Michael, Financial Times, 5 February 1986. p.21.
76 Gordon, David ‘New Edifice or Crumbling Foundation’, New Left Review 168, 
March/April, 1988.
77 Robertson, Roland Globalization: social theory and global culture, Sage, London, 1992. 
p.59.
78 Galbraith, John Kenneth The Age o f Uncertainty, Deutsch for BBC, London, 1977.
In light of these critiques, a definition of what the usage ‘globalisation’ does, and does not 
entail, is necessary. Globalisation is not a normative concept. It does not imply that greater 
levels of interconnectedness necessarily lead to greater cooperation or ‘world order’. 
Secondly, even if MNEs retain national identities, as argued by Butler, this does not diminish 
the impact of their transnational activities upon the system. Although the concept may imply 
a more widespread form of capitalism it does not imply a more efficient or harmonious form 
of capitalism. ‘Globalisation’ is best understood in terms of the increased volume of 
transactions over territories since the mid-1970s, and the systemic consequences thereof.
The relationship between globalisation and regional political integration is at the theoretical 
nexus of this thesis. Some recent literature has begun to examine the evolution of the EC in 
a systemic context. John Grahl and Paul Teague were among the first to stress the 
problematic nature of an EC economic identity.79 Erich Gundlach and Peter Nunnenkamp 
write that "..impaired competitiveness of EU industries is at the heart of labour market 
problems... Economic policy in the Community has been focused on regional integration, and 
discouraged European companies to go global and thereby to improve their 
competitiveness"80 and Zhang Yunling has concluded that: "The ‘internal benefit’ doctrine 
is not necessarily a safeguard for the relations of EC member states with the rest of the 
world".81 These writers have explored the evolution of the EC in its broader environment, 
leaving some indicators as to the possible implications of globalisation for regional political 
integration. This thesis, through an empirical analysis of one important externality, attempts 
to assess these views and evaluates the evolution of the Community in its global context.
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79 The authors write: "..a European industrial identity cannot be brought about as a well- 
defined system of enterprises with close and continuing links to the territory of the EC." 
Grahl, John and Paul Teague 1992 - The Big Market, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1990. 
p.142.
80 Gundlach, Erich and Peter Nunnenkamp ‘The European Union in the Era of 
Globalisation; competitive challenges, structural unemployment, and policy responses. Kiel 
Institute of World Economics, Working Paper, No.650, 1994. p.l.
81 Yunling, Zhang ‘European Economic Integration and East and South-East Asian 
Economy’, European University Institute, W orking Paper EPU no.92/15, Fiesole, 1992. p.16.
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C o n c lu sio n
The relationship between firm globalisation and political economic integration is a central 
theme in EC-Japan affairs. There are a number of ways in which the distinct phenomena of 
regional political integration and global economic integration may be theoretically 
conceptualised. Firm globalisation may be understood as de facto, trans-territorial, organic82 
or ‘low political’.83 Political economic integration can be understood as de jure, territorial, 
inorganic or ‘high political’. A further dichotomy - between markets and institutions - is 
useful. Alessandra Casella defines "a market as a set of traders who exchange private goods" 
and an institution "as a "club" whose members decide together, finance, and enjoy an 
excludable public good."84 Casella then distinguishes issues that do not require coordination 
as ‘economic’ from those which require collective decision-making as ‘political’. Despite its 
simplicity, the distinction is useful. The concept of ‘club’ draws attention to what is referred 
to below as the implicit sanction of non-membership which European integration implies. 
This typology is similar to the 19th century liberal distinction between the economic and 
political realms. However the specific concept of ‘club’ brings into sharper focus the issue 
of access. The club/market distinction can be utilised to focus on the intended inclusionary 
benefits, and implicit exclusionary ‘competitiveness’ intent, of political integration.
In the analysis which follows, this issue is treated with regard to Commission attempts to 
regulate Japanese firm entry to the European market. The club/market distinction becomes 
literally more meaningful with consideration of the Single Market Programme - a strategy 
whereby the Commission sought to raise the international political economic stature of the
82 Shinji Hasegawa for example states that "Business activities in general consist of an 
organic chain composed of various operation functions such as R&D, manufacturing and 
sales. ‘The multinationalisation of Japanese firms and the European market’ in The Japanese 
Presence in Europe, Euro-Japan Economic Research Centre, Catholic University of Louvain,
1991. p.39. Emphasis added. The term is also used by Wallerstein.
83 The terms ‘low politics’ and ‘high politics’ and their modified usefulness, are discussed 
in Ch.II.
84 Alessandra Casella ‘On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of 
Regions with Unequal Productivity’ in The American Economic Review, Vol.82, No.2, May
1992. p.115. The concept of club« is accredited to James M. Buchanan.
33
Community through a market programme.
Motivations for attempting to integrate frequently differ between states and firms. Robson and 
Wooton, and Thomsen and Nicolaides have identified the potential de facto region-building 
capacity of firms.85 However, whilst firms may assist in economically integrating an area; 
they can go further and faster with such integration, posing dilemmas for the de jure defined 
‘club’. Such a dynamic underlines a fundamental change in the spatiality of the political 
influence of firms since the Treaty of Rome. The (fixed) territoriality of the bloc and the 
(flexible) spatiality of the firm become crucial as the membership/non-membership sanction 
is challenged as an instrument of bloc power.
An analysis of EC-Japan relations touches upon many theoretical questions. The empirical 
results of this study may have implications for theories not used here; and likewise, diverse 
theoretical literature may shed additional light on the results obtained. Examples of such 
would include the voluminous literature on U.S.-Japan relations, policy studies and business 
organization. This thesis identifies strong similarities between the research approaches of 
international political economy (IPE) and the revitalised co-discipline of geopolitics (neo­
geopolitics). The methodological framework derived from these two approaches is reflected 
in the structure of the analysis which follows. Both IPE and neo-geopolitics probe aspects 
of dynamic change in the global system which are particularly appropriate for an analysis of 
EC-Japan affairs. Specific theories which provide insights into EC-Japan relations are 
European integration theory and globalisation theory. Integration theory is supplemented with 
theory on sub-state regions and literature on the state, while the insights of globalisation are 
reinforced by the IPE emphasis on the role of firms in the global political economic system.
85 Robson and Wooton write: "TNEs would already, in advance of formal regional 
integration, have brought about a substantial measure of regional or global cross-border 
integration through their capacity to surmount publicly imposed market distortions, in this 
case tariff barriers.” Robson, Peter and Ian Wooton, The Transnational Enterprise and 
Regional Economic Integration,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.31, No.l, March
1993. p.74. See also, Thomsen, Stephen and Stephen Woolcock Direct Investment and 
European Integration, Pinter for RIIA, London, 1993. p.6.

CHAPTER II EC-JAPAN RELATIONS: CONTEXT, THEMES AND
UNITS OF ANALYSIS
Introduction
In the previous chapter, common research concerns between the co-disciplines of international 
political economy and neo-geopolitics were identified, and theories of European integration 
and globalisation were discussed. This chapter develops a periodisation of Euro-Japan 
relations, noting important distinctions between the most recent period and those preceding. 
Following an overview of the historical background, the major themes of recent EC-Japan 
relations are identified. The existing treatment of EC-Japan relations is assessed, and some 
lacunae in both the approaches and thematic content are noted. A discussion of the units of 
analysis in the EC-Japan relationship is followed by an outline of the empirical research 
strategy.
\\2 P er io d isa tio n  and c o n te x t
The periodisation of Euro-Japanese and EC-Japan affairs varies over different facets of 
relations. The construction of a general periodisation depends on the relative significance of 
these various facets. Periodisation is therefore closely associated with priority.
That Europe and Japan have a qualitative relationship in the recent past, is largely due to 
developments within Japan itself. Endogenous developments such as the capacity of Japanese 
firms to surmount geographical distance through trade and FDI competitiveness, have been 
central to the evolution of Japan’s external relations - the relationship with Europe not being 
an exception. This geographical element is stressed, since the geopolitical dynamic of the 
relationship experienced a radical transformation with the surge in Japanese-EC direct 
investment in the mid-1980s.
In the period from first contacts in 1543, European missionary and trading interests in Japan
can be said to have been active. The era of closure (1639-1853) can be said to have been 
‘neutral’ - only Dutch and Chinese traders, scientists and medical doctors being permitted 
significant dealings with Japan. Since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the role of Japan in 
Euro-Japanese relations has been broadly active and that of Europe largely reactive - with the 
possible exception of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The era commencing with the Pacific War 
witnessed the substantive decline of European power in Japanese and latterly, Asian affairs. 
The Euro-Japanese agenda from 1945 until the late 1960s was once again influenced by 
geographical distance, and importantiy by the U.S.-Japan relationship.
Euro-Japanese relations were revolutionised by Japan’s extraordinary post-war economic 
recovery and trading success, and subsequently by her enhanced investment capacity. The 
change in unit of analysis which this implies must immediately be noted. Despite the strong 
role of government, bureaucracy, political party and exogenous (largely U.S.) forces in 
Japan’s economic transformation; economic developments were facilitated by Japanese firms. 
It is the successful internal development, and external manifestation of Japanese business 
which transformed her relationship with western Europe from one of thin contact to a 
relationship characterised by high-volume trade and investment activity.
The early 1960s saw Japanese alarm at the possibility of being excluded from EEC markets 
and the EC Commission commencing its long quest for a common external commercial 
policy. During the 1960s, Japan’s rapid economic growth was increasingly noted in western 
Europe, with frequent comparisons being made to that country’s craft and textile trade in the 
inter-war period. In the late 1960s, Japan’s re-emerging economic prowess was being noted, 
but the issue of ‘competitiveness’ was largely absent. It was unclear at this time, how far 
Japanese industry would advance to high value-added sectors. Such speculations however, 
were to be quickly and dramatically resolved in the following decades. By the end of the 
1960s Japan had surpassed every European country in terms of GNP. The oil crisis brought 
even greater pressure on Japan to export and in the mid-1970s, her trade imbalance became 
a political issue in Europe; aiding the EC Commission’s campaign for a broadened external 
commercial policy mandate from the Council.
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The period C.1973-C.1985, in EEC/EC-Japan affairs can be termed the ‘era of trade’. This
is not to imply that trade ceased to be important after 1985 (in fact the record EC trade 
deficits with Japan were recorded after this date). Rather, this arbitrary term emphasises the 
virtual exclusivity of trade during a period when imported goods from Japan became highly 
visible within the Community. In geopolitical terms, the extemality/intemality of the 
relationship can be said to have been largely intact Although in retrospect it can now be 
seen to have been in transition from a largely external manifestation (imports) to a more 
complex, external plus internal form of production (imports plus foreign direct investment).
The mid-1980s increase in Japanese direct investment in the EC was not only significant in 
statistical terms. The geopolitical structure of the relationship was transformed, the actors 
realigned, and much of the EC-Japan agenda ‘internalised’ within the EC itself. It is this 
period; the ‘era of investment and trade’ which is the subject of the present research project.
As established above, a general periodisation is closely associated with priorities accorded to 
phenomena whose periodisation may overlap. For example, trade has been an important 
continuous feature of EC-Japan affairs since the late 1960s. The EC-Japan agenda also 
incorporates non-commercial matters - for example cooperation on aid policies or discussion 
of UN reform. The situation is complicated by the continuance of bi-lateral relations between 
EC member states, some of which have had diplomatic missions in Japan for a century. 
However, the relationship underwent a significant qualitative and quantitative change in the 
mid-1980s. Levels of exchange (in both human and commercial terms) were raised to an 
historic high, bringing unprecedented Japanese involvement in European political economic 
affairs. The new phase was distinct from the previous ‘era of trade’.
The issue then arises as to when such a period closes. Events may expose the relative 
arbitrariness of this exercise. However, the decline of new stocks of Japanese FDI in the 
early 1990s [Chart 1 over] and the continued importance of ‘direct’ trade in the relationship, 
would appear to indicate that the factor of investment in the relationship had stabilised by 
1992/93.1 New questions arise in the post-1993 phase - particularly those relating to the
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1 Hideki Yamawaki has treated this aspect in ‘Exit of Japanese multinationals in U.S. and 
European manufacturing industries’ paper at Stratégies des firmes multinationales et impacts 

































































relationship between FDI and trade, and the extent to which FD1 might or might not expand 
at 1980s levels. Caution must be exercised in interpreting the post-1991 decline in new 
stocks of Japanese-EC investment as a permanent trend. However, it must be noted that most 
major Japanese firms are now present within the Community. Low growth-rates in both 
Japan and the EC in the early 1990s contribute to the ‘plateau’ in investment, and there is 
evidence that western Europe is less important in the global strategic interests of Japanese 
firms than was the case in the 1980s and early 1990s. This trend is reflected in the flow of 
Japanese direct investment to Asia and the mixed returns on investments in western Europe.
There are other reasons for the 1985-93 periodisation. The SEA was signed in December 
19852 and the new Delors Commission signaled an activist agenda. The period (1985-93) 
witnessed considerable constitutional movement and slow economic growth within the EC; 
Japan experienced political continuity until the fail of the LDP (1993) and strong economic 
growth until 1992.
113 T h e m e s  in  EC-J apan  r e la tio n s , 1985-93
Major themes in EC-Japan relations, 1985-93 include: an active/reactive dynamic; an 
ambiguity and lack of consensus regarding the extent to which both Japan’s Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry and the EC Commission could influence (their own and each 
other’s) firm-generated phenomena; the geopolitical importance of firms; the dejure evolution 
of the EC itself; and the influence, both direct and indirect, of the U.S.-Japan relationship on 
EC-Japan affairs. The relationship presents an opportunity to evaluate the impact of 
globalisation on regional political integration.
The broad historical ‘active/reactive’ concepts introduced above are here recalled. Although 
systemic conditions may influence the decision to invest abroad, FDI is a firm-originating 
phenomenon, and as such is active. Both FDI and trade matters within the EC-Japan 
relationship are active on the Japanese side, with the EC being active on the issue of market
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2 The Act was ratified in all member states by mid-1987.
access.3 This cycle of action and reaction was based upon an asymmetry in the dynamics 
of political economic power. Throughout the period the EC ran a ‘structural’ trade deficit 
with Japan, and Japanese investment in the 12 member states far outweighed EC investment 
in Japan [CHART 2 over] If the years 1985-93 constitute an integral period; the relatively 
sudden appearance of the phenomenon of FDI in EC-Japan affairs, can be treated as an event 
to which the EC -not only diplomatically, but in its constitutional entirety - responded.
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EEC/EC-Japan relations have been dominated by commercial matters since the Treaty of 
Rome. Economic diplomacy between the EC and Japan has been elevated to a point where 
it is an integral part of the salient political agenda. Chapter I above draws on the perspective 
of IPE scholars who argue convincingly that commercial and economic relations are indeed 
central to ‘salient’ international relations. The distinction between ‘high politics’ and Mow 
politics’4 may thus appear to be redundant. However, this distinction can still be useful - not 
to exclude economic dynamics from ‘the political’5 - but rather to identify and locate political 
power which may be outside state spheres of control. The distinction can be applied to draw 
attention to the strategies which states use to harness - or attempt to harness - such power.
3 There is preliminary evidence that such a cycle may be forming in EC-Asian relations 
post-1993. In September of 1994, the EC Commission announced the imposition of anti­
dumping duties on television sets imported from China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand. International Herald Tribune, 1 October 1994, p .ll.
4 Roger Morgan writes that "It is tempting, and to a certain degree useful, to distinguish 
between the concepts of "foreign policy" and "external relations" by arguing that "foreign 
policy,” as traditionally practiced by nation-states through their foreign offices and diplomatic 
agents, concerns such matters of "high policy" (or in Stanley Hoffmann’s term Grosspolitik) 
as prestige, political influence, national security, and the pursuit of diplomatic objectives, 
whereas "external relations" covers more mundane activities such as the regulation of 
international trade, migration across frontiers, and other issues which might not unfairly be 
characterized as "low politics." Morgan, Roger P. High Politics, Low Politics: toward a 
foreign policy for western Europe, The Washington Papers, Vol.l, No.l 1, Sage, Beverly Hills 
and London, 1973. p.8. Pierre Jacquet follows this paradigm, writing that EC-Japan relations 
"belong to the realm of ‘low politics’", ‘Japan and Europe in the 90’s: what scope for what 
economic cooperation?’, Von Heynitz, A. and H. Maull (eds.) ‘European-Japanese Relations: 
the next phase’, conference proceedings, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, 
November, 1989. p.64.
5 Morgan recognised the distinction as a methodological device: "..the attempt to separate 
economics and diplomacy, "low politics" and Grosspolitik, is clearly revealing itself as 

























In July 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu adopted a ‘politics-more-than-economy’6 approach at the 
EC-Japan summit in The Hague. Agence Europe reported that the Japanese side emphasised 
"the political significance of the declaration" and that the Community side insisted upon 
"tangible results being sought as soon as possible"? Such positions reflect that participants 
maneuver to delineate or associate, ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics as strategic priorities demand. 
The unresolved dilemma posed for public authorities by the trans-territorial activities of firms, 
is the silent reality behind these positions. The EC Commission has repeatedly requested 
action from the Japanese government regarding a trade deficit which has eluded ‘intervention’. 
Multi-lateral agreements such as the 1985 Plaza Accord, likewise did little to influence 
Japanese surpluses in trade and investment.
Japanese firms have played a central role in the evolution of EC-Japan affairs. This thesis 
is not primarily concerned with firm-state relations - rather it evaluates the extent to which 
trans-territorial bonds between (and within) firms, influence or overcome competitiveness- 
enhancement (integrationist) bonds between states. This tension is primarily manifest in the 
agent of FDI. The three central empirical chapters of this synthesis respectively treat 
Japanese FDI and EC sub-states; Japanese FDI and EC member states; and Japanese FDI and 
the EC institutional level. The activity of Japanese firms and the various responses to such 
activity are treated throughout, with a view to assessing the impact of such phenomena on the 
European Community itself in the period 1985-93.
Japanese firms, since the early 1970s have seen the gradual removal of constraints on 
outbound capital movements, to the point where such movements only need be registered with 
the Japanese Government. This trend was parallelled by the gradual softening of MITI 
influence during the 1970s and 1980s. The motives for Japanese investment are complex,
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6 The Japan Economic Review, 15 August 1991, p.l. This policy was seen as a reversal 
of "Japan’s past manner of carrying on its diplomacy on the basis and strength of Japanese 
economic cooperation or capacity".
7 Europe [Agence Europe], No. 5538, 19 July 1991, p.5 (original emphasis).
encompassing a combination of exogenous and endogenous factors.8 These include: reaction 
to/pre-emption of trade ‘protection’; internal competition9; surplus capital and the desire to 
become ‘commercial members’ of emergent blocs. Shortage of labour in Japan and 
technological change, are among the many factors which must be considered in evaluating 
investment strategies.
Recognition of firms as political actors has been pioneered by Susan Strange. Subsequent 
work by Gerd Junne has posed the question as to what the multiplicity of trans-national 
enterprises implies for the system. Junne argues that the proliferation of multinational 
enterprises makes it "less important what any individual company is doing."10 For Junne 
this shifts the effect of MNEs to "the structures that have come about as the result of their 
collective actions".11
Here a third dimension can be introduced. If the impact of individual firms is diluted by the 
proliferation of MNEs, then the extent to which firms of a common originating state may 
adopt similar strategies becomes important. Such a proposition is significant in the FDI 
relationship between Japan and the EC. If state interests can be reconstituted (with or without 
government guidance) through collective firm action, and if those firms seek (in the parlance 
of Coase) to ‘internalise’ transactions, then the possibility arises that firms might collectively 
internalise otherwise external political economic relations. This would be particularly 
applicable to relations in which the greater part of the agenda concerns the politics of
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8 Edith Penrose states that "A comprehensive theory of the growth of the firm must 
explain several qualitatively different kinds of growth and must take account not only of the 
sequence of changes created by a firm’s own activities but also of the effect of changes that 
are external to the firm and lie beyond its control." The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, 
Blackwell, Oxford [1959] 1980, p.4.
9 Ozawa has stressed that "Japan’s overseas investment has been an integral part of its 
industrial restructuring at home and, in fact, a crucial instrument or catalyst for industrial 
upgrading". ‘Japanese multinationals and 1992’ in Buergenmeier, B. and J.L. Mucchielli (eds.) 
Multinationals and Europe 1992. Routledge, London, 1991. p.137.
10 Junne, Gerd ‘Multinational Enterprises as Actors’ in Carlsnaes, Walter and Steve Smith 
European Foreign Policy, Sage, London, 1994. p.85.
11 ibid
economic affairs. This concept is distinct from neo-mercantilism, insofar as it claims that 
‘tandem’ firm action can be autonomously generated - and can coincide with the interests of 
the home state. In EC-Japan affairs, the international relations ‘frontier’ has been 
significantly replaced by an internal EC dynamic, reflected by increased roles for non-DGI 
(external trade) directorates in the relationship.12
The changing raison d ’être and structure of the EC itself is an important theme in EC-Japan 
affairs. Global economic competitiveness had become the central plank in the Community’s 
existence by the mid-1980s. The importance of EC ‘competitiveness enhancement’ priorities, 
when compared with the relative easing of MITI-firm relations in Japan, may be a reflection 
of the asymmetry in economic power between the EC and Japan. Such an imbalance is not 
so much an imbalance of numbers (although these are striking) - more precisely there has 
been an imbalance in the dynamic use of economic power - including technology, information 
and business strategy in the period since the early 1970s.
A further theme in EC-Japan affairs since the mid-1980s has been a closer exogenous probing 
of certain fundamental assumptions of integration which were not sharply posed in the first 
quarter century after the Treaty of Rome. Although the défi américain was a factor in the 
economic development of Europe, the 1980s volume of investment and the enhanced mobility 
of capital posed a new challenge to the assumption that adjacent territories can derive 
advantage from policy ‘economies of scale’. The institutional makeup of the Community is 
also substantively different in the period under review. Given the absence of the UK in the 
défi américain era, no meaningful structural evaluation of the EC can be drawn from 
comparisons with the 1985-93 period.
Increased global capital mobility in the 1980s highlighted the political economic philosophy 
differences between ‘Atlantic’ and ‘Continental’ states within the EC. Nowhere was this
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12 Saucier for example, has written that "Competition policy is probably going to be used 
to shape a new competition landscape in which extra-EC firms will not occupy dominant 
positions." Saucier, P. ‘New Conditions for competition between Japanese and European 
firms’ in Buergenmeier, B. and J.L. Mucchielli (eds.) Multinationals and Europe 1992, 
Routledge, London, 1991. p.132.
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more evident than in EC-Japan affairs.
Another theme which is manifest in EC-Japan affairs is the impact which FDI has had on the 
geopolitics of international relations. One of the consequences of this phenomenon is an 
alteration in the nature of membership and non-membership - from de jure territorial, to de 
facto trans-territorial. The ‘membership’ status of firms becomes crucial. During the ‘era of 
trade’ in EC-Japan relations (1973-1985), EC trade policy was the Commission’s most 
powerful function. In the subsequent period, the advent of high-volume FDI posed dilemmas 
for the use of trade instruments as competitiveness enhancers. Unsurprisingly, anti- 
circumvention emerged as one of the most important issues in EC-Japan relations in the 
period under review. The issue of the decline of the implicit sanction of non-membership 
arises since non-member states may be able to promote their agendas through the collective 
action of firms. Such a phenomenon would imply a loss of Community power in the 
international political economic system.
Several authors have adopted a cooperation/conflict paradigm in explaining EC-Japan affairs. 
Such an approach may remain valid with regard to diplomatic relations. However, during the 
1985-93 period, cooperation became driven by the relationship between Japanese firms and 
EC sub-states, and Japanese firms and liberal EC member-states. Cooperation was largely 
generated outside of the remit of the EC Commission and MITI. This cooperation is 
accompanied by tensions - with some ‘continental’ member states; with the EC Commission; 
or (infrequently) with local political authorities. Internalised ‘cooperative tension’ came to 
replace the cooperation/conflict paradigm.
A final and constant theme in EC-Japan relations is the relationship between the U.S. and 
Japan. The United States is Japan’s largest trading partner and its most important ally. 
Significantly, there has been a prominent, controversial and evolving security relationship 
between the U.S. and Japan. Despite tensions between the two, the U.S.-Japan relationship 
remains fundamentally strong. The economic destinies of both nations are increasingly 
interlinked by foreign direct investment and trade. This reality and Europe’s established 
Atlantic link, imply that the role of the US is significant in EC-Japan affairs. Brussels, Tokyo 
and Washington D.C. are constantly wary of being outmaneuvered by favorable commercial
terms negotiated or coerced between any other two. The EC Commission has been vigilant 
to the point of paranoia about any bi-lateral U.S.-Japan accords, (such as the 1986 US-Japan 
semiconductor agreement13 or the 1992 auto-component understanding). This has been 
accompanied by scepticism that Japanese market opening initiatives are merely part of US- 
Japan ‘managed trade’ initiatives for the facilitation of American goods. A 1989 EC 
Commission memorandum to the UK House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities stated that "Japan has continued to be less than even-handed in deals which de 
jure apply erga omnes, but de facto, privilege the United States".14 This assessment 
remained current throughout the period.
This thesis does not attempt to compare U.S.-Japan with EC-Japan relations. Such 
comparisons can be freely drawn by the reader, and unfortunately, the all too simple recourse 
to ‘triad’ comparisons and dynamics makes only a contribution at the most general level. In 
exclusively concentrating upon the topic at hand, it is not suggested that EC-Japan relations 
are more important than other EC or Japanese external relations; rather that the ‘third side’ 
of the U.S.-Japan-EC ‘tripod’ has not been extensively treated.15
A frnal, paramount, theme which emerges from the relationship between Japanese firms and 
the EC, including its constituent parts, is the relationship between globalisation and regional 
integration. This theme is present throughout the chapters which follow. It is important to 
note that this research does not concern the impact of globalisation on regional economic 
integration, which appears to be a localised process of globalisation itself. Rather, the focus
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13 See, Prendergast, James W. ‘The European Economic Community’s Challenge to the 
U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Arrangement’ Law and Policy in International Business, Vol.19, 
No.3., 1987. pp.579-601.
14 Memorandum to House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities; 
Relations between the Community and Japan, 13th Report, session 1988-89, Evidence, HMSO, 
London, 1989, p.31.
15 In the mid-1990s, both U.S. and European concerns are turning towards the strong 
Asian dimension in their relationship with Japan. Robert Taylor, in his China, Japan and the 
European Community (Athlone Press, London, 1990) added such a dimension to his 
consideration of EC-Asian affairs in 1990. The approach refreshingly recalls the existence 
of other ‘tri-angles’ in world political economic affairs.
of analysis is on the impact of increased globalisation on de jure, political economic 
integration - specifically in its unique, western European manifestation.
11.4 L it e r a t u r e
Many scholars have treated Euro/EC-Japan relations within the context of Japan’s relations 
with ‘the West’. Endymion Wilkinson’s Japan versus the West; image and reality16 draws 
heavily on the conflict/cooperation paradigm identified above - particularly in relation to 
misunderstanding in cultural communication. Whatever the relevance of misperception in past 
relations, this approach is strongly questionable in the era of firm-driven cooperation. The 
standard work on the evolution of Community relations with Japan is Albrecht Rothacher’s 
Economic diplomacy between the European Community and Japan, 1959-1981.n This work 
specifically treats the structure of the EC in its relations with Japan, according a central role 
to the EC institutional level in the conduct of EC-Japan affairs appropriate to the ‘era of 
trade’ analysed.18 William Nester’s European Power and the Japanese Challenge,19 draws 
heavily on Rothacher’s account of the evolution of the history of EEC-Japan relations. 
Surprisingly, Nester adopts the view that Japan’s role in the relationship is essentially neo- 
mercantilist.20 The emphasis on economic diplomacy, which Rothacher adopts, is still 
dominant in Nester’s (1993) work. Such a static approach is inadequate for a relationship
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16 Wilkinson, Endymion, Japan Versus the West: image and reality, Penguin ed., 1990. 
This work is one of the few which began as a Euro-Japan project and moved to the ‘western’ 
experience with Japan. Originally published as Misunderstanding: Europe vs. Japan [1981].
17 Rothacher, Albrecht Economic diplomacy between the European Community and 
Japan, 1959-1981, Gower, Aldershot, 1983.
18 A paper by Quinn Riordan at the Johns Hopkins Bologna Centre, examines inter-state 
relations and trade policy in this period. ‘The true nature of European integration as revealed 
by the European Community’s trade relationship with Japan’ paper, [Library] Johns Hopkins 
Bologna Centre, Bologna, 1991.
19 Nester, William R. European Power and the Japanese Challenge, Macmillan, London,
1993.
20 This view is fully outlined in Nester’s Japanese Industrial Targeting: the 
neomercantilist path to economic superpower, Macmillan, London, 1991.
completely transformed by the agent of FD1 and the involvement of TNCs during the 1980s.
In 1987 James Darby concluded a study of Japanese FDI in the UK and France with 
perception: "Inward investment policy may therefore occupy an increasingly important 
position within the general competence and objectives of industrial policy, as the 
competitiveness of foreign firms in individual sectors continues to become more apparent in 
terms of employment, technological capacity, and balance of payments considerations."21 
Although Darby was not primarily concerned with the pan-European political effects of FDI 
on integration, his work raises many important issues from an earlier period of Japanese FDI 
in western Europe. A more recent study by Roger Strange examines the pivotal role of the 
UK in Euro-Japanese FDI relations, evaluating the impact of such investment on the UK 
economy.22
Given the paramount importance of trade and investment issues in EC-Japan relations, it is 
unsurprising that many insights are to be found in literature on trade and more recently, 
investment. The FDI literature has been enriched by Dianne Julius,23 who retains the 
European state, rather than the EC as her unit of analysis. Stephen Thomsen and Phedon 
Nicolaides24 give a comprehensive assessment of Japanese direct investment in Europe, but 
do not significantly treat the political legacy of multi-leveled bargaining between EC 
constituents and Japanese firms. In a subsequent study, Thomsen and Woolcock do bring 
together direct investment and European integration - principally "..to place the rapid growth 
of direct investment in Europe during the 1980s in the context of European integration and 
to define more clearly those barriers to intra-European direct investment which still impede
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21 Darby, James The Political Economy of Japanese Manufacturing Investment in France 
and the United Kingdom (1970-86') Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute, Fiesole, 1987.
22 Strange, Roger Japanese Manufacturing Investment in Europe: its impact on the UK 
economy, Routledge, London, 1993.
23 Julius, DeAnne Global Companies and Public Policy, Pinter, London, 1990.
24 Thomsen, Stephen and Phedon Nicolaides The Evolution of Japanese Direct Investment 
in Europe: death of a transistor salesman, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991.
European integration."25 Important cutting-edge technologies accessible through extra- 
European investment are underestimated by a focus on intra-EC investment.26 Although the 
total size of Japanese investment in the European economy is small, the qualitative 
contribution is an additional and largely non-quantifiable factor, which explains the very high 
priority accorded relations with Japan by those states wishing to harness sources of external 
competitiveness. The evolution of external direct investment in the EC and the multi-leveled 
roles and reactions of the EC in connecting with such investment is an important test of the 
systemic integrity of the Community.
The advent of the 1992 programme caused some concerns of exclusion in Japan which were 
not dissimilar to those of the late 1950s. Kenjiro Ishikawa discusses most of these in Japan 
and the challenge of Europe 1992? while Ippei Yamazawa outlines the strong options of 
Japanese firms.28
Conclusion
In Japan and Western Europew, Tsoukalis and White identified a central problématique 
which remained valid for the 1985-93 period of EC-Japan relations. Stating why they would 
not include a general analysis of the ‘European side of the equation’ - the central task of this
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25 Thomsen, Stephen and Stephen Woolcock Direct Investment and European Integration, 
Pinter for RIIA, London, 1993. p.6.
26 Despite Honda’s relatively small stake in Rover (the UK auto-maker), the technology 
infusion to Rover [which included some dividends from Honda’s F-l motor-racing capacity] 
were sufficient to reinvigorate the UK company. BMW’s subsequent acquisition of the 
majority British Aerospace share in the company in 1994 would have been unimaginable 
without the small but crucial Honda investment.
27 Ishikawa, Kenjiro Japan and the challenge of Europe 1992. Pinter, London, 1990.
28 Yamazawa, lppei ‘Japan’, Ch.15 of Bomer, Silvio and Herbert Grubel (eds.) The 
European Community after 1992, Macmillan, London, 1992.
29 Tsoukalis, Loukas and Maureen White (eds.) Japan and Western Europe: conflict and 
cooperation. Pinter, London, 1982.
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thesis - the editors wrote:
"Whenever reference is made to Western Europe as an international partner, it is 
almost invariably the European Community that is implied. The Community... is not, 
at least as yet, a federal state. Nor is it, however, an example of a traditional inter­
governmental organisation in which case there would be little point in talking about 
EC-Japan relations. The hybrid nature of the Community makes it a very complex 
subject to study but also a difficult interlocutor, as many Japanese negotiations must 
have discovered in their dealings with it and at the cost of certain frustration. The 
existence of the Community may be seen as an additional complicating factor in Euro- 
Japanese relations but also potentially as a factor that may make the effective 
management of those relations more likely."30
The analysis which follows addresses the issues raised in this overview with a view to making
a definitive statement concerning the European Community’s integrity as global interlocutor.
The themes of EC-Japan affairs, 1985-93 suggest four central units of analysis in the
relationship. These are: Japanese firms, the EC institutional-level, EC member states, and EC
sub-states. In the three empirical chapters which follow, Japanese firms, as the agents of FDI
are treated in their relations, bargains and impact upon the EC in its structural entirety.
Japanese firm-EC sub-state relations constitute a ‘front-line’, tactile and flexible strand of the 
overall relationship. While the EC Commission was preparing competitiveness-enhancing 
strategies in the mid-1980s, the sub-states were beginning to seek their own welfare 
enhancement outside of the integration bloc. This development is even more evident among 
liberal member states. The role of the EC Council and the continuance of bi-lateral relations 
supports the importance attached to the Japanese firm-EC member state dimension. The EC 
Commission is also important, given its legal competence over external trade policy - the 
instruments of which constitute an important causal factor in the advent of Japanese FDI. 
However, the analysis which follows is not a static one. Rather, the emphasis is on the 
dynamics of the evolution of the EC through its experience in one important external 
relationship. Attempts by the Commission to extend traditional trade instruments to include 
FDI regulation reveal a dynamic, multi-variate evolution which involved powerful roles for 
externalities.
This tri-level analysis of EC-Japan relations affords an assessment of the impact of Japanese
30 ibid. p.xii.
FDI on the Community, and an evaluation of the EC as revealed in its actions to, and 
reactions towards this externality. From this assessment, the central problématique concerning 
the impact of globalisation on regional political integration can be addressed.
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CHAPTER III EC SUB-STATES AND JAPANESE INVESTMENT
Introduction
Analysis of the role of sub-states in EC-Japan affairs is an imperative component of the 
international political economy/geopolitics methodology outlined in the first chapter. 
However, the inclusion of sub-states is also a practical choice. By virtue of the presence of 
almost 40 EC sub-state representations in Japan, and the ‘front-line’ role of regional 
authorities interacting with Japanese firms; sub-states are an important strand in EC-Japan 
affairs. The sub-state level is given a prominent place in the empirical scheme, both for the 
practical reasons mentioned above, and because such a treatment provides important insights 
into ‘ground-level’ issues which EC solutions, regulations and initiatives are frequently 
intended to address. The treatment of member states in EC-Japan FDI relations [Ch.IV] and 
the EC institutional level [V] is made more immediate and more complete by this early focus 
on the area of strongest interface between Japan and Europe.
This chapter is arranged in four parts. Recent theoretical literature on the role of sub-states 
in international relations is reviewed. This is followed by the presentation of the author’s 
survey on EC sub-state representations in Tokyo. The European presence in Japanese regions 
is assessed for comparative insights and the conclusion evaluates theoretical literature in view 
of the empirical findings. The analysis explores the relationship between the EC member 
states and their internal sub-states; and also the contextual role of EC sub-states in the EC 
system.
I I U  Sub-states in the international system
Sub-state entities1 have increasingly attracted attention in the literature on international affairs
1 In the EC these are largely sub-state regions. However, many of those EC sub-states 
represented in Japan are not officially designated regions. Such include representations of 
metropolitan areas. The term sub-national is sometimes used. For a discussion on
during recent years. This section firstly considers literature on the role of sub-state entities 
in federal systems. Secondly, recent evaluations of the U.S. states’ role in international 
[particularly political economic] relations will be evaluated for comparative insights.2 
Thirdly, the quasi-legal debate on ‘subsidiarity’ provides an opportunity to evaluate the extent 
to which such concepts might have an effect on the real ability of sub-states to exert their 
identities. Finally, geopolitical methodologies, which emphasise the ‘organic’ inter­
connectedness of capital, people and other dynamics are evaluated with reference to EC sub­
states.
The literature on sub-state external relations in federal systems has provided valuable insights 
regarding sub-state external relations generally. An analysis of sub-states in Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the US by Michelmann, Soldatos and 
others, concentrates upon federal states. Michelmann concludes that "..the state-centered view 
of international relations, in which actions and interactions in the international system emanate 
from and are directed towards nation-state actors almost exclusively, is a gross distortion of 
reality.."3 This premise does not however, advocate the ‘neo-Braudelian’ approach which 
largely echewes state and even regional boundaries. The consolidated conclusion of 
Michelmann and Soldatos is that "..no country-chapter author concludes that the international 
activities of his federation’s component units seriously threaten the foreign-policy prerogatives 
of the national government..."4 The empirical survey of EC sub-state activity in Japan 
evaluates this conclusion. The empirical evidence presented below treats both federal and 
non-federal EC sub-states, and indicates that sub-states play strong external relations roles in
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terminology see Jan de Meyer, ‘External Relations of Federated States’ in Morgan, Roger 
(ed.) Regionalism in European Politics, P.S.I., London, 1986. pp. 155-6.
2 The experience of U.S. states in U.S.-Japan relations is compared with the experience 
of European sub-states in EC-Japan relations.
3 Michelmann, Hans J. and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.) Federalism and International 
Relations; the role o f subnational units, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990. p.312.
4 op.cit. p.313.
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both federal and non-federal states.3
Discussion of sub-state external relations has largely hinged on the potential diplomatic or 
treaty-making powers (or lack of such powers) of sub-states.6 A crucial change occurred 
during the 1980s with increased interaction between EC sub-states and external firms. The 
advent of increased levels of global FDI in the 1980s ensured an enhanced role for firms in 
political developments. Bargains between sub-states and firms lay outside the traditional 
modes of diplomatic representation. The engagement between European sub-states and global 
firms was made possible firstly by the external firms themselves, and secondly by the strategy 
of the sub-states to seek welfare enhancement through global interface with MNEs. The role 
of sub-states and liberal member states, which allied with Japanese firms in political economic 
bargaining illustrates the concurrent nature of internal and external welfare enhancement 
strategies. EC sub-states seek to enhance welfare not only through bargains with their state 
and the EC, but simultaneously through their relations with entities outside of the EC. There 
is no chronological lag between efficiency and redistribution in this regard. A similar 
regional/global dynamic has been at play regarding the relationship between the EC 
institutions and the EC member-states. Whilst trade policy was being centralised, the political 
economic power derived from FDI relations and trade promotion was within the competence 
of the member states.
In general terms, the U.S. can be compared to Germany in the role which U.S. sub-federal 
units play in U.S.-Japan investment relations. Despite a large trade deficit, the U.S. has 
maintained competitiveness and productivity. Germany also runs a trade deficit with Japan, 
but her competitive stature (in terms of exports to Japan and third-market competition with 
Japan) remains strong. Although the U.S. is as open as the U.K. and the Netherlands in terms
3 Non-federal states are included in the analysis of Morgan et al, Regionalism in 
European Politics, P.S.I., London, 1986. John Kincaid includes both Japan and France in the 
growing number of unitary states asserting "consumership and citizenship interests
internationally." ‘Consumership versus citizenship: is there wiggle room for local regulation 
in the global economy?’ in Hocking, Brian (ed.) Foreign Relations and Federal States,
Leicester University Press, 1993, p.27.
6 See De Meyer, Jan, ‘External Relations of Federated States’ in Morgan, Roger (ed.) 
Regionalism in European Politics, P.S.I., London 1986. pp.157-8.
of its disposition towards FDI; the constitutional structure of the U.S. invites comparisons 
with Europe’s most evolved federal state. Investment from Japan to the U.S. has involved 
low levels of federal regulation7 and an important role for U.S. state-Japanese firm relations. 
In Germany, regulation and guidance have been less liberal than in the U.S., and the Länder 
have played strong roles. The Länder themselves have also acted as proxies for German 
federal scepticism towards a completely liberalised environment for inbound investment.
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Significant Japanese FDI in the U.S. predates that of the EC by approximately one decade. 
U.S. state representation has intensified competition between individual states represented in 
Tokyo8 which has been termed a ‘war between the states.’9 For state leaders, investment 
seeking is a high priority - then Governor Bill Clinton for example, visited Japan three times 
seeking investment for Arkansas.10 Many of the experiences of U.S. states are echoed in 
those of EC sub-states. The setting up of state offices to negotiate with Japanese firms for 
investment purposes; the searching for new roles in the more recent period of declining
7 Michael Hodges observes that "The official US policy toward inward investment is 
‘neutrality with encouragement’.." ‘The Japanese Industrial Presence in America: same bed, 
different dreams,’ in Newland, K. (ed.) The International Relations of Japan, Macmillan, 
London, 1990. p.49.
8 The following list of U.S. states with representative offices in Japan was compiled from 
the JETRO Directory of external missions, 1992 and the Tokyo Classified Telephone 
Directory, 1993: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, Wisconsin, Virginia and West Virginia. The Florida Department o f Citrus is 
represented, as are the city and port representations of Dallas, Greater Houston Partnership, 
San Diego Economic Development Corp., Richmond Metropolitan Economic Development 
Council, The Port o f Portland, The Port Authority o f New York & New Jersey, and the Port 
of New Orleans. There are also Japanese representative offices of San Bernardino County 
of California and the Tennessee Valley Industrial Development Association. [The Economic 
Development Administration of Puerto Rico and the Guam Visitors Bureau are also 
represented.] See also, Morita, Akio ‘Japanese investment in the US and US-Japan trade 
problems,’ in Japan and the World Economy, Vol.3, No.l, 1991. p.113.
♦
9 Tokyo Business Today, April 1987, p.l. See also ‘Civil War, Round Two’ in Barron’s,
3 April 1995. pp.23-26.
10 The Independent, 5 November 1992, p.16.
outbound Japanese investment; the extent to which sub-states11 represent a challenge or a 
compliment to national authority, are issues which invite comparison with EC sub-states and 
member states.
Recent writing on the external relations experience of federal sub-states and the external role 
of U.S. states, can be supplemented with reference to the debate on the concept of 
‘subsidiarity’ within the EC.12 A common feature of literature on EC regions is the scant 
treatment of their external roles. Such is also the case with regard to most considerations of 
subsidiarity. The experience of global increases in FDI in the 1980s and the recognition of 
the political role of firms by Strange, Junne and others indicates that any consideration of de 
facto subsidiarity ought to examine the external role of EC sub-states.
In a discussion on the impact of the principle of subsidiarity, Renaud Dehousse writes: "Yet 
there is still no clear understanding of the actual scope of the subsidiarity principle, nor of 
the ways in which it could be used by the Community institutions."13 Despite renewed 
attention to this principle from 1990 onwards, there has been little reference to the 
phenomenon of considerable EC sub-state representation in the international realm, which 
predated the Maastricht recognition of subsidiarity.14 De jure recognition of this principle 
lagged behind actual sub-state interaction with political economic externalities. Increased 
interaction between sub-state entities and large multi-national enterprises, rather than concepts 
of power demarcation, was the defining sub-state characteristic of the period. Kees Van 
Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, in their discussion of subsidiarity, also ignore the
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11 ie. U.S. states
12 Article 3B, of the Treaty on European Union refers to subsidiarity: "In areas which 
do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community." Council, 
Commission of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1992.
13 Dehousse, Renaud ‘Does Subsidiarity Really Matter?’ E.U.I. Working Paper in Law, 
no.92/32, Fiesole, 1992. p.2.
14 Tab. 5 lists the dates of establishment of EC sub-state representations in Japan.
opportunities for enhanced sub-state roles through relations with external firms. As with 
Dehousse, these authors are pessimistic about the future utility of the subsidiarity concept in 
EC evolution.15
Literature on federal structures in international relations uses a comparative political systems
approach while that on subsidiarity largely focuses upon de jure principles. However, recent
geopolitical writing is very much concerned with the realities of exchange and the actualities
of the conditions for change in the global political economy. The importance of regional
networks determined by geographical or geo-economic realities, has been stressed by François
Gipouloux. The following paragraph discussing urban centres illustrates this methodology:
..as an economic entity, a city is not limited to its municipality, but embraces a wide 
range of activities and interests which can be metropolitan as well as regional. It is 
necessary however, that exchanges between cities not be restricted to formal channels 
or national initiatives; they should increase direct contact and links without passing 
through capital cities.16
To Gipouloux, considerations of proximity, geographic features and change over time, are
fundamental to the understanding of international and regional change. Such tools are
traditional. However, their potential to accurately explain complex international political
economic realities, exceeds the explanatory power of Cold War era international relations
theory. Barnes and Ledebur also build on Braudel to point to tensions between the
territoriality of political authority and the scope of economic activity:
The emergence of the nation-state created what is now referred to as the national 
economy by the imposition of political boundaries on emerging patterns of market 
organization and development. A central thrust of economics and economic policy in 
the last century has been oriented to bringing rationality and coherence to this 
artificial economic construct.17
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15 Van Kersbergen, Kees and Bertjan Verbeek ‘The Politics of Subsidiarity in the 
European Union’ Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol.32, No.2, June 1994. On the latter 
point see p.229. The authors comprehensively treat the historical evolution of the concept of 
subsidiarity in western Europe.
16 Gipouloux, François ‘Globalization and Regionalization in East Asia: stakes and 
strategies’ in François Gipouloux (ed.) Regional Economic Strategies in East Asia: a 
comparative perspective. Maison Franco-Japonaise, Tokyo, 1994. p.31.
*•
17 Barnes, W.R. and L.C. Ledebur ‘Toward a new political economy of metropolitan 
regions’ Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 1991, Vol. 9. p.130. The 
authors write: "This system of MERs [metropolitan economic regions] overlays the geography
A similar view has been espoused by Patrick Smith, who writes: "Traditional distinctions
between domestic and foreign policy have given way to ‘intermestic’ definitions which merge 
the two.."18
The introduction of geopolitical approaches is particularly prescient in the post-cold war era. 
The logic and integrity of territorial entities as effected by a world of movement, expansion, 
interaction, mobility of trade and finance is at the heart of EC evolution in the global system. 
The geopolitical approach, combined with IPE can be used to analyse multiple levels of 
political authority in their interactions with externalities. The first of these levels, that of sub­
states in the EC-Japan FDI relationship is now examined in depth.
IIIJ Survey of EC sub-state regional representations in Japan
Whilst studies of US-Japan relations have frequently analysed the role of U.S. states in the 
field of U.S.-Japanese relations, the role of European sub-state regional representations in 
relations with Japan has been completely ignored. The survey presented below attempts to 
redress this lacuna in the understanding of EC-Japan relations.
Tokyo constitutes an international political economic ‘microcosm’ in which more European, 
American and other sub-state representations interact with firms than in any other world
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of the USA but does not respect national boundaries. Because of the intertwining of MERs 
in the global economy, these functional regional economies transcend geographical and 
political boundaries. The emergence of the multinational firm creates a network within the 
global system of MERs that functions, to a great extent, independently from national 
governments. The geographic profile both of national and of international corporations, 
however, reflect the spatial organization of the MER system. It can be argued that the 
organizing principle of the geographical orientation of national and multinational corporations 
is presence in, or access to, these regional metropolitan economies both in domestic and in 
international economies. If this is indeed the case, policies of national and multinational 
corporations reflect the reality of MERs and the system of regions far better than federal 
policies." pp. 135-6.
18 Smith, Patrick J. ‘Policy Phases, Subnational Foreign Relations and Constituent 
Diplomacy in the United States and Canada: city, provincial and state global activity in 
British Columbia and Washington’ in Hocking, Brian (ed.) Foreign Relations and Federal 
States, Leicester University Press, 1993. p.211.
centre. During mid-1993 the writer conducted a survey in Tokyo examining diverse aspects 
of the activities of EC sub-states. Following the presentation of the results of this survey and 
a comparative consideration of Japanese prefectures in EC-Japan affairs, the theoretical and 
general literature introduced above will be evaluated.
Tab .1 Profile of Survey of EC sub-state regional representations in Japan
Place of survey: Tokyo
Dates of survey: 12 March - 22 July 1993
Number of representations identified: 38
Number of respondents: 27
Response rate: 71%
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The purpose of this survey was to determine the level and nature of EC sub-state regional 
representation in Japan and the role of such representation in EC-Japan affairs. The following 
list of EC sub-state regions and metropolitan areas represented in Japan as of mid-1993 was 
compiled from the JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) directory of external economic 
representations, Tokyo, 1992; and the ‘Embassies, Consulates & Govt. Offices’ section of the 
Tokyo Telephone Directory, 1993.19 The following list constitutes the full set of 
representations contacted for the survey, with their operational names.
Tab.2 List of EC sub-states represented in Japan
GERMANY: Baden-Württemberg Representative of the Ministry of Economic Affairs;
Bavarian Ministry of Economics, Office for Economic Promotion; Berlin Economic 
Development Corporation; The Economic Development Corporation of the Federal State of 
Bremen; Japan Representative Office of the Ports of Bremen/Bremerhaven; The Industrial 
Development and Trust Company, State of Hessen; State Government of Niedersachsen 
Office of Industrial Location; North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW Japan K.K.) Economic 
Development Corporation; Economic Development Corporation for the German State of 
Rheinland-Pfalz; Saar Contact Japan; Economic Development Corporation of Schleswig- 
Holstein (joint representation with) Hamburg Business Development Corporation; 
Treuhandanstalt Representative Office [c/o German Chamber of Industry and Commerce in 
Japan].20 United Kingdom : Devon & Cornwall Development Bureau; Kent Enterprise 
Office; Milton Keynes Development Corporation; Commission for the New Towns;
>
19 For representative offices outside of Tokyo see Tab.5.
20 This is a federal government agency with responsibility for the privatisation of formerly 
state-owned industry in the eastern German Länder.
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Northern Development Company (of England); Industrial Development Board for Northern 
Ireland21; North West England (INWARD); Nottinghamshire County Council; Locate 
in Scotland; Welsh Development International; West Midlands Development Agency; 
Yorkshire & Humberside Development Association Ltd. France: Tokyo Office for 
Alsace, Alsace Development Agency (joint representation with) Gascogne Office; Belfort 
Japan Office; Bordeaux Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Bretagne Region, Trade and 
Economic Development; Tokyo Office for Grenoble-Isère; Le Havre Port Authority; Japan 
representative office of Loiret; Representative Office of Touraine in Japan. SPAIN: 
Andalusian Autonomous Government; Basque Development Board; Centre d’Informació
i Desenvolupament Empresarial, Generalitat de Catalunya (CIDEM); Institute de Fomento 
Region de Murcia; Valencia Investment & Trade Office. Bei/ uiim: Attaché of the 
Flemish Community Flanders.
A number of observations on this set of sub-state representations are necessary. Firstly, some 
sub-state regions and cities are represented for reasons which are little related to their 
constitutional position or even their economic strength. The aspiration of particular regions 
to diversify their economic profiles, or the dynamism of local governors accounts for the 
presence of some regions on this list.22 Some ‘regions’ such as the UK Commission for the
21 Northern Ireland is represented as a region of the United Kingdom. The IDB for 
Northern Ireland is in receipt of direct financial and other assistance from the Invest in Britain 
Bureau (IBB). [Investment attraction to the Republic of Ireland is dealt with solely by the 
Industrial Development Authority of Ireland (IDA), which operates an office in Tokyo. The 
Republic of Ireland’s inbound investment attraction activities are discussed in Ch.IV.] The 
role of foreign direct investment in reviving the economy of Northern Ireland was frequently 
referred to in discussions and analysis of the ‘complete cessation’ of September 1994. A joint 
delegation of the Irish [Republic’s] Business & Employers’ Confederation and the Belfast 
office of the Confederation of British Industry, visited Brussels in September 1994. Although 
there was no alteration in the constitutional position of the CBI or the IBB in Northern 
Ireland, one report stated that "The delegation was promoting an "island of Ireland" approach 
to economic development." The Irish Emigrant, issue No.400, 3 October 1994. UK Prime 
Minister Major hosted an international inward investment conference in Belfast in December
1994. The President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, invited Japanese businessmen to consider 
investment opportunities throughout Ireland at a reception in Tokyo in February 1995. ibid. 
iss. 421, 27 February 1995. President Clinton opened a U-S.-sponsored Irish investment 
conference in Washington D.C. in May 1995.
22 Andrew F. Cooper refers to these as ‘maverick non-central actors.’ He quotes 
Queensland’s then premier Bjelke-Petersen as saying to Japanese investors at the inauguration 
of Queensland’s Tokyo office: "Come to Queensland, not to Australia" ‘Towards a typology 
of non-central foreign economic behaviour: the case of agricultural trade’ in Hocking, Brian 
(ed.) Foreign Relations and Federal States, Leicester University Press, 1993. p.57. citing 
Hocking ‘Pluralism and Foreign Policy: the states and the management of Australia’s external 
relations,’ Yearbook of World Affairs, vol.38, Stevens, London, 1984. p.l. The Mainichi
New Towns are not to be found on traditional EC lists of regions; yet they constitute an 
important conduit in EC-Japan affairs. Secondly, some sub-states rely on information- 
gathering visits to Japan rather than offices. Thirdly, Japanese firm negotiations with EC 
states which do not have strong sub-state roles in attracting inbound FDI do include 
negotiations with local officials. Such links can be developed by the investing Japanese firm 
or by a European firm seeking a partner, and can involve a strong role for the national 
authority which ‘devolves’ functions to regional players.23 Sub-state activity does therefore 
exist within states which have centralised inbound FDI roles. Fourthly, sub-state 
representative activity is constantly changing with the climate for FDI.24 Despite these 
caveats, a clear picture of the role of EC sub-state entities in EC-Japan relations 1985-93 can 
be constructed from the data.
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Ta b . 3 Survey questions put to EC sub-states represented in Japan
How many offices does your regional authority/mission have world-wide?
What year did your office open in Japan?
Do you have more than one representative office in Japan? (If so, please state where 
any others are.)
How many European staff do you have?
How many Japanese staff do you have?
What are the main activities of your mission?
How highly would you rate investment-attraction among your activities?
Daily News referred to the role of David Bookbinder, leader of the Derbyshire County 
Council who negotiated the Toyota/Derbyshire deal in three months as "..determined to sweep 
aside all obstacles." 1 August 1990, p.7.
23 Interviewed at the Danish embassy in Tokyo, Ms. Jasperson stated that in Denmark 
"there is a sub-committee which represents the regions." Interview, Embassy of Denmark, 
Tokyo, 9 July 1993. As is the case with the Republic of Ireland, such regions do not have 
external representations in Japan.
24 The survey does not include regional or municipal representations which were both 
established and disestablished prior to 1993. An example of such would be the Couseil 
Général de Vaucluse which ceased to be represented in Japan in 1992. The Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry of Madrid is represented c/o Banco Exterior de España. This 
representation was not listed in the aforementioned sources and was subsequently identified 
through the Commercial Office of the Embassy of Spain, too late for inclusion in the survey. 
The Thuringian Economic Development Corp. established a representative link through BOT 
Research International Ltd. during 1992/93. Sachsen began to be represented by this firm 
[which is associated with the Bank of Tokyo] in mid-1993.
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How do you promote your region?
Have your activities been successful?
Does your office have a special relationship with any single firm or industry?
How does your regional activity differ from the efforts of your state embassy?
Do you co-ordinate with the embassy of your European state?
Do you co-ordinate with the EC?
How does your regional activity differ from the efforts of the EC?
Do you plan to maintain your office in Japan into the future?
- Short-term, Medium-term, Long-term25
71% of the representations responded to the survey. Some chose not to answer all of the 
queries. Absences of responses are indicated; reasons for not responding are reported where 
given. Those sub-state representations which responded to the survey are identified in the 
following table.
















25 An additional question regarding the number of Japanese firms which invested in 
particular regions was spoilt due to the inclusion of sales outlets, distributors &c. Regions 
were also asked if they employed European regional civil servants. Nord Rhein Westphalia 
reported two; Scotland reported two UK civil servants on secondment.
26 The representative office of Baden-Württemberg did not formally reply to this survey, 
but did grant an interview.
27 Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg are jointly represented in Japan. This is also the case 
in Brussels. ‘Index of Representative Offices Based in Brussels’ in The New Regional Policy 
of the EC, Club de Bruxelles, 1993. p.A228.
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Comm. New Towns R
Northern England R
Northern Ireland R





Yorkshire & Humberside R














In order to determine the scope of representation, the EC sub-states were asked questions 
concerning the extent of their representation world-wide; the length of time which their office 
in Japan had been operational; and whether they had a Japanese representative office outside 
of Tokyo.
28 Alsace and Gascogne are represented by the same consultancy firm in Japan. Replies 
in this survey only apply to Alsace.
29 Located in Osaka, c/o Belgium Flanders Exchange Center. This representation is due 
to move to Tokyo in 1995.
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Tab.5 Duration and scope of regional representation30
Year Tokyo 
representation Other offices Offices
commenced31 in Japan32 globally33
Bavaria 1989 _ 2
Berlin 1981 _ 7*
Ports of Bremen 1975 . 1535
Hessen 1987 - 1
Niedersachsen 1992 - 1
North Rhine-Westphalia 1991 - 4
Rheinland-Pfalz 1985 - 3
Saar 1987 - 3
S.-Holstein/Hamburg 1989 - -
T reuhandanstalt 1991 - 236
Kent 1985 Osaka (1988) 337
Comm. New Towns 1992 - 5
Northern England 1987 Osaka (1989) 12
Northern Ireland 1987 - 10
Nottinghamshire 1989 - 238
Scotland 198439 - 740
Wales 1985 - 10
30 Sub-state representations not responding to the survey (see Tab.4) are not listed on this 
and subsequent tables.
31 ‘What year did your office open in Japan?’
32 ‘Do you have more than one representative office in Japan? (If so, please state where 
any others are.)’
33 ‘How many offices does your regional authority/mission have world-wide?’
34 Surrey, San Francisco, Boston, Vienna, Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei.
35 Includes agents; 3 in North and Latin America, 12 in Asia/Pacific.
36 and 7 honourary representatives in Europe."
37 Philadelphia, Tokyo and Osaka.
38 Bad Honnef (Germany) and Tokyo.
39 Through agents until 1988.
40 4 in the U.S.A., Brussels, Tokyo and Hong Kong.
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Yorkshire & Humberside 1985 - 4
Alsace 1982 Nagoya41 442
Grenoble-Isère 1989 - 2«
Loiret 1987 - 2
Touraine 1986 - 2M
Andalusia 1989 245
Basque 1990 - 6
Catalonia 1988 - 4*
Murcia 1991 - 4
Valencia 1990 - 5
The date of the establishment of representation in Japan is highly significant in addressing the 
nature of the role of European sub-state activity in Japan. 85% of respondents set up offices 
during the 1985-92 ‘era of investment.’ [The preeminence of the investment function is 
confirmed by the responses in Tabs.7 and 8.] This indicates a quite narrow activity range 
for the sub-state offices. However since the advent of Japanese FDI was the most significant 
development of the era, the sub-states can be said to have played a frontline role in EC-Japan 
affairs during the period. Tab.5 above indicates that only 11% of EC sub-states had Japanese 
representations outside of Tokyo.47 [The European presence in Japanese prefectures is 
treated at Section 111.4. below.]
The response of sub-state entities was flexible and welcoming to Japanese firms. While the 
dispositions of EC member states towards the advent of Japanese FDI was widely variant,
41 This is the main office.
42 U.S.A., Japan (2), Australia.
43 Agent in the U.S.A.
44 Consultant in the U.S.A.
45 Brussels and Tokyo.
46 Tokyo, Brussels, New York and San Francisco.
47 Two of these three representations are located in Osaka, which would not indicate an 
interest in prefectural-interface so much as the seeking of opportunities in Japan’s second 
industrial metropolis - now an Asia/Pacific economic centre in its own right.
sub-states were generally willing to embrace Japanese FDI in the hope of developing their 
economies, irrespective of their member states’ dispositions. This is reflected ill the following 
tabulation, extrapolated from information in Tab.5, which indicates the median set-up date 
of regions by member state:
Tab .5a Median set-up dates of sub-state representations, bv member state category
France 1986
U.K. 1986 [2nd half of]
Germany 1986 "
Spain 1989 " "
This result surprisingly, shows French sub-state regions as the most keen to link with 
Japanese firms.48 The findings must immediately be put in the context of a low sample for 
France (ie. 4.), and perhaps more importantly, the fact that French representations are 
predominantly conducted through consultants (Tab.6). Additionally, the UK’s Invest in 
Britain Bureau has promoted a strong embassy-led inward investment campaign since the 
1970s.49 Nevertheless, the view of France as an exclusively dirigiste political economic 
entity needs to be tempered in view of these findings. The role of the changing climate in 
the French state towards Japan is also a factor.
Whilst it would be premature to question the general picture of France’s position in the EC- 
Japan policy debate, these results indicate that an analysis solely based on the Commission 
or the member states is inadequate for a thorough examination of EC-Japan affairs. Rather, 
EC institutional-level, member state and sub-state relations with Japan and particularly, 
Japanese firms becomes an analytical imperative.
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48 Caroline Bray and Roger Morgan write that "Traditionally, French governments have 
resisted the development by the Community of a very active regional policy, which was seen 
as a challenge to the sovereignty of the State, i.e. central government." The European 
Community and Central-Local Government Relations, E.S.R.C., London, 1985. p.31. This 
view is partially based on research by Yves Meny.
49 See Strange, Roger Japanese Manufacturing Investment in Europe: its impact on the 
UK economy. Routledge, London, 1993. pp.115-117.
The costs of maintaining any form of official representation in Tokyo were the highest for 
any metropolitan area in the world through the 1980s.50 EC sub-state regions have a number 
of options as to how such connections with Japanese firms can be established. They can; 
adopt a passive stance (as did Italy during the period); visit Japan on a regular basis; establish 
representation through agencies or consultants; or, open a representative office. This survey 
only pertains to the last two options, although both of these also involve visits from EC sub­
state regional headquarters during critical negotiations. The option of opening a full 
representative office is the most costly, but potentially the most rewarding.51 Tab .6 
examines the forms of representation favoured by respondents and the size of each 
representation by numbers of employees.
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Tab .6 Form and size of representation





Bavaria Representative Office 1 -
Berlin c/o Scope Int’l Ltd. 4 -
Ports of Bremen Representative Office 3 -
Hessen Representative Office 2 -
Niedersachsen Representative Office 4 -
North Rhine-Westphalia Representative Office 5 654
50 This continued to be the case in the early 1990s. Reuter, quoting Japanese Economic
Planning Agency (EPA), 8 July 1993. A JETRO official also commented that the ‘Japanese
style of business’ (formal visits &c.) was expensive, but that European authorities who did
not follow business formalities would not impress Japanese firms. Interview, Tokyo, 22 
March 1993.
51 Ivo Duchacek writes: "Establishment of permanent offices in foreign capitals or centres 
of commerce and industry to represent non-central governments abroad - [are] the most 
visible and expensive signs of what we have called ‘globalization of provincialism.’" 
Duchacek, Ivo D. ‘Perforated Sovereignties: towards a typology of new actors in international 
relations’ in Michelmann, Hans J. and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.) Federalism and International 
Relations: the role of subnational units, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990. p. 14.
52 *How many Japanese staff do you have?’
53 ‘How many European staff do you have?'
54 Including 2 state civil servants.
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Rheinland-Pfalz c/o JEP (Japan) Ltd. 4
Saar c/o CRC Research Inst.lnc. 1
S.-Holstein/Hamburg ILLIES Consult Ltd.55 _
Treuhandanstalt Representative Office56 1 2
Kent Representative Office 3
Comm. New Towns Representative Office 3
Northern England Representative Office 5 .
Northern Ireland Representative Office 3 -
Nottinghamshire Representative Office 2 -
Scotland Representative Office 2 257
Wales Representative Office 3 1
Yorkshire & Humberside Representative Office 2 -
Alsace I.M.T. Ltd. 5
Grenoble-Isère JITEX Consulting 3 8s8
Loiret D.M.L. & Associates 5 -
Touraine J.M.S. Corp. (C’sult) 5 359
Andalusia Representative Office 1 1
Basque Representative Office 2 360
Catalonia Representative Office 4 -
Murcia Representative Office - 1
Valencia Representative Office 3 3
The above table indicates that 70% of EC sub-state regions responding preferred full 
representative offices. This is markedly so in the case of the UK and Spain (100% in each 
case) indicating a very high regional priority given to inbound FDI from Japan. Four German 
regions preferred consultative representation, whilst the commitment of French regions was 
more tentative. Staffing of representative offices was predominantly Japanese (71% of total). 
The high degree of liaison with Japanese firms (see Tabs.7 & 9) and the organisation of fairs 
and information seminars, particularly in the initial stages of liaison with a Japanese firm,
55 Represented by a German consulting firm on a "consulting contract basis."
56 c/o German Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Japan.
57 And "2 UK government civil servants on secondment."
58 Consulting firm executives.
59 Consulting firm executives.
60 Including 2 trainees.
were largely conducted by Japanese employees. The sub-state representation-firm relationship 
in Tokyo is characterised by a fluid and flexible cooperation between public authority, 
consultancies and private firms. For example, the former head of the Niedersachsen 
representation was in 1993, promoting the German Machinery and Plant Manufacturers 
Association.
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If conclusions regarding the political power and political economic preferences of sub-states 
are to be drawn, the intention of sub-state ‘para-diplomacy’ has to be gauged. Replies to an 
inquiry into the nature of sub-state representation activities generated the verbatim responses 
tabulated below.
Tab .7 Main representation activities61
To invite Japanese companies to Bavaria.
To promote investment in Bavaria. - The only purpose of this 
office.
- Attract Japanese investors (mainly manufacturing) to Berlin
- Organize/assist Japanese business delegations’ visit to Berlin
- Conduct investment promotion seminars
- Maintain contacts with Japanese government/industry/business
- Disseminate information/data on Berlin in Japan, etc.
1. Liaison & Coordination
2. Port Marketing
3. Public Relations
Advice and Information to the Japanese Investors. 
Organisation of Study-Tours to Germany.
Investment promotion 
Investment promotion
PR-activities for the state of NRW in various fields 
(taking part in and visiting fairs nationwide, providing 
information of any kind concerning NRW...etc.)
PR activities of our state
Information, consulting activities for direct investment 





• To induce investment by Japanese companies in Kent - 
plant, stock-point, sales office, or R&D centre.
Bavaria
Berlin









61 ‘What are the main activities o f your mission?’ Replies are given in full.
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* To help promote Kent companies’ business in Japan 
Investment promotion (industrial)
To invite Japanese investment (mainly manufacturers) to the 
North East of England.
To attract inward investment ftom Japanese companies to 
Northern Ireland.
To induce Japanese firms to invest (incl. establish operation 
bases) in Nottinghamshire.
Inward investment (Manufacturing and to a lesser extent 
R&D)
Securing manufacturing investment in Wales, U.K.
Introducing the region to companies to attract their investment, 
and supporting them for starting business smoothly and 
managing well afterwards.
1) Promotion of Japanese investment in Alsace
2) " " tourism in Alsace
3) Promotion of cultural and overall exchanges between Alsace
and Japan.
Find new industrial investors. The investment can be a 
production unit, R&D center.
To attract investment by Japanese companies to our region. 
Find Japanese makers able to open factories (to "solve" the 
unemployment pbl.) in the prefecture62 of Indre-et-Loire 
(Touraine region)
- Diffusion of general information on economic situation,
investment climate, etc.
- Diffusion of particular information on specific subjects,
industrial sectors, etc.
- Search for industrial partners.
* Arrangement of business missions from/to Andalusia.
- To promote industrial cooperation (technology transfer,
technical assistance, J-V distributorship agreement) 
between Basque & Japanese companies.
- To promote Japanese investment in our region (Green field)
- To promote our region
* Promotion of industrial investment from Japan and other Asian
countries to Catalonia by offering legal, economical, 
individual information on Catalonia, or by consulting on 
any relevant issues.
* Assistance to Catalan companies to find Japanese partners
* Any support to deepen economical relationship between
Catalonia and Japan 
Trade & investment promotion
62 Department.
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Valencia - Investment promotion
- Export promotion
- Technology transfer
- Joint-ventures (local partners presentations)
The overwhelming importance of FDI facilitation is evident throughout these responses. (This 
result is reinforced in Tab.8) The final section below will treat the issue of the extent to 
which general conclusions as to the power of sub-state entities in the international63 political 
economic system can be drawn from what is largely a single-purpose form of representation.
With the end of the Heisei boom and the ‘plateau’ in new stocks of outbound FDI from 
Japan64, EC sub-state entities in Tokyo face a difficult strategic choice. They can either 
diversify into other spheres of activity; or they can exit. Thus far, EC sub-state 
representations in Japan have not been heavily involved in trade affairs. Trade agreements 
are the preserve of the Commission (Ch.V), which also negotiates for trade and FDI access; 
the member states are the primary players in trade promotion, and also play a strong role in 
trade and FDI access issues. For EC sub-states to assume a role in trade issues would be 
difficult and not necessarily practicable since for example, those French or Spanish firms 
interested in pursuing a Japan strategy are typically large enough to have an interest 
throughout their domestic state, if not the entire EC, making reliance on local authorities 
unlikely. However, for regional representations, exit is a reverse gamble. New infusions of 
investment, particularly in high-technological sectors, are necessary to validate what has gone 
before.65 The highly successful Welsh Development Authority points out in its response 
(Tab.9) that liaison with established investors is important for new projects. Of course, new 
high technology, or other projects, need not come from Japan. An option for budget­
63 ‘Inter-entity realities’ is a more apt term than ‘international relations.’ This is due to 
the importance of sub-states, states, international organizations and firms. ‘Realities’ is 
preferred to ‘relations’ since concepts such as ‘disposition’ (see Ch.IV) ‘structure’ and 
endogenous factors in states and firms, are considered to be as significant as relational 
dynamics.
64 See JETRO’s 10th Survey o f European Operations of Japanese Companies in the 
Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo, October 1994. p.2.
65 "Without new investment, memory-chip making plants are likely to wither and die.." 
The Observer, 25 September 1994. p.B.5
conscious regions would be to open and close offices in Tokyo, San Francisco etc., on an ad 
hoc basis determined by FDI flows. Such a strategy could generate questions as to the 
reliability of the region as a partner.
Sub-state regions have established, largely for cultural and educational relations, twinning 
arrangements between Japanese prefectures and European regions. Tourism is also one area 
where the regions may have a promotional role, but the existence of national airlines may 
temper such a move.
The following tabulation regarding the priority of inward investment attraction indicates that 
77% of respondents regarded this activity to be of the highest priority.
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Tab.8 Priority rating of investment attraction activity66
key
5 - Very highly
4 - Highly
3 - Medium priority
2 - Low priority
1 - Not important
5 4 3 2 1
Bavaria ■
Berlin ■
Ports of Bremen ■
Hessen ■
Niedersachsen ■










66 ‘How highly would you rate investment-attraction among your activities ?'














The issue of promotion strategy is important in illustrating the flexibility of EC sub-state 
regions potential to directly bargain with Japanese firms. The activities within the promotion 
strategy also explain the high level of Japanese staffing in sub-state offices (see Tab.6). The 
following table indicates the main methods of sub-state outreach to Japanese firms.
Bavaria
Berlin









Direct contact with firms; investment seminars
- Mostly direct contacts, but seminars are also a main activity.
- Effectiveness of advertisements is questionable.
Space advertisement through trade papers, journals and other 
media by allocated budgets on regular basis.
Advertisement through publications; seminars etc.
Direct contact with firms
Organizing seminars; receptions; working discussions; 
advertisements; trade fairs, direct contact with firms.
Direct contact with firms
Direct telephone calls; visits; direct mail; investment seminars 
Direct contact with firms
• Investment seminars & workshops
- Regional promotion & trade fairs
- Press campaigns
- One-on-one company visits
• Study trips to regions
68 ‘How do you promote your region? (eg. adverts, trade fairs, direct contact with firms 
etc.)' Replies are given in full.
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Direct mail; telephone contacts; company visits. (Seminar was 
popular in earlier days, but out-of-date now. Many are fed-up 
with it.)
Direct contact with firms
A) Holding seminars targeted at every prospective industry.
B) Advertisements through newspapers.
C) Direct contact with firms. (This is the most effective method)
D) Propaganda at the booth whenever IBB69 holds seminars. 
Seminars (IDB70 Solo - sponsored seminar)
(IDB Seminar - Coordination for participation) 
Questionnaire survey 
Joint business exhibition 
Market Survey 
Trade mission
IBB seminars; brochures; company calls (with local staff, twice 
a year)
Company visits plus PR activities
All of the above.71 Plus advice from a network of friends and, 
of course, from companies who already have set up in 
Wales.72
Yorkshire & Humberside 1) direct contact with firms
2) holding seminars several times a year in cooperation with the
embassy or individually
3) participation in trade fairs
Alsace Direct contacts and indirect publicity of all aspects of Alsace in
Japan, and vice-versa, that is, the promotion of Japanese 
information for Alsatian people.
Grenoble-Isère Almost all is done through direct contact. Sometimes, seminars.
69 The Invest in Britain Bureau, an office of the UK Department of Trade and Industry.
70 The Industrial Development Board for Northern Ireland.
71 ‘Adverts. trade fairs, direct contact with firms. ’
72 This means of investment attraction is highly important. NEC’s decision to invest in 
Scotland in 1994 followed earlier inroads by the company. The Baden-Württemberg 
representative in Tokyo stated: "We have high expectation for the expansion of existing 
facilities." Interview, Mr.Kiyoshi Kobori, Tokyo 21 July 1993. The follow-on effect further 
diminishes the possibility of a more even spread of Japanese FDI through the Community. 
"Around 50% of all [UK] inward investment is accounted for by expanding existing projects." 
The Observer, 25 September 1994, p.B.5. In October 1994, the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry announced that Samsung of Korea would make its biggest European investment in 
the UK. One aspect of the agreement was that Samsung would move its European 
headquarters from Frankfurt to London. The Financial Times, 18 October 1994. p.l.















The means are documents in Japanese. We are regularly 
publishing a Newsletter called ‘Grenoble Tsushin.’
By all those activities [see index 38]
1. Direct contact with private companies.
2. Organization and/or participation of/at seminars, receptions,
exhibitions.
3. Publication of a newsletter (2-3 times/year)
4. Organization of technical missions from Japan to Touraine.
1. Direct contacts
2. Mailings





Direct and individual contact with firms/ Contacts and 
cooperation with intermediate organizations like banks, trading 
and public institutes/ Trade fairs and seminars / Advertisements
- Trade fairs
- Direct contact
- Direct contact with manufacturers, trading cos., Banks, etc..
- Trade fairs, Investment fairs.
- Investment seminars (Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya)
- Mailing of ‘Newsletter.’
Derived from these verbatim replies, the following tabulation of most frequently noted 
methods of sub-state outreach to firms can be constructed:
Tab.9* Prominent methods of sub-state promotion strategy73





Through banks/trading cos. 3
73 Multiple responses included. Frequency of 3 or more included.
74 Examples of these include: ‘The Chance of the ’90s: Investing in Eastern Germany,’ 
‘Technology Partner Saarland,’ ‘Eurotunnel Briefing’ [Kent] and ‘Setting up Business in 
Catalonia.’
Tabs.9 AND 9a  indicate that EC sub-states interface directly with Japanese firms in their 
attempts to improve local economic welfare.75 A second reason for the strong presence of 
EC sub-state regions in Japan is simply functional. A Japanese firm interested in investing 
in Europe needs specific information about candidate location sites. Much of this information 
is only available from the regions themselves. This is confirmed by interviews with Japanese 
firms.76
The kind of operational activity of an EC sub-state regional representation in Tokyo can be 
illustrated by the following example. In late March 1993 NRW Japan [the North Rhine- 
Westphalia Economic Development Corporation’s representation] held a two-day conference 
in a Tokyo Hotel. With about 200 Japanese executives attending, four themes were explored 
in a seminar format: ‘Construction of an Ecological Infrastructure for Industrial Vitalization,’ 
‘Logistics and Distribution in the Single Market,’ ‘The EC’s Largest R&D Cities - 
Technology Development and Transfer Processes,’ and ‘System Communication EC - The 
Center of Europe’s hardware and Software Communications.’ Vigorous and competitive 
promotion of regions in their European context is common. The Netherlands promotes both 
Rotterdam and the entire country as the ‘Gateway to Europe.’ The title of the NRW Japan
77
75 This is also the case with U.S. states. Cynthia Day Wallace and John M. Kline write 
that: "Experience with their various investment promotion programs has now imprinted on the 
consciousness of sub-national government officials the realization that foreign investment can 
be an important factor in the welfare of their local economies." EC92 and Changing Global 
Investment Patterns, Vol.XIV, #10, Significant Issues Series, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, D.C. 1992. p.23.
76 Mr. Hisashi Tainaka, General Manager of Canon, Affiliates Management Division in 
Tokyo stated that although his firm was monitoring EC regulations, local regulations were 
"more important at the moment." Interview, Tokyo, 15 June 1993. Mr. Michio Sasamori, 
Manager of the European Business Development Department at Hitachi Ltd. stated "At least 
as a first contact its easier for us to deal with regions." He also stated that discussions were 
multi-layered, with national, regional and city authorities. Interview, Tokyo, 30 June 1993. 
In the case of Nissan’s large investment in the UK, Mr. Yoshiaki Gogami, Manager, European
& American Operations of Nissan stated: "First we contacted the UK government, then the 
region." Interview, Tokyo, 15 July 1993. Mr. C.E.A. Ripley of the British embassy in Tokyo 
reported that this phase of decision-making for Japanese firms on average lasts for 18 months. 
This compares with an average of 12-36 months for European firms in Japan. Commission 
of the European Communities/EXPROM Guide for European Investment in Japan, based on 
a study by Booz Allen & Hamilton, Brussels, Tokyo, 1990. p.85.
conference was ‘Challenge of NRW - the EC frontier.’ The emphasis on R&D plays on the 
fact that Germany is second only to the UK in the number of Japanese R&D facilities it has 
attracted.77 The land representation co-ordinated the participation of metropolitan, county 
and industrial park authorities in an exhibition setting. Represented were: the City of Köln, 
MediaPark Köln, City of Bonn, City of Mönchengladbach, City of Krefeld, Kleve County, 
Wesel County, City of Duisburg and the (‘MEO’) Cities of Mülheim an der Ruhr, Essen and 
Oberhausen. Westdeutsche Landesbank executives and the land’s economic affairs minister 
participated. Whilst earlier attempts to attract Japanese companies had focused on tax breaks 
and subsidies, by the 1990s the competition for FDI projects and (from late 1991) the 
economic recession in Japan demanded greater sophistication from sub-state representations. 
The seminar titles above reflect this. Dr. Thomas Klante, Advisor to the Chairman of the 
board of RWE AG, an electricity supply company, presented the concept of "public-private 
partnership" in the management of enviro-economic issues. "The term ‘public-private 
partnership’ implies a co-operation between public law and private industry with a view to 
solving major problems facing the [local] community... This is taking place in the shape of 
joint ventures and working associations"78 he said. This sophisticated and tactile approach 
goes well beyond tax-breaks and encourages an organic relationship between Japanese firm 
and host region. The flexible and direct approach of EC sub-state regions raises the issue of 
the relationship between sub-state entities and states in the international system. This is a 
recurrent theme in much of the introductory literature. However, more pertinent for the 
purposes of this study is the nature of the relationship between EC sub-states, member states 
and the EC institutions (particularly the Commission). Tabs.10 & 11 report responses to 
queries regarding the multi-layered relationship between different levels of political authority 
as gauged by their external manifestation in Japan. Tab .10 displays responses to questions 
regarding co-ordination between sub-state offices, embassies and the EC Commission 
Delegation in Tokyo. Tab .11 reports responses to questions regarding the difference in 
Junction between sub-state entities, embassies and the EC Commission Delegation in Tokyo.
78
77 *JETRO The 9th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies in the 
Manufacturing Sector. Tokyo, October 1993. Table I-l, p.3.
78 Author’s notes. NRW Japan conference, Otani Hotel, Tokyo, 29 March 1993.
Tab.10 Coordination with state and EC levels79
79
State80 EC81
Bavaria The embassy of F.R.G. 
supports our activities
No
Berlin Yes. Seminar arrangements, Yes. Seminar
visits by Berlin government 
leaders et.al.
arrangement
Ports of Bremen Yes No
Hessen Each state82 is in charge Until now there
of promoting its own was no
investment activities, and 
the embassy helps it.
connection.
Niedersachsen No No
North Rhine-Westphalia We don’t coordinate, but 
we help each other if possible
No
Rheinland-Pfalz Yes Sometimes
Saar No Have been contacting 
the EC representative 
in Tokyo sometimes 
for getting information
S.-Holstein/Hamburg No No
T reuhandanstalt No, sometimes marginally Don’t know
Kent Yes, with British consulate No, their scope is
in Osaka too wide
Comm. New Towns Yes Not specifically
Northern England Yes, we do very much Not much here,83 but our 
head office in Newcastle 
does.
Northern Ireland Yes - British embassy No




Wales Yes Not really
Yorkshire & Humberside Yes No
79 Replies are given in full.
80 ‘Do you co-ordinate with the embassy of your European state?'








Yes, very much with 
French embassy 
Not really. We made one 
seminar together.
No
We collaborate with 
DATAR, the French agency 
that represents the 22 






Andalusia Yes Not so much
Basque Yes, for promotion Not much
Catalonia — —
Murcia We try No
Valencia Yes No
74% of responding sub-state regional authorities reported positive relations with their state’s 
embassies. The following tabulation extrapolated from Tab. 10, treats levels of positive 
relations by member state category:





The highly positive relationship between UK sub-state regions and UK government 
departments reflects the centralised nature of internal government in that state, but also the 
vigorous and consistent policy of the UK government to pursue, promote and encourage 
inbound FDI as a means of economic welfare enhancement at state level. Within this 
approach the role of the UK sub-states frequently perform state-auxiliary roles. An interview 
at the British embassy in Tokyo revealed very strong co-ordination by the government, of 
regional in-bound investment promotional activities. This includes direct financial support 
for external sub-state promotion since 1975. Mr. C.E.A. Ripley, First Secretary (Inward 
Investment) stated that the Invest in Britain Bureau co-ordinated the regions and acted as "a
catalyst."84 Each of the official regions bids for state assistance for a percentage of their 
costs on an annual basis. The Committee on Overseas Promotion meets quarterly and regions 
give notice of their promotional activities abroad. "We don’t want four regions putting on four 
similar events in Japan on the same day" said Mr. Ripley. UK regional representatives meet 
at the embassy in Tokyo every second month. However, such meetings do not appear to dull 
competition between regions in the UK: "1 wouldn’t say they’re cutting each other’s throats 
but there is vigorous competition" said Mr. Ripley. UK pro-FDI policy was manifested by 
government support for Japanese FDI access in inter-member state negotiations. In this 
respect, the de facto role of the UK as represented in Japan, although structured like Spain, 
Germany, France and Belgium - is actually more similar to the state-centric approach of the 
second most successful inbound FDI destination in the EC - the Netherlands. The size of the 
UK, more than its constitutional nature, has given rise to sub-state representation in Tokyo. 
It might also be inferred that a strong role for the state (whether through regional offices in 
the UK case, or direct government promotion in the case of the Netherlands) is a highly 
efficient means of promoting inbound FDI from Japan.
The Spanish embassy in Japan also has a coordinating role in the activities of the regions 
represented at sub-state level. At the Global Business Opportunities Convention (G-BOC) 
organised by the Osaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 12-15 October 1993, the 
Spanish Embassy’s Commercial Office co-ordinated the participation of all Spanish regions 
represented in Japan. This large-scale business fair involved foreign and domestic firms and 
regions from all over the world. In the survey, Spain’s regions showed a high degree of 
positive relations with the state, from which advice on such matters as technology transfer and 
joint-ventures emanates, in a form of ‘administrative guidance’ not unknown in Japan itself. 
The UK government however, offers no such stipulations to its regions - preferring to raise 
local content after the establishment of a plant. The role of central government is therefore 
apparent in policies of liberalisation and of stipulation. There is no evidence that a high level 
of centralisation in this domain implies less liberalisation.
Germany exhibited a level of Länder cooperation of 70% in the survey. This reflects an
81
84 Interview, Tokyo, 23 March 1993.
evolved federal system, financially secure representative offices and perhaps, the realistic and 
slightly sceptical view of the federal government towards inbound FDI. The federal 
government is scrupulous in not promoting one land over another, in the matter of inbound 
FDI. At interview Mr. Kiyoshi Kobori, Representative for Baden-Württemberg stated; "We 
sometimes need embassy support. But because of the German federal republic [structure] it 
does not function like England. If a firm wants to set up, it’s a competitive situation and the 
German embassy cannot show favour... Every three months we have a meeting between the 
Länder in Tokyo [at which] a representative of the embassy attends. But it is only a general 
information project." He added: "Thatcher visited Nissan - but Kohl has never done so."85
As with T a b .5a above, the French response must be viewed in the context of the small 
number of French regions represented and responding, and the fact that these are 
predominantly represented through consultancies. A central government co-ordination role 
of the regions was strongly evident in the 1989 Franco-Japanese initiative to encourage 
investment between the two states. Each government decided to set up a council to encourage 
investment. "The members of the council on the French side will include officials of 
municipal governments concerned, while the French national government’s Industry and Land 
Development Ministry will take part in the capacity of observer.."86 The disposition of 
France, and changes in that disposition during the 1980s are treated in Ch.IV. Here however, 
it is important to stress the variance of disposition within France toward Japanese investment. 
Although Prime Minister Cresson was negatively disposed, Fauroux and particularly Chirac, 
stressed the need for France to connect more closely with Japanese firms. The commercial 
section of the French embassy in Tokyo adopted a pragmatic, exploratory approach - in 1986 
inviting Japanese company chairmen to visit France with a view to investment.87 Perhaps
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85 Interview, Tokyo 21 July 1993.
86 Daily Yomuiri, 22 February 1989, p.4. The agreement was negotiated by Hiroshi 
Mitsuzuka, Japan’s MITI minister and Roger Fauroux, Minister of Industry of France. Asahi 
Evening News, 3 February 1989, p.3. As with the examples of Denmark and Ireland above, 
this is a further example of sub-state involvement in international relations through the offices 
of the state.
87 Interview, Mr. Jean-Pierre Dubois, Commercial counsellor, Embassy of France, Tokyo,
21 July 1993.
significantly, this was the median year of the setting up of French sub-state regional 
promotional contacts in Japan.
The Belgian region represented in Japan did not respond to the survey, however the efficiency 
of fragmented external authorities in a small member state was questioned by Shigeru 
Horikoshi at the Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (Europe) S.A. in Brussels. "In Belgium there are 
problems as to whom to address."88
The second column of Tab.IO concerns co-ordination between sub-state regions and the EC. 
Before conclusions can be drawn from this data, it is important to stress that the EC has no 
direct role in inbound FDI promotion from Japan, and has encountered opposition in 
attempting to extend its de facto role in the realm of inbound FDI policy (Ch.V). Secondly, 
as noted above, the primary and sometimes exclusive activity of sub-state regional 
representations in Japan is concerned with this very matter. There is consequently little 
overlap between the functional spheres of activity of sub-state regional offices and the EC 
Commission delegation in Tokyo. This does not however preclude important political 
consequences emanating from the demarcation of FDI competencies within the EC itself.
The data in Tab.IO show that although there is a high level of co-ordination between EC sub­
states and member states (74%); there is a very low level of interaction between the sub-state 
representations and the EC delegation. Only 15% of responding sub-state representations 
indicated any form of collaboration, with no significant variance across member states. This 
cannot however be interpreted as an antipathetic disposition towards either the EC or the EC 
Commission delegation in Tokyo, and is more a reflection of the functional division of tasks 
regarding inbound FDI.
The possibility that "poorer regions may be unable to participate effectively in the process" 
of investment attraction has been raised by Hill and Munday.89 That poorer regions have
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88 Interview, Mr. Shigeru Horikoshi, Brussels, 22 July 1992.
89 Hill, Stephen and Max Munday ‘The UK Regional Distribution of Foreign Direct 
Investment: Analysis and Determinants’ Regional Studies, Vol. 26.6, 1992. p.543.
difficulty staying in the inbound investment inducement orbit is confirmed by a JETRO 
official. However Hill and Munday’s view that the EC ought to have "an important role in 
co-ordinating packages of assistance available in different regions", although shared by the 
Commission, has been resisted by member states. Alliances between Japanese firms and 
liberal European states (and sub-states) had a direct influence on the course of the evolution 
of the Single Market Programme. As noted earlier, the relationship between the EC-level and 
the member states is markedly different from the relationship between states and their internal 
regions. The latter relationship involves a complex set of checks and balances (even in liberal 
states) whilst any form of guidance from the EC level is absent in the former relationship.
One sphere in which the EC Commission does have a direct and somewhat adversarial 
relationship to sub-state regions in EC-Japan affairs is that of the investigative role of the 
Commission regarding subsidies to investing firms. This power has been used neither 
frequently nor with force. However, firms are aware of Commission monitoring of land and 
infrastructural deals with regional authorities, and the prospect of having to alter location, 
suffer adverse publicity or face penalties is not relished by any firm. Such an investigation 
concerned one of the biggest Japanese projects in Europe - Toyota Motor Corporation’s 
investment in Burnaston, Derbyshire. In 1990, the EC Competition directorate general 
calculated that Toyota had acquired a site for less than market value (£9.9m as distinct from 
an independent evaluation of ¿12.6m90). Since the land in question (an old airstrip) was 
local authority property, the investigation directly concerned Derbyshire local Councils. In 
July of 1991 the Commission ruled that Toyota had received an illegal subsidy from 
Derbyshire and told between the UK government "to ensure that Toyota repays £4.2 million 
to Derbyshire."91 In response to a conference question by the writer in 1994, Mr. Osamu 
Komori, Deputy Managing Director of Toyota Motor Manufacturing U.K. Ltd. stated that 
"The amount was very small compared to the total investment."92
84
90 Mainichi Daily News, 1 August 1990, p.7.
91 The Guardian, 1 August 1991, p .ll.
92 D ialogue Europe and  Japan  1994, Canon Foundation/E.U.I. conference, Fiesole, 13 
June 1994.
The competition among and between states and sub-states obviously producers winners as 
well as losers in project terms. The Derbyshire/Toyota case was said to have caused tension 
between Derbyshire and Wales, but also the UK and France. However, as an official at the 
Portuguese embassy perceptively pointed out, the engagement between European regions and 
Japanese firms - even in instances where a project might eventually be located elsewhere, can 
be highly beneficial to a region seeking advice on how to improve the efficiency of their 
regional matrix for potentially investing firms.93 Such exchanges are not simply one-way. 
A professor at the Tohuku University in Japan has concluded that Baden-Württemberg 
provided "the best model for the development of Tohouku."94
In conducting firm-sub-state negotiations, external firms are participating in a process of 
integration. However, that process is not constrained by the authority of provinces, states or 
supra-national authorities. Any integration which is ‘gained’ from the process is at least 
potentially global rather than regional.
Tab. 11 displays responses to questions regarding the function of sub-state entities as distinct 
from embassies and the EC Commission Delegation.
Tab .11 Variations in functions95
vis. State96 vis. EC97
Bavaria We are not a diplomatic —
agency in Japan
Berlin - Due to the nature of the Our focus/interest
85
93 Interview, Mr. Rui Boavista Marques, Manager Investment Dept., ICEP, Portugal, 
Tokyo, 8 July 1993.
94 Interview, Mr. Kiyoshi Kobori, Representative, Baden-Württemberg, Tokyo, 21 July 
1993. The Tohuku region consists of the north-east prefectures of Honshu, Japan’s principal 
island.
95 Replies are given in full.
96 ‘How does your regional activity differ from the efforts of your state embassy?'’
97 ‘How does your regional activity differ from the efforts of the EC?’
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Comm. New Towns 
Northern England
Northern Ireland
Federal state (Germany), 
most of economic/investment 
matters are taken care of by 
State (Berlin) Government.
- We of course work closely 
with the German Embassy for 
seminars etc.
In the broad sense, we are 
dedicating our effort to 
promote the international 
trade of Germany through 
our ports. It is our mission 
and different from foreign 
service like German 
Embassy in Japan.
Our office is working for
Germany
Unknown
The state98 embassy doesn’t 
do any concrete investment 
promotion for only one state 
of Germany 
[We] Concentrate on 
services for direct 
investment
German Embassy under­
takes the whole of Federal 
affairs, not of each state.
No relation
Embassy does not promote 
specific regions
Limited to our several 




However, we just take care 
of one small region of 
England, so our work is 
much tougher than that of 
the embassy.
We deal solely with the 
Japanese sector of the 
market
is in Berlin as a 
part of EC
In the broad sense, 
we contribute to their 
market as a gateway port. 
However, we do not work 
for EC






Our’s is limited to 
our area














Difference in levels 
between national and regional 
Company visiting programme 
reflects Scotland’s particular 
strengths rather than those 
of UK as a whole 
More focused
Basically there is no 
difference in the field 
of attracting inward 
investment
Same, but we do more 
regionally
The action of the DATAR 
office is more oriented to 
the "régions défavorisées" 
which is not the case of Grenoble 
We promote Loiret region 
only
We are able to provide very 
quick & accurate information
& arrange meetings for Japanese 
clients... but only for one 
prefecture.99
More personalised and 
more specialised in our 
region (better knowledge 
of and contacts with 
businesses in Andalusia).
We complement our embassy 
activities.
We work more with real 
cases for industrial agreements. 
Embassy is just promotion. 
Detailed and practical 
information and services 
Acting as an intermediate agency
•*- referred to
EC not heavily involved 
in inward investment 
promotion
Di f f i cu l t  to say.  
Fundamentally it 
probably does not.
Same, but we do more 
locally
Don’t know what efforts the 
EC is actually doing. 
Difficult to answer.
We promote Loiret region 
only






We promote just companies 
from our region 
We give concrete and 
specific service that the 
embassy can not provide
The EC delegation in Japan 
doesn’t do anything for 
promoting Japanese 
investment in Europe
The first column of Tab. 11 underscores the complementary relationship between sub-states 
and states as revealed in Tab .10. Specifically, the data in the first column above emphasises 
the function of regional activity within overall state strategy. Sub-state regional 
representations stress the immediate and practical dimension of bargaining with Japanese 
firms as distinct from the general ‘promotional’ activities of member state embassies. Sub­
state regional representatives saw their role as more specific than EC activity. The second 
column of Tab.1 l again illustrates the low level of EC involvement in inbound FDI affairs.
The issue of the success of sub-state regional offices is closely related to the cost of operation 
and the perceptions of future prospects and roles of representations in Japan (Tab.13). In 
order to assess the perceived usefulness of sub-state regional representation in enhancing the 
economic welfare of a particular region, representatives were asked to assess their degree of 
inbound investment success. Responses to this enquiry are reproduced in Tab .1 2.
Ta b .12 Perceived success of activities101
Bavaria Yes
Berlin Very successful in terms
of dramatically increased 
attention to Berlin by the 
Japanese business and 
number of investments, etc.
100 Catalonia response ctd.:
"* We look for M/A partners in accordance with a specific request and act as an 
intermediate
* We assist investor’s feasibility studies
* We answer to particular and individual questions
* We help to find their site in accordance with request"

























Yes. Our ports are highly 
regarded among shipping 
companies who are calling 
our ports as the gateway 
port to European market 
In some cases it was 
successful and in some 
cases it is difficult to 
say if it was successful 
Hard to say
Yes, they have been the





Yes, to a certain degree 
Yes
Very successful up to now,
but we are facing a difficulty






Yes, they have been 
successful, but a bit difficult 
recently as companies are 
experiencing a severe period 
because of this recession
We think so 
Not for the moment 
Yes, but not enough
Quite successful in 
implementing plans 
Not as much as we would 
like. Economic situation is 
the reason.
Yes. Number of Japanese 
companies established in our 
region has been tripled from





We are just one and a half 
years in Japan so I think it 
is too early to talk about 
success. Anyway there is a 
great interest in exports to 
Japan among companies of our 
region.
Yes
63% of respondents considered their activities to have been successful. However, reports of 
success are tempered by references to recessionary conditions in Japan c.1992- and the 
downturn in outbound investment. This downturn is not an insignificant development, and 
may give clues as to whether or not the dramatic rise in global FDI will continue 
exponentially as envisaged by Julius; or whether Japan-EC FDI fits the ‘sudden spurt’ 
phenomenon of FDI with accompanying disequilibria, outlined by Marcello De Cecco.103 
Should the volume of global FDI stabalise or even decline, the FDI phenomenon may recede 
in importance when compared with trade. The era of high-volume new stocks of Japan-EC 
FDI assumes an historical periodisation (c.1985-c.1993) with preliminary indications 
challenging the view that FDI will continue to rise at rates close to those of the 1980s.
Closely tied to the question of perceived sub-state investment attraction success, is the issue 
of future representation intentions. The following table illustrates responses to the relevant 
question.
102 Includes sales and distribution outlets
103 Marcello De Cecco has noted that while FDI has a broadly positive impact, sudden 
increases or decreases in FDI can also have ‘instability’ effects. DIALOGUE EUROPE and 
Japan  1994, Canon Foundation/E.U.I. conference, San Domenico di Fiesole. June, 1994. 
Author’s notes.
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Ta b .13 Future representation intentions 104
key
3 - Long-term




Ports of Bremen 
Hessen
Niedersachsen 






















106 "GID is deciding [currently]."
107 "As for the continuation of our activities in Japan, it is depending upon the decision 








59% of respondents reported intentions to remain in Japan in the long term. In the context 
of recessionary investment conditions, this represents a high proportion. The possibility that 
sub-state regions could diversify their activities more in the direction of trade promotion 
activity thus becomes a possibility - particularly for sub-states whose representations are of 
recent vintage. Such a development is becoming more widespread in US-Japan relations, 
where Japanese firm-U.S. state relations are more mature than Japanese firm-EC sub-state 
relations. The experience of some U.S. state representations in Japan also suggests that once 
new lanes of FDI have been established, trade may follow. The director of Missouri’s office 
in Japan has stated: "Its natural that our activity in trade would increase right now. We can 
help Missouri manufacturers with general market research, help them create their own strategy 
for exporting. And we will provide them with lists of contacts and make introductions."111
Another possible avenue of concentration for EC sub-state representations is the promotion 
of investment by small and medium-sized Japanese firms which have an interest in investing 
in Europe. Gerd Junne has stressed the important role of medium and small sized multi­
nationals in the economic system.'112 Although these have thus far not been to the fore in 
EC-Japan affairs, an increase in their investment role would be a favourable development for 
European sub-state representations in Japan. Another possibility is that FDI into Japan could 
increase. However, for the 1985-93 period, EC sub-state representations did not report a role
109 "At least"
110 Short-term: "For sure." Medium-term: "I think so." Long-term: "I hope so."
111 John A. King quoted in Japan Economic Journal, 29 September 1990, p.7. At 
interview, Baden-Wurttemberg’s representative Mr. Kiyoshi Kobori stated that "Our function 
is to attract investment, but quite recently we have had a cross corporate function for exports 
and technology cooperation." Interview, Tokyo, 21 July 1993.
112 Junne, Gerd ‘Multinational Enterprises as Actors,’ in Carlsnaes, Walter and Steve 
Smith (eds.) European Foreign Policy, Sage, London, 1994, p.85.
in the promotion of European investment in Japan. A further possibility is that sub-states 
might begin to interact with Asian mainland firms and political authorities. Many EC sub­
state offices are already nominally ‘Asian’ or ‘Asia/Pacific’ representations, although thus far 
there has been a low level of connection with non-Japanese firms or authorities. The possible 
advent of outbound FDI in other Asian countries, could give sub-states a renewed general 
Asian role.113 Mr. Kobori of the Baden-Württemberg office stressed the future need for 
partnerships in general Asian access:".. to develop China, German business people need the 
assistance of Japan."114
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EC sub-states play a minor role in facilitating European FDI access to Japan. This is due to 
a number of factors. FDI strategy is frequently made solely within large European firms; 
medium and small-sized European firms (which might need assistance) have not invested in 
Japan to any significant degree thus far; the European Business Community’s Investment 
Committee is active in representations to the Japanese government regarding problem areas 
for European firms attempting to access Japan;115 (as is the EC Commission delegation116) 
and frequently investment promotion is, like trade promotion, a de facto competence of the
113 Two developments may indicate a trend in this direction. Firstly, in late 1994, the EC 
Commission decided to impose anti-dumping duties on Asian television sets (some of which 
were produced by Japanese firms, but none actually produced in Japan). This may increase 
FDI from Asia to Europe. The Financial Times, 16 September 1994, p.l., International 
Herald Tribune, 1 October 1994, p .ll. Secondly, in October 1994, the UK won a significant 
project from Samsung of Korea which entails the eventual creation of 3,000 jobs in the north 
of England. The Financial Times, 18 October 1994, p.l.
114 Interview, Tokyo, 21 July 1993.
115 Issues identified by the EBC Investment Committee include the high collateral 
requirements by Japanese banks, high corporate tax levels, "extreme difficulties" in M & A 
and the keiretsu (conglomerate) structure of some firms. Interview, Dr. Reinhard Neumann, 
Investment Committee Chairman, European Business Community, Tokyo, 18 June 1993. On 
keiretsu, see Strange, Susan, ‘European Business in Japan: a policy crossroads?’ Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol.33, No.l, March 1995.
116 With the support of Brussels officials. For example EC Commission Vice President 
Bangemann lobbied the Japanese government to take action on obstacles to investment during 
his visit in March 1993.
member states.117 This situation may however be undergoing change with the deceleration 
in Japanese investment to Europe. This in turn could lead EC sub-states to take a more active 
role in facilitating European investment in Japan. For example the Baden-Württemberg 
representation was actively proposing that a ‘German village’ be constructed in Japan in order 
to facilitate German investment and other German-Japanese economic exchanges.
The continued ability of EC regions to attract whatever FDI is available,118 their ability to 
assist medium-sized local European enterprises export to Japan, and the possibility of 
attracting small or medium-sized Japanese firms, emerge as the tests of EC sub-state 
representations’ success and survival in Japan into the late 1990s.
A supplementary question to sub-state regional representatives concerned industry-specific 
relations.119 Some EC member states are particularly interested in certain sectors or 
categories. Examples include; Ireland for pharmaceuticals and secondary manufacturing, and 
Portugal attempting to attract Japanese firms considering a second European plant. Sub-state 
representatives addressed the issue of special relations with particular industries as follows:
94
117 See Ch.V for discussion of the interconnectedness of trade and investment policy, and 
the dilemmas presented by their separation at EC level.
118 Despite the down-tum, new investment has not ceased. In September of 1994 Scotland 
secured its largest single Japanese plant investment; an NEC plant at Livingston due to 
employ 430.
119 Tab. 14 presents data on the issue of whether or not specific regions have special 
relations with particular industries or firms in Japan. [In addition to sub-state regional and 
municipal representations there are some miscellaneous representations which are associated 
with specific industries. These include the Representation of the Leipzig Fair in Japan and 
the Institute of Small and Medium Sized Industry of Valencia. There also exist miscellaneous 
state commercial organisations, frequently constituted on sectoral lines. These include the 
Danish Agricultural Marketing Board, the French Fashion and Textile Center and the Greek 
National Tourism Organization. The German Machinery and Plant Manufacturers 
Association for example, has been represented through a Japan Liaison Office since 1980.]














Shipping industry in Japan
Yes. The main body of our office is the "Nippon Carl Duisberg 
Society Inc." (Business: Exchange of vocational trainees 




No, several M&A mandates with Japanese financial institutions
Kent







Not quite, but maintains contact with industry suitable for Kent 
(Hi-tech, Hi-added value etc.)
No
Yes121
Yes we have, but it’s confidential 
No
Closest links are with major Japanese electronics companies 
because of Scotland’s strengths in electronics.
No. Relationship is very close with all potential firms/industries 
No
Alsace No overall
Grenoble-Isere Not really, but we are looking for the industries which matches
with the "Pole d’excellence:' of Grenoble.
Loiret —
Touraine Medical field. (We prospect a lot in the pharmaceutical and












120 ‘Does your office have a special relationship with any single firm or industry ?’ Replies 
are given in full.
121 No details given.
122 No details given.
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Generally EC sub-states were eager to accept investment from any source. However, regions 
such as Scotland and Touraine were targeting firms in sectors from which they had already 
received investment and perhaps had established a sectoral comparative advantage in terms 
of skills and supply. Some regions refused to disclose details of relationships with individual 
firms and/or sectors on the grounds of confidentiality.
Before evaluating the theoretical literature oudined at the beginning of this chapter, the role 
of Japanese prefectures in EC-Japan relations, and the European presence in Japanese regions 
are treated.
III.4 Japanese prefectures and EC-Japan FDI relations
The role of Japanese prefectures in the international relations of Japan has been largely 
conditioned by the very high degree of administrative centralisation in that country. This 
centralisation is reflected in the presence of nine regional Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry prefectural bureaux within Japan.123
The low level of direct external prefectural representation cannot be ascribed to constitutional 
convention alone. The level of FDI penetration by external firms in Japan (the lowest among 
major industrialised states) corresponds to the low level of external outreach by prefectures.
MITI and JETRO disseminate information about the 47 prefectures abroad, and the 
Development Bank of Japan also promotes foreign investment in the regions.124 The EC 
delegation in Tokyo has attempted to encourage Japanese prefectures to bring European 
investment into their regions. This strategy was motivated by the assessment that many local
123 Interview, Mr. Yuji Hosoya, International Business Affairs Division, MITI, Tokyo, 16 
June 1993.
124 With acknowledgements to Professor Gorow Ono, MITI Research Institute, Tokyo, for 
discussions on this subject "JETRO is the window for regional representation abroad" said 
Dr. Reinhard Neumann, Chairman of the Investment Committee of the European Business 
Community in Japan. Interview, 18 June 1993.
regions wished to have more direct investment and trade links with external firms, rather than
relying on the large trading houses, banks and ministries in Tokyo. This themè was taken up
by the EC Head of Delegation in Tokyo, Andreas Van Agt in the inaugural speech to the
Kagawa-EC Association in 1989:
....we know from increasing evidence that Japanese business people, and especially 
Japanese SME’s, want to do business directly with EC enterprises, that they want to 
buy on their own account instead of always relying on a trading company which may 
control distribution and price: and they, like the regions of Europe, also seek foreign 
investment125
Commencing in 1986/87, the EC Commission Tokyo delegation pioneered the setting up of 
EC Associations in provincial prefectures with a view to making direct contact with local 
commercial leaders. The associations are usually headed by local bank or firm 
presidents126and involve the prefectural and metropolitan governors in information 
dissemination and meetings with European firms and business experts.127 In this regard, the 
Commission can be seen to have exercised a quick-reflex response to local geo-economic 
political realities. This was in marked contrast to the Commission’s campaign to extend its 
trade authority to include inbound FDI regulation (Ch.V below).
By mid-1993 there existed twelve EC Associations in Japan.
T ab . 15 EC Associations in Japan
The Aizu-EC Association 
The Gifu-EC Association 
The Hyogo-EC Association 
The Kagawa-EC Association 
The Kumamoto-EC Association 
The Matsuyama-EC Association 
The Miyagi-EC Association 
The Nagano-EC Association 
The Oita-EC Association
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125 Andreas Van Agt Speech, Kagawa-EC Association, Takamatsu, 25 January 1989. EC 
News, PR. 1/89(E).
126 For example the President of a Kumamoto Bank was also the chairman of the 
Kumamoto-EC Association.
127 These associations are not directly related to the EC Documentation Centres such as 
that at Sophia University in Tokyo.
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The Saga-EC Association 
The Yamagata-EC Association 
The Yamaguchi-EC Association
The EC Commission attempts to promote relations between the EC and the regional 
prefectures by encouraging such regions to become more interactive with Europe - particularly 
in trade and investment affairs.128 At the Yamagata-EC Association Annual General Meeting 
in July 1993, the writer made the following remarks concerning the roles of regions in EC- 
Japan relations:
The EC assists regions through structural funds. Regions in receipt of assistance are 
those whose development is lagging behind; areas affected by industrial conversion; 
and less-favoured rural areas. In addition to receiving aid however, it is very 
important to emphasise that most European regions are taking an active stance in 
helping themselves. They are doing this by establishing important trade and 
investment links with each other, and importantly, with the world economy at large... 
Problems which European firms face when investing in Japan include the complexity 
of M&A activity in Japan and the difficulty of obtaining information on companies 
for sale. By becoming aware of the problems which foreign firms face in investing 
in Japan, regions can make a valuable contribution to positive national change. If 
regional authorities feel that they would benefit from European investment, European 
know-how, European expertise and European style, they ought to establish links with 
European firms. If it is not feasible to have a permanent office in the EC, Japanese 
regions should visit European firms and regions at least once a year, and co-ordinate 
closely with those national agencies which represent them abroad.... EC-Japan co­
operation would be strengthened if European inward investment into Japan is
128 The member-states also have a presence in regional prefectures. While some larger 
states have consular missions, smaller states hold seminars. An example of the latter is the 
series organised by the Portuguese embassy in October 1993 which visited Chiba, Kawasaki, 
Nagoya, Osaka, Toyama and Fukuoka. Only a small number of EC sub-state regions have 
representations outside of Tokyo. (See Tab.5.) Some regions have established twin city 
arrangements for educational and cultural exchange purposes. One region-to-region 
relationship which appears to be successful is the ‘mutual exchange’ between Baden- 
Württemberg and the Kanagawa region near Tokyo. The representative of the German land 
said: "This area is similar to Baden-Württemberg. The Kanagawa region introduces us to 
many high-tech companies." The link was established in 1985. With reference to cross- 
national sub-state co-operation in external affairs, Mr. Kiyoshi Kobori said that although 
Baden-Württemberg had special Links with Lombardia, Catalonia and Loaire, there was no 
co-ordination between them in Japan. Interview, Tokyo, 21 July 1993. The very high instance 
of direct company contact revealed in Tab.9a indicates that sub-state representatives in Japan 
travel extensively on company visits.
facilitated by the host country, and importantly, by the host regions.129 
Foreign firms have continued to experience difficulties in gaining access to Japan for 
investment and trade distributive purposes. The negotiations under the framework of the 
American Structural Impediments Initiative130 led to an increasingly strident critique of 
cultural, social and historical ‘non-tariff barriers’ which emerged as a more important excluder 
of foreign firm activity than government policy. However, the distribution system and other 
aspects of socio-economic organisation in Japan, are essential elements of a much broader 
social fabric embracing elements such as employment practice and the care of the elderly. 
The EC critique has been less piquant than that of the U.S. and the Trade Assessment 
Mechanism, preferred by the Commission in the mid-1990s eschews direct critiques of 
Japanese society.
The trend towards ‘internationalisation’ and the ‘internationalisation of the regions’ which is 
officially encouraged by the government,131 has been tempered by the economic slow-down 
in Japan. The recession of c.1992- rendered investment in exploratory sales networks in 
regional or remote areas by European firms potentially risky.132 The question of European 
FDI to Japan is framed in the context of overall FDI intentions of European firms and 
specifically, the environment for direct investment in Japan. The role of Japanese prefecture! 
and metropolitan authorities as active outreach hosts for such investment from Europe is 
limited by the territorial administrative structure within Japan, and perhaps more importantly, 
by the demographic and economic-structural constraints which have produced the continuously
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129 Bourke, Thomas ‘EC-Japan relations and the role of regions’, address, Annual  
General Meeting of the Yam agata-EC Association, Yamagata, 19 July 1993. Text, 
pp.3-4.
130 The S.I.I. (1988-92) was the most detailed government market access effort undertaken 
in recent times.
131 An example of this is the Japanese government’s JET programme, through which 
foreign nationals are hired to teach in Japanese high schools or work on overseas promotion 
in prefectural or municipal offices.
132 The EC Ambassador [Press conference, EC delegation, Tokyo, 17 June 1993] and the 
U.S. administration [U.S. Trade Representative Kantor, Press Conference, 24 May 1994] have 
identified the stimulation of consumer demand within Japan as one of the principal pillars in 
a strategy to reduce their respective trade deficits with that country.
low propensity toward inbound FDI within Japan. It is against this background that the EC 
Commission introduced its strategy in the regions of Japan.
An assessment of conditions for investment in Japan was produced by the Commission of the 
EC in conjunction with EXPROM133 in 1990. The Guide for European Investment in Japan 
was based on a study by Booz Allen & Hamilton.134 The report contains valuable 
reflections on political economic conditions for relations with European firms in the Japanese 
prefectures, citing four ‘important investment location criteria cited by foreign companies in 
Japan’:
- Labour access; i.e. the ability to recruit high quality people
- Land availability and price
- Distance to customers; suppliers; key government officials
- Transportation infrastructure135
These results give a high priority to two factors which are not major concerns in Japanese 
firms’ investment decisions in Europe: labour and land. The very low level of unemployment 
in Japan, the continued preference of graduates to work for Japanese firms, and the long-term 
demographic labour shortage, make hiring local staff difficult.136 Land is less available and 
more expensive in Japan than in most parts of western Europe. There are some measures 
which local prefectures can and do take to alleviate these conditions. Some provide 
consultancy services to assist with hiring; while prefectures more distant from Tokyo advertise 
lower land prices. Generally however, the leeway for prefectural authorities to influence geo- 
economic factors in investment conditionality is limited. European firms noted that there was
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133 The export promotion unit of the EC Commission.
134 Booz Allen & Hamilton, Guide for European Investment in Japan, Brussels and 
Tokyo, 1990.
135 ibid. p.45.
136 The problem is not limited to external firms; Japanese firms compete vigorously at 
graduate fairs each year. Manual and unskilled sectors also experience difficulties. In 1993 
the number of foreign workers exceeded 1 % of the population of Japan for the first time in 
Japanese history. I am grateful to Fr. Horgan of the Immigrant Workers Advice Bureau of 
Yokohama for this information.
"not that large a difference in the levels of incentive which are offered by local 
governments."137 The national government is thus entrusted with measures which may 
effect the geographical spread of industrial activity. A number of measures such as the 
establishment of Tsukuba Science City138 and legal provisions during the 1960s and 
1970s139 were enacted in an attempt to decentralise aspects of the economy and respond to 
chronic early 1970s pollution in Tokyo.
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Gerald Curtis has recently addressed growing prefecture] assertiveness, saying that there was 
relatively little understanding among foreign businessmen that local prefectures in Japan 
compete for inbound investment. There had been cases where local governments had 
overturned MITI objections to such investments. Cargill Corp., for example, had built a 
fertilizer plant in Kagoshima, Kyushu "using the power of the Kagoshima government to 
overwhelm MITI’s opposition." In Oita prefecture and the Tohoku region of the North-East, 
there were also vigorous attempts to draw in foreign investment.140 As in the EC - but to 
a far lesser degree - there is potential conflict between the centralised ‘protecting’ trade
137 Booz Allen & Hamilton Guide for European Investment in Japan, Brussels and Tokyo,
1990. p.45.
138 This specially designated urban area was conceived in the early 1960s and 
administered by the Science and Technology Agency of the Prime Minister’s Office as a 
‘science city’ for the enhancement of Japanese research and development. The metropolitan 
area has a population of 180,000 - significantly lower than early projections which envisaged 
entire Japanese government departments moving to Tsukuba, some 80km from Tokyo. 47 
national research institutes and 170 private research institutions have facilities there. The 
ability of the city to compete with Silicon Valley and other hi-tech centres has recently been 
questioned. The weakening of MITI’s role in the co-ordination of Japanese competitiveness 
enhancement and the fact that large firms are conducting their own research challenges the 
utility of such an ‘administered’ centre. Writer’s field visit in collaboration with Executive 
Training Programme of the EC Commission, Tokyo.
139 For example ‘The Law for the Promotion of Industries in Rural Areas’ (1961), ‘The
I .aw for the Development of New Industrial Cities’ (1962) and ‘The Industrial Relocation 
Promotion Law’ (1972). Commission of the European Communities/EXPROM Guide for 
European Investment in Japan, based on a study by Booz Allen & Hamilton, Brussels, Tokyo,
1990. Appendices.
140 Gerald Curtis quoted in ‘Europe in the Asia/Pacific Region - involvements, challenges, 
policy roles’, conference report, Thomas Bourke, rapporteur, E.U.I., Fiesole, April 1994. 
p.30.
policies of government and the hospitable economic welfare enhancement outreach of regions. 
Conclusion
The theoretical literature outlined above treated the external relations of sub-states in federal 
systems; the applicability of the principle of subsidiarity to the external relations activities of 
sub-state regions; and the new geopolitical literature on the ‘organic’ development and 
activities of regions. The latter vision of change in the global political economy is 
particularly useful. Scholars such as Gipouloux, Barnes and Ledebur and Smith have been 
influenced by Braudel’s work. This stresses the spatio-temporal and organic nature of 
political economic activity - with its emphasis on the local the relational and the potentially 
global economy of the world - better capturing the pulse of post-1989 change than the more 
formal - albeit useful - literature on federal systems and subsidiarity.
The central issues investigated in the empirical survey were: What is the extent of EC sub­
state activity in EC-Japan relations; how important is their role; and how does what they do 
relate to the state and EC-level institutions? The role of Japanese prefectures in EC-Japan 
affairs was examined in a comparative context.
The significant increase in levels of global FDI in the 1980s brought trans-national 
corporations into direct contact with multiple levels of political authority. This dynamic was 
particularly evident between Japan and the EC. In this environment, EC sub-states exhibited 
a strong degree of flexible interaction with global capital and production. The function of 
sub-state representation was largely confined to the sphere of investment attraction. The 
welfare enhancement nature of this function gives it a high priority. Sub-states were 
sufficiently flexible to participate fully in the most important development in recent EC-Japan 
history; the intensification of direct links between Japan and the EC through FDI.
The involvement of sub-states in this important external development in EC affairs raises the 
issue of how the role of sub-states relates to those of states and the EC institutions. As 
anticipated in some of the introductory theoretical reflections, the state/sub-state relationship
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in EC external affairs is largely co-operative. Particularly impressive was the institutionalised 
structure (grants, regular meetings, joint representations) of EC state/sub-state relations in 
Tokyo. This confirms the view of Soldatos that "decentralization could enhance unity and 
efficiency in external relations.."141 This is particularly evident in the case of the UK and 
Spain. State/sub-state relations are not without tensions and the relationship resembles a 
partnership in which the state is leading. The interaction between sub-states and external 
firms also brings a ‘leverage of transparency’ which favours the sub-states in their dealings 
with states regarding FDI activity.
The relationship between sub-state entities and the EC institutions is markedly different from 
that between sub-states’ and member states. Sub-states in external affairs have little contact 
with the EC Commission delegation in Tokyo, while in Europe, sub-states are wary of DGIV 
intrusion in highly sensitive external deals.
More important than the simple functional relationship however, is the evolution of the EC 
‘system’ in the important sphere of external bargains regarding economic welfare 
enhancement. Since the mid-1980s, the configuration of tri-level external representation on 
this crucial issue with Japan has favoured the enhancement of state and sub-state (shared) 
power to a greater degree than the enhancement of EC institutional power.
The EC institutional/member state/sub-state relationship can be compared to the NAFTA/U.S.
/state relationship. From an integrationist perspective, Hans Michelmann envisages difficulties
arising from the wide variety of subnational laws and policies:
As world trade and international investments continue to grow, these become more 
visible., [and] will have to be considerably curtailed if they are not to provoke 
substantial irritation in the North American free-trade area; similarly, analogous 
practices in the West German Länder will be limited by the higher degree of EC 
integration brought about by the completion of the EC domestic market.142
Such a view is not supported by the empirical evidence above. Just as there is no trend
141 Soldatos, Panayotis ‘An Explanatory Framework for the Study of Federated States as 
Foreign-policy Actors’ in Michelmann, Hans, J. and Panayotis Soldatos (eds.) Federalism and 
International Relations.' the role of subnational units, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990. p.42.
142 Michelmann, Hans J. in Michelmann and Soldatos, op.cit. p.309.
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towards sub-states and the EC ‘ganging up’ on the state, there is no evidence from the 
involvement of German Länder in EC-Japan affairs, that sub-states will be limited by any 
‘higher degree of EC integration.’ The external representative powers of sub-states are largely 
supported by member states as an efficient extension of state predisposition and policy. The 
fact that sub-states negotiated efficiently and speedily with firms in the 1980s and 1990s, prior 
to the Maastricht position on subsidiarity, indicates that the de facto nexus of relations 
between sub-states, states and firms was the defining and more powerful integrating force of 
the era.
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CHAPTER IV EC MEMBER STATES AND JAPANESE INVESTMENT
Introduction
Both states and firms have played central roles in the evolution of EC-Japan relations. The 
literature on the interaction between states and firms, such as the work of Vernon1 and 
Servan-Schreiber2, has examined the challenge to state authority posed by firms in an age of 
increasing capital mobility and transnational control of production. This chapter - while 
focusing on states - is not primarily concerned with the state/firm sovereignty debate. Rather 
than focus on the challenge of firms to state power; it is the integrative power of member 
states versus the integrative power of transnational corporations which is under examination.
FDI is an important and (in terms of volume) a relatively novel, extension of transnational 
firm power.3 This is particularly the case in ‘the age of investment’ in EC-Japan relations. 
European integration is a key host political condition (eg. Commission trade policy), which 
provides options and a framework of network bargains, influencing and influenced by 
exogenous and endogenous factors.
Literature which treats multinational corporations relative to regional integration, tends to do 
so in terms of economic integration alone. Here, it is the political dynamic which is the focus 
of analysis.4
1 Vernon, Raymond Sovereignty at Bay: the multi-national spread of the U.S. enterprise, 
Longman, London, 1971.
2 Servan-Schreiber, Jean Jacques Le défi, américain, Denoel, Paris, 1967.
3 DeAnne Julius has written that "As a means of international economic integration, FDI 
is in its take-off phase; perhaps in a position comparable to world trade at the end of the 
1940s." Global Companies and Public Policy, RIIA/Pinter, London, 1990, p.36.
4 Neil Mitchell notes that: "The issues raised by FDI are more clearly defined and the 
claims more easily testable in the economic than the political debate." Mitchell, Neil J. 
Review Essay ‘Foreign Money & American Politics,’ Polity, Vol. XXIV, Number 2, Winter,
1991, p.338. Peter Dicken has also commented on the political economic mix: "Foreign direct 
investment is both an economic and a political phenomenon. In the case of Japanese FDI it
Due to the rapid rise in FDI from c.1985 and the decrease in new stocks from c.1991; the 
investment phenomenon assumes a clear periodisation. The impact of this ‘event’ upon 
European integration, and the extent to which such FDI reveals the nature of European 
integration are analysed. Chapter V below, will examine the EC institutional level response 
to Japanese firms in the period of increased inbound FDI from Japan. Some of the issues 
raised in the course of that analysis will include reflections upon the actions, roles and nature 
of EC member states. Strong state involvement is evident in the analysis of the role of 
Japanese firms in the evolution of the single European market - particularly in their testing 
of the applicability of the movement of goods principle (sect. V.6) - and concerning 
Commission power and Japanese production (V.10 & V .ll). The treatment of sub-states, 
member states and the EC institutional level, forms an analysis of the constitutional ‘totality’ 
of the EC in this important external relationship.
The importance of member states in EC-Japan affairs has been noted by Jean-Pierre Lehmann: 
at least until very recently, the expression ‘Euro-Japanese relationship’ was somewhat 
misleading. One had Franco-Japanese relations, Anglo-Japanese relations, German-Japanese 
relations, but the unified, Europe-wide policy towards Japan implied by the phrase ‘Euro- 
Japanese’ simply did not exist. To say that it exists would be premature."5 Opinion among 
Japanese investors predicted that "moves toward the economic and monetary unification 
would probably be slowed down by various factors such as the coordination of interests 
between member countries."6 In the analysis which follows, an emergent theme is the 
manner in which Japanese firms highlight pre-existing differences between member state 
external commercial priorities.
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is especially difficult to disentangle the two dimentions." ‘The changing geography of 
Japanese foreign direct investment in manufacturing industry. A global perspective’ in Morris, 
Jonathan (ed.) Japan and the Global Economy, Routledge, London, 1991. p.15.
5 Lehmann, Jean-Pierre ‘France, Japan, Europe, and industrial competition’, International 
Affairs, Vol.68, Number 1, January, 1992. p.40.
6 JETRO The 9th Survey o f European Operations of Japanese Companies in the 
Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo, 1993. p.3.
Alan Milward and Andrew Moravcsik implicitly question the extent to which integration is 
occurring.7 Cafruny and Rosenthal write from a different perspective: important symbolic
as well as real elements of national power, if not sovereignty, have been surrendered to the 
Community. The power of the nation-state has been diminished, both as a result of the EC 
and of global economic interdependence."8 The question of the extent to which the changing 
geometry of power within the Community may be attributable to such political economic 
forces as ‘global economic interdependence’ is frequently lacking in EC studies. In the case 
of EC-Japan relations, this is particularly important due to the predominantly economic nature 
of the relationship, and secondly, due to increased FDI flows in the 1980s.
In the opening theoretical discussion a number of theories of European integration were 
discussed. The analysis below contradicts functionalist theory - member states did not 
relinquish FDI powers. Although neo-functionalism may plausibly explain states’ ratification 
of the SEA - the lack of a centralised ‘gate-keeper’ function at Commission level actually led 
to the continuance of inter-governmental bargaining over sensitive inbound FDI issues. Inter­
governmental explanations however were found to overestimate endogenous state 
developments and non-state actors.
Changes in the configuration of state power and EC executive power occurred while the EC 
(through the SEA) stressed economic competitiveness more than at any previous time. 
Secondly, the Commission selected the market as the vehicle for competitiveness enhancement 
precisely at the point when FDI was accelerating. In order to reap competitiveness gains, the 
Commission’s task of establishing an ‘internal market’ (with its implicit, logical exclusionary 
implications) emerged as a fundamental test of the power of integration to ‘fence off an area 
of the increasingly globalised economy for regional political economic dividends.
107
I V J  M e m b e r  sta tes  and tra n s-n a tio n a l  c o r po r a tio n s
7 Discussed in the theoretical survey at I.V above.
8 Cafruny, Alan W. and Glenda G. Rosenthal The State of the European Community, 
Longman, Harlow, 1993. p.5.
Attempts to increase the momentum of EC political integration, and the reality of increased 
global economic integration, have considerably overlapped since 1985 (the year of the Milan 
Summit and the Plaza Accord). One may shadow the other, and the threads of causality are 
difficult to disentangle. However, in seeking to reinvigorate the Community with the SEA, 
(in response to U.S. and Japanese TNC competitiveness) the Commission, perhaps unwittingly 
underlined the importance of the global political economy.
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DeAnne Julius has stressed the continuing relevance of the state in FDI dynamics:
Thus, except for expatriates and purchases by travellers, the ultimate benefits from 
open markets (both for imports and for inward FDI) can still be defined in terms of 
the nation-state. They accrue to consumers, and consumers have a clear domicile - 
unlike multinational companies. Thus the efficiency/distribution trade-off can still be 
considered in a national context.9
By reserving the bulk of inward FDI policy functions, Community member states exercised
an important external economic relationship function. The member states presented differing
approaches to investment policy at a time when the Commission attempted to present a
uniform external trade policy. It is stressed however, that although the states are ‘reserving’
their FDI powers (and their non-merchandise trade powers), such have increased in
importance due to the activities of firms. The arrival of high-volume FDI could conceivably
strengthen member state-firm bargaining at the expense of member state-EC level relations.
The advantage in the state-firm bargain rests with the investing firms.'0 Diverse authors 
have addressed the issue of firm-public policy dynamics. Vernon concludes that "So far, the 
world has managed to stagger on without effectively addressing the many facets of
9 Julius, DeAnne Global Companies and Public Policy, RIIA/Pinter, London 1990, p.43.
10 Daniel Drache has compared states to unions in this regard. They are he says "..forced 
to bargain with powerful groups of capital to attract investment and prevent widespread 
disinvestment in a nation’s industrial capacity." ‘The World Economy and the Nation-State: 
the new international order’ in Drache, Daniel and Meric S. Gertler (eds.) The New Era of 
Global Competition, McGill Queen’s University Press, 1991, p.8/9. Charles J. McMillan has 
written that "..in a world of very high factor mobility, multinational firms are capable of 
moving from one jurisdiction to another, and if economies of scale are great enough (as they 
usually are), they can exploit the differentials created by national policy to their own 
profitable advantage.” The Japanese Industrial System, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1985, p.270. All 
of these arguments apply to states in general and not just EC member states.
jurisdictional conflict and without directly acknowledging the inescapable fact that the 
behavior of any affiliate is unavoidably influenced by external forces."11 Dunning, less 
convinced of the défi thesis, stresses that the presence of foreign-owned firms is not so recent 
a phenomenon.
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The ability of Japanese firms to choose between states, and between sub-state regions 
confirms a careful, information based, multi-locale strategy. In the EC, this approach 
eschewed overly aggressive lobbying of the kind which drew negative attention in the US.12 
As such, the actions of Japanese firms can be understood in terms of a refinement of the 
concept of ‘exit’. Like consumers, if such firms do not find one location suitable, they can 
go somewhere else.13 Selection of sites by Japanese manufacturing firms in Western Europe 
in the 1980s was a matter for the firms themselves, and for competing states and sub-state 
regions within the EC. Just 42 Japanese manufacturing plants were located in EFTA states by 
the beginning of 1993, compared to 671 in EC member states14 and 90% of Japanese direct 
investment in Europe, including financial investment, was in EC member states.15
11 Vernon, Raymond Exploring the Global Economy, University Press of America, 
Lanham, 1985. pp. 59-60. Vernon implies that sovereignty is impaired by the activities of 
multinational enterprises. But absent from this view is a definition of the threshold at which 
the surrender of sovereignty reaches a critical mass. Foreign banks, embassies, spies, illegal 
aliens &c. have been (albeit often reluctantly) tolerated within states for quite some time. 
Any of three propositions could be true: either sovereignty is being surrendered; no 
sovereignty is being surrendered or a certain amount of sovereignty is being surrendered. 
Milward has suggested that the state retains sovereignty even when it decides to surrender 
certain aspects of sovereignty in pursuit of its own strategic interests. Again however, the 
point at which the state reaches an ‘integrating mass’ is not defined.
12 See for example, Pat Choate Agents of Influence, Knopf, New York, 1990.
13 Caporaso, James A. and David P. Levine state that "If the consumer dislikes price, 
quality, or mere existence of a commodity, he or she exercises the power to search 
elsewhere... the option of dialogue, argument, or persuasion hardly exists as an independent 
form of influence." Theories of Political Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.223.
14 JETRO The 9th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies in the 
Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo, 1993. p.3.
15 This figure is calculated from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics 
Yearbook 1994, Paris, 1994.
Transnational corporations exhibit highly mobile strategies.16 The member states of the 
Community, although constrained in the pursuit of trade agreements, still exhibit considerable 
autonomy vis-à-vis trade promotion and FDI policy. The Community level, is compromised 
in its quest for greater regulatory authority by the strategic mobility of Japanese firms and the 
de facto, residual strategic options of member states. States making alliances with firms - 
Britain and the Netherlands are the obvious examples in EC-Japan relations - can directly 
affect the broad constitutional evolution of the EC.
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The choice of location for investment is the outcome of many factors, among which no single 
outstanding locational factor appears paramount. In his analysis, Charles McMillan has 
pointed out that "in a world of very high factor mobility, multinational firms are capable of 
moving from one jurisdiction to another, and if economies of scale are great enough (as they 
usually are), they can exploit the differentials created by national policy to their own 
profitable advantage.”17 Criteria for choice of investment sites now tend to focus on factors 
such as ‘technology support’ rather than production and labour costs alone. The Paris-based 
HEC Eurasia Institute supports Lutkenhorst’s18 view empirically, finding that "the location
16 Susan Strange writes that "resource-based, manufacturing and service enterprises have 
all discovered that this accelerating rate of change does not give them sufficient time to 
recoup in profits derived solely from local, national markets the costs of developing and-or 
installing new products or new processes. To keep up with their competitors, who may 
already be transnational corporations, they are obliged to sell on several national markets at 
once." ‘Big Business and the State’ in Eden, Lorraine and Evan H. Potter (eds.) 
Multinationals in the Global Political Economy, Macmillan, London, 1993. p.104.
17 McMillan, Charles J., The Japanese Industrial System, 2nd ed., de Gruyter, Berlin,
1985, p.270.
18 Cheap labour is not the overriding concern of investing firms in the view of Wilfried 
Lutkenhorst. ‘Challenges from New Trends in Foreign Direct Investment’ in Intereconomics, 
vol. 23,1988, p.222. Stopford and Strange state that "Attractive sites for new investment are 
increasingly those supplying skilled workers and efficient infrastructures. These new demands 
from firms affect how governments allocate resources to attract wealth-generating 
investment." Rival States, Rival Firms, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.2. The 
conclusion regarding skills and infrastructure is clearly borne out by Japanese firm strategies 
in Europe. Governments continue to be the main enhancers of such factors. In the absence 
of an FDI policy the EC Commission could distribute regional funds with FDI locational 
considerations in mind. Thus far this has not occurred, although EC funds in road projects 
in Ireland for example have indirectly influenced Japanese FDI decisions.
of Japanese industrial plant clearly shows that the Japanese [firms] have a well thought out 
and well established strategy, positioning themselves at the heart of the large European 
markets rather than seeking comparative advantages, such as lower salary costs, in the 
outlying areas of Europe."19 John Doherty, Director of the Industrial Development Authority 
of Ireland in Tokyo stated that "the Japanese have gone to big markets rather than the EC as 
a whole."20
A subtle argument has been made by Ozawa, who suggests that the heterogeneity of
conditions within the Community is an advantage for Japanese firms:
..the EC, whose membership has recently included Spain and Portugal, is an
economic entity more suitable for transplanting Japan’s multi-layered system of
manufacturing than the US market, since wages and other labour-market conditions 
are regionally still so diverse and structurally heterogeneous that a vertical division of 
labour through sub-contracting can be more appropriately arranged and 
implemented.21
This, combined with what Steven Globerman calls the "major change in the environment for 
foreign direct investment"22 brought about by the liberalisation of state policies in general, 
means that virtually every part of every EC state, is at least a potential site for Japanese FDI.
The subcontracting strategies of Japanese investors are invariably transnational. Large
manufacturers such as Toyota have even promised subcontracts to unsuccessful host bidders, 
to ensure harmonious relations. A full estimation of such transnational links would be near 
impossible - however the following tabulation of firms with investments in more than one EC 
member state indicates that transnational strategies are substantial. This tabulation, 
extrapolated from JETRO data, is conservative. Keiretsu partners, minority holdings, research 
and development centres and financial institutions are not included.
I l l
19 HEC Eurasia Institute, The Japanese in Europe, VoLl: the impact of Japanese 
investment strategies, for the Club de Bruxelles, 1990, p3.£.
20 Interview, Mr. John Doherty, Director, Far East, Industrial Development Authority 
(IDA) of Ireland, Tokyo, 13 July 1993.
21 Ozawa,T. ‘Japanese multinationals and 1992’ in Burgenmeier, B. and J.L Mucchielli 
(eds.) Multinationals and Europe ‘92, Routledge, London, 1991. pp.150-1.
22 Globerman, Steven ‘Government Policies Toward Foreign Direct Investment: has a 
new era dawned?’ Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol.23, issue 3, 1988. p.41.
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Tab.16 Japanese firms with plants in more than one EC member state.









Compiled from JETRO’s 10th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies 
in the Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo 1994. pp.96-170.
This data underestimates the level of transnational activity by Japanese firms in the European 
Community. Although subcontracting and multi-locational activities can diminish opposition 
to extra-European investment, there is no evidence that the Japanese government has an 
effective role in encouraging such a trend. Individual locational decisions - including those 
for strategic purposes are the prerogative of the firms.
The following sections treat the competence of EC member states regarding FDI matters; 
divergences in the strategies of member states; the distribution of Japanese FDI in the EC; 
the dispositions of individual member states towards Japanese FDI, and the role of the 
Japanese state in EC-Japan FDI relations.
IVJ  M em ber s t a t e  co m p eten ce  and Japanese FDI
In treating the competence of EC member states in Japanese FDI relations, the most important 
element is ‘disposition.’ Disposition as used here, includes the historical propensity of a 
member state to engage in FDI activity, the prevailing state philosophy towards FDI, the 
regulatory framework which affects FDI decisions and the complex web of bargains, direct 
incentives, side-deals and political stratagems which states use to promote, protect or deter 
FDI. Neither regulation per se, nor incentives alone are sufficient factors in the analysis of 
political conditions for FDI. In the sphere of FDI relations with Japan, member states and 
sub-state regions have a more ‘total’ FDI armoury than the EC Commission or other
Community institutions.23 The Commission’s exercise of competition policy is one area of 
Community strength, although due to the confidentiality of inbound investment negotiations, 
the Commission’s investigative powers are limited and almost always post facto.
The interests of the integrating unit are different to those of the globalising firm. Firms 
which emphasise trans-national strategies pose policy challenges for both the EC institutions 
and member states. The strategic purpose of Japanese investment was outlined in a 1989 UK 
House of Lords report which stated: "The Japanese are not investing in Europe as a favour. 
Japanese investment is based on sound commercial decisions - in particular, a conviction that 
profits will be made in the long-term, and on the basis of the concept of a global market."2* 
This conclusion stresses the paramount importance of firms in global FDI movements. 
However, as the uneven distribution of FDI in the EC clearly illustrates, firm endogenous 
conditionalities alone cannot provide a sufficient explanation for the geographical distribution 
of FDI. It is here that the member states, the sub-state regions and the Community 
institutions play important roles. The Commission and Community strategy provided an 
important (albeit largely unintended) motive for Japanese firms to invest through anti-dumping 
measures and the ’92 Programme. Liberal states and a range of sub-states eagerly sought the 
advantages of Japanese FDI.
During the 1980s, the rise in Japanese FDI underwrote the role of states and sub-states within 
the EC. This was partially a simple geographical reality. Firms coming into the Community, 
selecting a location needed to pin-point local conditions. In doing so, firms responded to
113
23 The difficulty of the EC Commission’s position was outlined in a 1993 speech to the 
Tokyo European Business Community by James Moorhouse MEP: "The EC cannot afford to 
take a passive stance in its relationship with Japan. Unfortunately, the Commission is in a 
very difficult position and does not have a very constructive policy towards Japan. This is 
partly due to the fact that the Council of Ministers has not given the Commission its firm 
backing in its dealings with Japan." Tokyo, 7 June 1993. Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Head of 
the EC Commission delegation in Tokyo commented on government policies towards inbound 
FDI: "Member states must take into account a Community perspective and Community 
priorities in this respect." Rotterdam Seminar, 14 October 1985.
24 House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Relations between 
the Community and Japan, Report, 13th report, Session 1988-89, London 1989, p.25. 
Emphasis added.
disparities - many of which were not political. However, the firms also respond to diversities 
which are clearly caused by political authorities, and even accentuate them. This in turn is 
fuelled by the states who, in the ‘new era’ of FDI, see direct political reward in capturing a 
share of the more than 200,000 manufacturing jobs which JETRO estimates to have been 
created by Japanese investment in the decade to 1993.25 The selection of location - and 
importantly, repeated patterns of locational selection throughout a given period - presents a 
de facto critique of variant political economic conditions within the Community. That the 
member states of the EC found their external economic policy given enhanced expression 
through bargains with Japanese firms, was a generic phenomenon. Specific states however, 
exploited this reality differently.
The UK and the Netherlands have been particularly successful in facilitating external firms. 
Both enacted financial sector deregulation in the mid-1980s, and vigorously supported 
bargains with Japanese interests within the European Council and bilaterally. The manner in 
which member states summon a range of external relations powers can only be the envy of 
the Commission. Jonathan Morris for example states that: local content levels have been
agreed as a quid pro quo for financial inducements.."26 In this global political economic 
environment it is unsurprising that Mr. Keld Hammering, Executive Director of the European 
Business Community council in Tokyo should state: "All the [EC] embassies are not giving 
up just because trade is an EC competence."27 This is illustrated by the fact that as of 1993 
the Commercial section of the French embassy in Tokyo had approximately an equal number 
of staff as the EC delegation in Japan.28
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25 JETRO The 9th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies in the 
Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo, 1993.
26 He cites Nissan’s agreement with the UK government Morris, Jonathan 'Japanese 
foreign manufacturing investment in the EC’ in Japan and the Global Economy, Jonathan 
Morris (ed.), Routledge, London, 1991. p.197.
27 Interview, Mr. Keld Hammering, Executive Director, EBC council, Tokyo, 11 May 
1993.
28 Interview, Jean-Pierre Dubois, Commercial Counsellor, French embassy, Tokyo, 21 
July 1993.
Japanese officials recognise the role of states in investment decisions; both in the
liberalisation of outbound investment conditions by Japan, and the desirability - even the
necessity for host states to engage in attraction activities:
..Japanese direct investment overseas has been deregulated under the Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, and it is now the responsibility of the 
private sector to make decisions in this area. Accordingly, countries wishing to attract 
investment must improve the general business environment, the economic situation, 
and make efforts to attract foreign capital.29
Understanding variations in the dispositions of member states and member state regions is an
important function for any Japanese firm engaged in locational selection. Wallace and Kline
have emphasised that foreign investors are subject "to prevailing laws wherever they do
business."30 For Canon Inc., Mr. Eiji Tozosaki stated that local regulations were the most
important within the Community.31 Mr. Takashi Saegusa, President of Canon Italia SpA
supported this view.32 Mr. Yoichi Harada of Honda Motor Co. referred to the fact that
"through our production activities in motorcycles we should be able to gather information
about the culture on the spot. Culture means history, business practices and common
sense."33 Mr. Susumu Takiguchi of Nomura’s London office has written: for us to
assume a unified market in which Japanese firms can operate anywhere in Europe in exactly
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29 Yoshiki Nagatomo, Representative o f JETRO, Brussels, ‘Japanese Investments abroad 
Past Present and Future’ conference paper Jap an ese  B usiness S t r a te g ie s  in E uro p e  and 
THE E u ro p e a n  A n sw ers , Universite Catholique de Louvain and the International Advertising 
Association, Brussels, 22 October 1987. pp.22/23.
30 Wallace, Cynthia Day and John M. Kline EC 92 and Changing Global Investment 
Patterns, Vol. XIV, #10 ‘Significant Issues Series’ Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington D.C., 1992. p.49. In her statistical methodology DeAnne Julius treats 
the G-5 for the analysis of inbound and outbound FDI. The EC is however listed as an entity 
for projected scenarios. Global Companies and Public Policy, RIIA-Pinter, London, 1990. 
pp.3,20,52.
31 Interveiw, Eiji Tozosaki, Canon Inc., Tokyo, 15 June 1993.
32 Mr. Saegusa stated that "each government will still be important" after 1992. He listed 
language and differing histories as important elements within the Community. Interview, 
Milan, 7 April 1992.
33 Interview, Yoichi Harada, Assistant Manager, Public Relations Division, Honda Motor 
Co. Ltd, Tokyo, 24 May 1993.
the same way would be to assume that we are living in cloud-cuckooland!"34 JETRO found 
that 65.6% of respondents in its 1993 survey of Japanese manufacturing investors in the EC 
believed that the completion of the single market "would not be positive nor negative."35
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IV.4 D iv e rg e n c e  in member s t a t e  s t r a te g ie s
An important theme in the evolution of the European Community has been the tension 
between the primacy of common cause among member states, and member state relations with 
externalities. Modern political economic history reveals no single model in European 
economic philosophy. Rather, since early modern times there have evolved fundamentally 
divergent political economic approaches between regions. Many of these proto-policies have 
repeatedly reappeared in the same areas, suggesting that the selection of one approach to the 
governance of an economy involves far more than rational decision-making.36 Geography, 
historical experience, society and culture play important roles in the evolution of the political 
economic predisposition of states. That there is no single European ‘model’ of political 
economic management is a fundamental theme in the evolution of EC-Japan relations.37
34 Takiguchi, Susumu ‘Europe and Japan: The Anatomy of their relationship’ paper 
presented at the Dialogue Europe and Japan ’94 conference, European University Institute, 
Fiesole, June 1994.
35 JETRO 9th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies in the 
Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo, 1993. p.7.
36 This is in contrast to the view of William Nester who states that the ‘power imbalance’ 
between Japan and Europe is due to ideology: "Ideology is perhaps the ultimate source of 
power. The power and fate of a nation or alliance rests ultimately on its ideological 
foundations. It is ideology which determines how and to what ends a state is organized." 
European Power and the Japanese Challenge, Macmillan, London, 1993. p. 166.
37 Michel Albert, Chairman and CEO of Assurances Générales de France (AGF) argues 
that tensions between variants of capitalism have become more evident and more relevant 
since the demise of communism. "TTie neo-American model is based on individual success 
and short-term financial gain; the Rhine model, of German pedigree but with strong Japanese 
connections, emphasises collective success, consensus and long-term concerns." Capitalism 
against Capitalism, Whurr, London, [1991] 1993. p.18.
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Michèle Schmiegelow has summarised the dominant philosophies:
[Colbert] also strove to increase France’s share of international commerce and reduce 
the commercial hegemony of the Dutch by imposing tariffs on imports. These 
mercantilist sins were vehemently criticized 100 years later by Adam Smith... In the 
meantime, Britain had replaced both France and the Netherlands as the dominant 
trading nation and, quite clearly, free trade worked in its favor, both in terms of 
‘principle’ and in terms of ‘results’.. Germany, the next challenger from the 1870s to 
the 1940s, did present a lively Colbertist tradition dating back to Prussia’s Frederick 
the Great. This heritage had been further developed in the 19th century by the 
mercantilist strategy of Friedrich List’s "Zollverein."38
Government strategy within states is neither unchanging nor predictable. However, patterns
in the predispositions of member states towards issues such as external trade and investment
are clear. These have largely domestic origins and are imbued with legitimacy by virtue of
their long standing and the systems of direct democracy in member states. Divisions in the
Council of Ministers regarding anti-dumping on Japanese parts for example, do not concern
immutable rights or wrongs, but tension between legitimate systems. The enduring question
for the EC is whether or not the integration of adjacent state policies - a form of strategic
‘economies of scale’ - can be as efficient as state decision-making.
Differing economic dispositions of member states are clearly and recurrently visible in the 
phenomenon of foreign direct investment. Stephen Thomsen notes that "the vast bulk of 
investment flows in and out of the same set of countries. The UK is the largest recipient in 
Europe but it is also the largest investor."39 That states such as the UK and the Netherlands, 
which have a high propensity towards extra-European trade and investment, should seek to 
defend these interests is not surprising. Since the primary raison d’être of the SEA was the 
enhancement of European competitiveness in the face of U.S. and Japanese firms, the pooling 
of political economic philosophies as a means of enhancing strength in the global economic 
system may be questioned. On some issues, liberal states have had more in common with 
Japan than with other Community members. Although such is countered by the fact that 
intra-EC trade and investment is substantial; the technological edge in important sectors is to
38 Schmiegelow, Michèle ‘Asia’s Pragmatic Challenge to Europe: mercantilist, capitalist, 
corporatist, Confucian or otherwise?’ paper EUROPE IN the Asia/Pacific Region conference, 
European University Institute, Fiesole, March 1994. pp.4/5.
39 Thomsen, Stephen The Financial Times, letter, 10 March 1993, p.12.
be found in alliances with extra-European partners - particularly those from the U.S. and 
Japan.
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A matrix of member states’ dispositions towards Japanese investment can be attempted.
Simon Reich finds that "the ways in which Western European governments have dealt with
the presence of American MNCs suggests a variety of operative policy responses ranging
from pure liberalism to pure protectionism."40 James Moorhouse M.E.P. identified "the UK
and Denmark at one end, to France, Italy and Spain at the other end.. This will continue to
be the trend. Given the diversity of positions the Community has trimmed its sails and
accommodated state positions."41 A Japan Times editorial writer in 1990 saw the EC in two
camps regarding trade and investment:
In the view of angry Listians, EC free-traders appear to be abandoning Europe’s 
defenses, and therefore inviting Japanese domination of strategic sectors of European 
manufacturing. Embodied largely by the West German Ministry of Economics and 
the Cabinet of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the free-trade camp views 
the Listians as clever defenders of special interests who are keener on captured 
markets than on fostering competition.42
The Listians were France43 Italy and to a lesser extent, Spain - all of whom opposed the 
liberalisation of the European car market. The inclusion of Germany in the same category 
as Britain is not wholly accurate. As seen from the analysis below, Germany’s disposition 
towards Japan has been broadly based on competitive strength and pragmatism rather than an 
unquestioning liberalism.
40 Reich, Simon ‘Roads to follow: regulating direct foreign investment’ in International 
Organization 43, 4, Autumn 1989, p.546. He points out that "the divergence in European 
policy responses stemmed from differences in the dominant national ideological principles of 
these governments, especially with respect to the degree of access granted to American MNCs 
and the type of support extended to indigenous firms." p.549.
41 Interview, James Moorhouse, M.E.P., Tokyo, 1 June 1993.
42 The Japan Times, editorial, 25 July 1990, p.20.
43 Business Week presented the following view of state positions: "France’s Cresson is 
readying proposals for EC industrial aid and other Japan-fighting moves. But Britain * where 
the Japanese have put 40% of their EC investments - will oppose the French. German 
officials, confident about their staying power vs. Japanese rivals, are against protectionist 
measures." 3 June 1991, p.17.
The UK and the Netherlands have been Japan’s closest political economic partners within the 
EC in the period under review. Denmark and Ireland tended to support these two states in 
the European Council, having few market protective interests of their own vis-à-vis Japan. 
Germany was well disposed, but not unequivocally open to FDI from Japan. Luxembourg 
and Belgium could be considered ‘well disposed’ • attracting a high proportion of Japanese 
FDI relative to their size. Portugal and Greece had little interface with Japan. Spain had a 
co-operative inbound FDI regime, which stipulated joint-ventures to a greater extent than 
Japanese manufacturers would favour. France was increasingly well-disposed to Japanese 
investment - particularly after the realities of the SEA became apparent; although a 
fundamental change in disposition to inbound FDI cannot be confirmed. Italy largely 
eschewed Japanese FDI.
Bargains between liberal member states and Japan were resented by some member states and 
frequently, by specific industries. Eberhard von Kuenheim, Chairman of BMW "criticized 
Toyota Motor Corps, decision to construct an assembly plant in Britain."44 Tensions 
therefore were not always along the lines outlined by Reich and Schmiegelow; however these 
did largely predominate. Nor were questions of disposition always identifiable by state over 
sector.
The question of investment subsidies offered by both member states and sub-state regions has 
been controversial. Often the objections to excessive subsidy offers come from local firms 
who feel that enticement funds for foreign investors could be spent on domestic 
competitiveness enhancement.45 James C. Abegglen has stated that "the EC should find a
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44 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2 May 1989, p.2. Mainichi Daily News quoted a European 
company representative in Tokyo as saying: 'Toyota, and the Japaense generally speaking, 
are taking advantage of the EC weakness. They play European manufacturers and 
governments against each other, and there is always a weakest link." 1 February 1989. For 
sectoral and firm diplomacy in attempts to access the Japanese market see Strange, Susan 
‘European Business in Japan: a policy crossroads?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol.33, No.l, March 1995. pp.1-25.
45 Domestic firms have also argued that subsidies "encourage the proliferation of foreign- 
owned "screwdriver" plants with low added value, particularly when they are set up in 
response to actual or threatened trade protection." The Financial Times, 10 November 1986, 
p.26.
standard. It is unseemly and costly competition."46 Liberal states however, have been 
unyielding in their support for Japanese investment. Following the Maastricht Social Chapter 
opt-out crisis, a British M.P. wrote that: "Britain, he [Prime Minister Major] argued at the 
time, had to say clear of that sort of burden if it wished to cany on attracting Japanese and 
other overseas investment."47 In 1991, EC Commission President Jacques Delors stated that 
any country which ‘opted out’ of the EC Social Chapter would become "a paradise for foreign 
investment, particularly Japanese investment."48 The perceived threat to levels of Japanese 
FDI in the UK was one of the main contributing reasons for UK government opposition to 
the Social Chapter at Maastricht. There remains therefore, considerable scope for competition 
between European states for FDI; and for individual, quite divergent policies to govern 
domestic conditions which impact on EC-Japan relations.
IV.5 T he d is tr ib u tio n  o f  Japanese FDI in t h e  E uropean Com m unity
Scholars and practitioners have commented on the inadequacy of FDI statistics.49 Statistics 
concerning outflows from Japan50 do not represent a total profile since Japanese firms can 
raise capital locally - from Japanese or other financial institutions, reinvest profits, or have
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46 Interview, James C. Abegglen, Chairman, Gemini Consulting (Japan), Tokyo, 13 April 
1993.
47 David Howell M.P., The Japan Times, 17 March 1993.
48 The Financial Times, 11 December 1991, p.2.
49 For example: Jacques Leonard, summary paper L’INVESTISSEMENT EXTÉRIEUR DIRECT 
conference, summary, Waseda University, October 1988. Ed Graham at the JAPANESE 
Direct Investment in a Unifying Europe: impacts on Japan and the European 
community conference, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, June 1992. Susan Strange at the Europe 
in THE Asia/Pacific Region conference, European University Institute, Fiesole, March, 1994. 
The Economist states that "Official statistics have also failed to keep up with the rapid 
expansion o f foreign investment. In the past decade, direct investment overseas has grown 
five times faster than world output and more than three times faster than trade. As a result, 
crude trade figures are becoming less useful as a guide to economic health." 26 December
1992.
50 Compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Finance since 1951.
particular arrangements with their operations in the U.S. and elsewhere. Monitoring the exact 
impact of Japanese capital flows is also difficult. A DATAR [French regional development 
agency] official stated: "We have tried to get information about the economic contribution of 
inward investment in every European country, in terms of output, value added and so on, but 
there are no reliable figures."51 Japanese firms investing abroad are required to register 
investments of $5,000 or more with the Ministry of Finance. These statistics relating to new 
outflows are the only relatively accurate indicator of investment destination, both globally and 
within Europe. No accurate statistics regarding reinvestment and other capital sourcing are 
available and there is every indication that such accounting would be near impossible.
Ministry of Finance statistics indicate a heavily increased outflow of Japanese FDI from the 
mid-1980s until the early 1990s.
Ta b . 17 Outflow of Japanese direct investm ent 1984-93.
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$US bn. Represents financial and manufacturing investment outflows from Japan, 
globally and to Europe, 1984-1993. Source: ‘Charts and Tables related to Japanese 
direct investment abroad’ International Business Affairs Division, MTTI, Tokyo, June 
1993. Based upon Japanese Ministry of Finance statistics. Compiled from Charts 1 
and 3. Figures for 1993 from Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1994: an international 
comparison, Tokyo. [Based on Japan Ministry of Finance statistics.]
An analysis of Japanese FDI by the Export-Import Bank of Japan reveals that out of 
$352.39bn invested abroad between 1951 and 1991, some $93.92bn was in manufacturing
51 Ms. Bougeneaux, quoted by The Financial Times, 19 November 1986, p.26.
activity.32 Japanese FDI abroad continued to be concentrated in the financial and non­
manufacturing sectors during the 1980s, both globally and within the EC. However, the 
amount of ‘non-manufacturing FDI’ devoted to manufacturing support is difficult to 
determine, and may increase the ‘manufacturing FDI’ proportion.
A more complete picture of the distribution of FDI can be gained from a tabulation of total 
EC inbound investment by amount, (including non-manufacturing sectors):
Tab.18 Japanese direct investment to the ‘EC 12*. 1951-93.
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SUSm. Represents accumulative Japanese FDI to [future] member states 1951-92, and 
to member states in 1993. Source: ‘Charts and tables related to Japanese direct 
investment abroad * International Business Affairs Division, MTTI, June 1993. Compiled 
from Table 1. Based upon Japanese Ministry of Finance statistics. Data for Denmark: 
see footnote 57. Statistics for 1993 courtesy of the Mission of Japan to the EC, 
Brussels. [See also CHARTS III & IV over.]
32 Export-Import Bank of Japan, with Japanese Ministry of Finance statistics, appendix, 
p.13.
33 Excluding GDR.
34 Central Bank of Denmark statistics for 1984-1992 were obtained courtesy of the 
Economic and trade section of the Embassy of Japan in Copenhagen. Direct investment from 
Japan to Denmark in that period totalled 541,000,000 Kr.D. [approx. $71m. Calculated at 






















































































































The most comprehensive survey of Japanese manufacturing firms in Europe is the annual 
JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization) Survey of European Operations of Japanese 
Companies in the Manufacturing Sector. The survey targets firms with a 10% or more 
Japanese interest, and has a relatively high response rate of 60.7%.55 In terms of numbers 
of plants, the following break-down of the 671 plants in the EC was reported for 1993:














Source: JETRO 10th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies in the 
Manufacturing Sector. Tokyo, 1994. [Excludes R&D bases.]
By sector, these plants were concentrated predominantly in electronic and electrical machinery 
and parts; chemicals; general machinery; transport and parts and the metal product sector.56 
The decline in new outflows of Japanese investment capital is visible from the data. The 
decline in inflows to EC countries was explained in terms of the "completion of the Single 
European Market and the slump in both European and Japanese economies".57 However the 
long-term volume prospects of FDI raises important theoretical issues, and more fundamental 
reasons for the decline could be present. The global increase in FDI flows is comparatively 
new and has spawned a number of works speculating on trade substitution and trade support. 
Despite the recent nature of the high volume of FDI, the phenomenon of delocation has
55 JETRO 9th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies in the 
Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo, 1993. p.2. This annual series commenced in 1983.
56 JETRO, ibid. p.2.
57 JETRO, ibid. p.2.
recently been examined.58 An important question which arises from the analysis of Japan- 
EC FDI flows is whether or not such FDI will be a permanent feature of the relationship, or 
whether the recent phase of the relationship has been characterised by FDI in a specific set 
of political economic conditions from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. In addition to 
JETRO’s interpretation, it is highly significant that all major Japanese financial and 
manufacturing groups are now represented within the EC. Should EC growth increase and 
the Japanese economy recover, Asia still represents a counter-pole drawing on Japanese 
outbound FDI. The JETRO survey found that "The percentages of the companies which were 
planning to increase investment and employment levels were also lower than at any time in 
previous surveys."59 New stocks of Japanese direct investment decreased in the early 1990s. 
This was in part due to the presence of most large Japanese firms in the Community by the 
start of 1993, low growth in the EC and the divertion of FDI to Asian destinations. The 
overall global rate of FDI also slowed.
The decline in the volume of Japanese FDI to the European Community also highlights the 
important factor of spatial distribution of investment (particularly by manufacturing FDI). 
From a Commission perspective, a concern has been whether investments which are 
intrinsically beneficial for one member state or region could be detrimental to the Community 
as a whole. Both the Commission and the MITI would have preferred less ‘loading’ of FDI 
in specific member states such as the U.K. and the Netherlands. However, there was little 
either authority could do to affect the spatial distribution of FDI within the EC.60 A more 
even spread in FDI distribution was frequently predicted. But as Fig.2 indicates, such hopes
58 The concepts of delocation to the home base; and relocation to other economic hosts 
are of growing importance. The latter became important in the Anglo-French ‘social 
dumping’ controversy focused on American firms during 1993. Thus far, Japanese firms have 
not been involved in such relocational controversies. Delocation of financial investment is 
however a growing reality. See ‘A ‘slow squeeze’ by Japan - investment reversal starves 
world of funds’ International Herald Tribune, 23 March 1992, p.l.
59 ie. since 1983. JETRO, 9th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies in 
the Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo, 1993. p.5.
40 Neil J. Mitchell has written that "To offset the tendency for individual states to pay too 
much in the competition with each other to attract foreign investment, policy towards this 
investment would have to be developed at the federal level." ‘Foreign Money & American 
Politics’ (review essay), Polity, Vol. XXIV, Number 2, Winter 1991. p.341.
126
were merely wishful thinking. With the reduction in levels of investment, it can be concluded 
that in this phase of Japanese investment to the EC, firm locational strategies were broadly 
consistent.
Predictions of a global economy where FDI will expand exponentially are premature. The 
Japan-EC experience indicates that FDI is still an option which must be viewed with close 
attention to firm trade strategy, the multiple-level political dispositions of host areas and trade 
policy.
IV.6 EC MEMBER STATES AND JAPANESE FDI: DISPOSITION, BARGAINS AND 
REGULATION
This section treats the dispositions of individual member states towards Japanese investment. 
For the purposes of inbound regulation activity, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal, Greece and Denmark function as single entities in Tokyo. The U.K., Germany, 
France, Spain and Belgium have sub-state regional offices which are responsible for attracting 
investment. All of the member states with sub-state regional representation have co­
ordinating roles between their embassies and sub-state regional offices and frequently the 
embassies in this group also have an involvement in inbound investment decisions. (This is 
particularly evident in the case of the UK, France and Spain.) Officially-designated regions 
frequently receive financial assistance for their inbound investment programmes. No general 
conclusion can be drawn regarding the relative efficiency of FDI attraction activities at state 
or sub-state levels. The two highest recipient states in the EC operate differing systems. For 
the most part, this is a function of size. However, the fact that Italy has no sub-state 
representation in Japan and (for a member of the G-7) a low penetration of FDI may represent 
a co-relation. Japan itself, another G-7 state, also has an exceedingly low level of inbound 
investment and her prefectures are not substantially active abroad.
The United Kingdom
Although Portugal, Spain and particularly, The Netherlands had strong historical links with 
Japan, her closest European ally by the early 20th Century was Great Britain. The post-war 
era confirmed the United States as the closest external diplomatic and economic partner of
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Japan. Links with the United States had been expanding since the Meiji Revolution and the 
Occupation consolidated Japan as an American ally. Exchanges between Europe and Japan 
remained at a low ebb until the growing competitive strength of Japanese industry produced 
mounting deficits with western European states in the 1970s. This factor, European trade 
policy reaction and the trade and investment dispositions of member states and sub-states, 
heightened Euro-Japan exchanges. Within this evolution, the U.K. has clearly been the most 
reliable of allies; both in its co-operative disposition towards firms, and in its political support 
for Japanese interests at the EC level.
The bilateral political economic cooperation between the UK and Japan61 has aroused some 
concern,62 particularly in France where it has been suggested by Jacques Calvet of Peugeot 
and others that the UK is a proxy for Japanese interests. The issue however, is not so much 
one of liberal states acting as ‘aircraft carriers’63 or ‘Trojan horses,’ but of the extent to 
which common cause between the member states should supersede bilateral external interests. 
As discussed above, both the UK and The Netherlands have had a more open disposition to 
extra-European trade and investment prior to the arrival of substantial amounts of Japanese 
investment in the EC. Their positive disposition represents a continuation of this disposition 
and the government policies which had long supported it.
UK government policy has had a significant influence on Japan-EC FDI flows. Other factors
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61 The Anglo-Japanese has been treated in more depth than any other Euro-Japanese bi­
lateral relationship. The standard work on the contemporary political economy of this 
relationship is Roger Strange’s Japanese Manufacturing Investment in Europe: its impact on 
the UK economy, London, Routledge, 1993.
62 Dunning and Cantwell have noted "current concern among some EC countries that the 
UK is receiving too high a share of Japanese direct investment in the EC." ‘Japanese direct 
investment in Europe’ in Burgenmeier, B. and J.L. Mucchielli (eds.) Multinationals and 
Europe ’92, Routledge, London, 1991. p.174. Fujitsu’s acquisition of a majority stake in ICL 
in 1990 caused widespread consternation, despite the fact that the two firms had been 
cooperating since 1981. ICL was excluded from EC-funded semiconductor projects. In 1992 
however, as in the case of the Nissan free movement case, the EC permitted ICL to 
participate in the Secure European System for Applications in a Multivendor Environment 
(Sesame). The Japan Times, 9 May 1992, p.24.
63 Business Week, 3 June 1991, p.21.
which give the UK a favourable disposition for Japanese investors include proximity to 
Europe’s biggest financial centre, a cooperative investment relationship with the U.S., 
availability and cost of labour, language, and proximity to other EC markets.
Government policy is also crucial. In his analysis of FDI regulation in the automobile sector, 
Simon Reich designates government policy towards FDI along two variables (after Servan- 
Schreiber): the degree of access granted by the state to foreign firms, and the type of support 
provided by the state to domestic firms. For the UK he identifies the type: "unlimited access 
and nondiscriminatory intervention."64 Applied to Japan, this has been combined with open 
government support for UK-Japanese firm bargains at EC level. On the important issue of 
free movement of UK Japanese automobile production, Jean-Pierre Lehmann has observed 
that "the United Kingdom is not only on the side of the Japanese, but indeed championing 
the cause."65 Apart from individual UK sub-state offices in Tokyo which are active in 
attracting Japanese investment, the Invest in Britain Bureau was set up within the Department 
of Trade and Industry in 1977 for the purposes of inbound investment attraction generally.66
In addition to liberal FDI access, incentives to investors and political support for firm activity 
on the broader European stage, there is also potential for bilateral economic transactions in
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64 Reich, Simon ‘Roads to Follow: regulating direct foreign investment’ in International 
Organization 43, 4, Autumn 1989. p.558.
65 Lehmann, Jean-Pierre ‘France, Japan, Europe, and industrial competition’ in 
International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1, January 1992. p.45. Mr. Yoshiaki Gogami, Manager, 
European & American Operations Group, Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. Tokyo, stated that "Mrs. 
Thatcher negotiated with the French and Italian governments, and since that time we have no 
problem." Interview, 15 July 1993. The Mainichi Daily News reported [7 March 1989] that 
Prime Minister Thatcher had informed her cabinet that the UK would prosecute France in the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities, if such automobiles were not allowed access. 
At interview, Mr. Nobuya Etoh of Toyota Motor Corp. stated: "the main reason why we 
invested in the UK is that the government welcomed our investment." Interview, Tokyo, 28 
May 1993. Yoko Sazanami has identified UK government policy as a key element in 
attracting Japanese investment; ‘Determinants of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment: 
Locational attractiveness of European countries to Japanese multinationals’ Revue économique, 
No.4, July, 1992. p.667.
66 The DTI is also involved in promoting British investment to Japan, under the ‘Priority 
Japan Campaign’ at the Japan Exports Unit. Interview with Mr. C.E.A. Ripley, First 
Secretary, Inward Investment, British Embassy, Tokyo, 23 March 1993.
the form of govemment-govemment or government-firm bargains. A recent and apparently 
unprecedented loan from the Export-Import Bank of Japan for a major infrastructural project 
in the UK [the Heathrow Express Rail Link] is the kind of untied loan normally offered by 
a government Bank to a developing country. UK-Japan involvement in such financial 
arrangements is highly discretionary and does not involve the EC Commission.67
Grazia Ietto-Gillies has written of the UK position vis-à-vis British sovereignty within the EC:
It may be also considered an irony that some political forces should resist more 
integration within the EC on the grounds that it would lead to loss of sovereignty. In 
reality the major loss of sovereignty has already occurred in the economic sphere 
through the power of TNCs (enhanced by the policies often advocated by the same 
political forces!). One cannot help wondering whether what is being feared in a full 
European integration is the loss of sovereignty or the strengthening of countervailing 
power to the TNCs.68
This view aims to identify an apparent contradiction in the UKs stance vis-à-vis ‘integration’ 
and ‘globalisation’. However, the UK could equally be said to be opposing further 
integration69 precisely in the belief that it could capture, or at least harness the agenda of 
Japanese firms in attempting to improve the trade balance or alleviate unemployment. Since 
Japanese firms have accessed the European Community market anyway, and since 
UK/Japanese goods have liberal access to that market, (largely due to victory in an internal 
bargain at EC level) further political integration was questioned as unnecessary. The point 
made by Ietto-Gillies, while not invalid regarding TNCs, does not expose a logical 
inconsistency in British policy. Like Milward, Ietto-Gillies does not indicate at which point 
sovereignty ‘transfers’ acquire any kind of critical mass - a general defect in the EC literature 
discussion of ‘sovereignty surrender.’
The Netherlands
During the Tokugawa closure of Japan, which lasted from the mid-17th Century until 1868,
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67 Export-Import Bank of Japan, News Release, NR93-18, Tokyo, 11 November, 1993.
68 Ietto-Gillies, Grazia, International Production: trends theories and effects. Polity, 
Cambridge, 1992, p.210.
69 For example, the opt-out of the Social Chapter of the Maastricht treaty in December
1992.
the Netherlands was the only European power to be given (albeit limited) trading access to 
Japan. A positive Dutch disposition to extra-European trade and investment has attracted high 
levels of American and more recently, Japanese investment The Dutch government through 
the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency, (NF1A) promotes itself as a centrally located, 
cosmopolitan state which is well-disposed towards external trade and investment.70 Mr. CJ. 
Dirkzwagar, Commercial Councilor at the Dutch embassy in Tokyo stated: "There is no public 
debate in Holland where you will find people airing sceptical viewpoints on Japanese 
investment."71 As was the case with the UK, high-level political economic missions to 
Japan sought investment during the mid-1980s as Japan turned attention to the EC. On one 
such mission in 1986 the Dutch transport minister, accompanied by thirty Dutch businessmen 
promoted the country as the "gateway to Europe."72
Yoko Sazanami has pointed to the important role of deregulation in the Dutch case: "The 
Netherlands attracted Japanese subsidiary finance companies by financial deregulation since
1986, which provided the liberal framework for inward FDI".73 Dutch political support for 
Japanese firms has also been conspicuous - the Netherlands strongly opposing the EC move 
to impose anti-dumping duties on imported component parts for assembly in Japanese plants 
in the EC [Ch.V.10]. It is likely that The Netherlands will continue to strongly protect its 
extra-European trade links, despite the general tendency observed by Yui Kimura: "Generally, 
creation of a common market leads to an application of unified tariffs to imports from non­
member countries. This tends to divert trade with efficient non-member countries to less
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70 Additionally, MIP, a venture capital institution "has worked closely with regional 
development agencies to attract foreign investment since it was set up by the government in 
1982." This is a 57% state-owned enterprise. The Financial Times, 10 November 1986, p.26. 
The EC Commission has cautioned the Dutch government that interest-free loans given in the 
promotion of FDI projects may constitute "unfair subsidies." Nikkei Weekly, 13 April 1992.
71 Interview, Tokyo, 13 July 1993.
72 The Japan Times, 23 January 1986, p.7.
73 Sazanami, Yoko ‘Determinants of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment’ Revue 
économique No.4, July, 1992, p.666. The Daily Yomiuri reported that "The Netherlands 
received the biggest amount of Japanese investment in Europe $2.81 billion, up 325 percent 
[from the previous year] - due to more lenient tax laws." 5 December 1989. 1986 was also 
the year of the City of London ‘Big Bang’.
efficient member countries."74 Mr. Dirkzwagar at the Dutch embassy stated that such a 
trend could become a cause for ‘concern.’ In the sphere of FDI, the Dutch government 
however, has thus far effectively protected its extra-European interests.
Dutch-based multi-national enterprise activity in Japan bears a similarity to Japanese firm 
activity in Europe, vis-à-vis independence from government control. Mr. Dirkzwagar 
commented that most Dutch investment in Japan comes from large firms: "These companies 
don’t rely on embassy support - they make their own decisions."75 The firm culture is thus 
a further commonality between the Netherlands and Japan.
Luxembourg
The Board of Economic Development in the Luxembourg Ministry of the Economy cites 
favourable economic conditions for FDI such as "a liberal policy to set up in business and on 
the transfer of capital and dividends."76 In Tokyo, the embassy’s "primary mission is to 
promote Luxembourg as a place to invest in and conduct business."77 The embassy 
promotes this activity through economic missions and seminars through which prospective 
investors are informed of the climate for investment. For example, officials moved to 
reassure Japanese investors that the Maastricht Treaty would not imply a Community-wide 
harmonisation of taxes. A common feature of representations in Japan is to accentuate both 
the advantages of a particular state’s ‘access’ to the Community (via location or political 
influence) while simultaneously reassuring potential investors that there are clear differences 
between political regimes.
The size of the Duchy is perhaps the main reason why Luxembourg’s embassy in Japan
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74 Kimura, Yui ‘Foreign Direct Investment by Japanese Semiconductor firms in Europe’ 
conference paper JAPANESE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN A UNIFYING EUROPE: IMPACTS ON JAPAN 
AND the European community, INSEAD Euro-Asia Centre, Fontainebleau, June 1992. 
p.21.
75 Interview, 13 July 1993.
76 Board of Economic Development Investment in Luxembourg: management guide, 
Luxembourg, 1992. p.13.
77 Mainichi Daily News, 9 May 1993, S.8.
resembles a regional mission of a larger state. The embassy gives primacy to inbound 
investment and financial service matters. Mr. Takeo Miyauchi of the Luxembourg Industrial 
Development Department in Tokyo stated that the size of the bureaucracy was a major 
advantage: "It is very easy to handle problems with Luxembourg government officials and 
decisions come very quickly."76 He also noted a change away from the traditional financial 
sector investment which had predominated in Luxembourg-Japan relations. By the end of the 
1980s, most major Japanese banking concerns had set up in Luxembourg. The government 
has attempted to invite investors from other sectors, and has met with success among 
transportation firms. However, Luxembourg’s share of Japanese FDI has remained 
predominantly in the financial sector.
Denmark
¡Denmark has experienced a healthy trading relationship with Japan, but did not receive a 
significant proportion of inbound FDI during the period under review. Denmark does not 
have major indigenous electronic or transport manufacturing interests and has avoided trade 
friction with Japan. Ms. Jasperson at the Danish Embassy in Tokyo stated that "We have a 
surplus in our trading relationship with Japan., we don’t experience generally speaking, this 
conflict feeling."79 The proportion of new cars from Japan registered in Denmark (which 
along with Ireland) is the highest in the Community, annually fluctuating around 40%. On 
a visit to Japan in 1991, the Danish Prime Minister stated that Denmark was "an ardent 
defender of free trade."60 This has been borne out at the EC level. Unlike Luxembourg’s 
more neutral EC-level stance however, Denmark has vigorously supported the ‘Atlanticist 
approach of the UK and the Netherlands in EC debates concerning Japan.
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78 Interview, Takeo Miyauchi, Manager, Industrial Development Department, Embassy of 
Luxembourg, Tokyo, 15 July 1993.
79 Interview, Danish Embassy, Tokyo, 9 July 1993.
80 Paul Schluter, press conference at the Nippon Press Club, Asahi Evening News, 19 June 
1991.
Ireland
Relative to its size, Ireland81 has received a significant number of (particularly,* American) 
multi-national corporations. The debate regarding the long-term contribution of such firms 
to the industrial fabric and employment base has frequently been contentious. Despite three 
decades of total liberalisation in the inbound investment field82 Ireland has consistently 
recorded high levels of unemployment. Although FDI is not a panacea for unemployment; 
in the transitional Irish economy of the 1960s and 1970s expectations that foreign firms would 
make a permanent contribution to the solution of this problem were high. Delocation became 
a recurrent feature of FDI in Ireland. Before drawing broad conclusions regarding inbound 
FDI strategy options and job creation, it is worth noting that in Spain, where government 
policy has nurtured the highest percentage of Japanese joint-ventures in the EC, high 
unemployment has also been present.
In the 1980s wave of Japanese investment, Ireland vigorously promoted itself as a destination 
with a young, educated and abundant labour supply.83 The Industrial Development Authority 
specifically sought Japanese electronics, software and pharmaceutical firms. The IDA also 
targeted component parts manufacturers - a reflection of Ireland’s proximity to the large 
primary production investments made by Japanese firms in the UK. The opening of the 
Dublin Financial Centre in 1991 provided favourable conditions for Japanese financial 
institutions.
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81 This section treats the Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland is treated in Ch.III.
82 The UNCTC report on trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) found that Ireland 
was widely known among firms as offering generous locational subsidies. UN, The Impact 
of Trade-related Investment Measures on Trade and Development, New York, 1991.
83 An Taoiseach, [The Prime Minister] Charles J. Haughey, visited Japan in April 1989, 
the first such visit in an official capacity. On a visit to Tokyo in 1993, Charlie McCreevy, 
Minister for Tourism and Trade listed Ireland’s attractiveness criteria as a location for 
Japanese investment as: a 10% corporate tax rate for manufacturing (guaranteed until 2010), 
an educated work force, and a low industrial cost structure for labour, energy and 
telecommunications. Mainichi Daily News, 9 May 1993, S. 10. In September 1994, An 
Tainste (the Irish Deputy Premier) opened ‘Ireland House’ in Tokyo. This office consolidates 
in one facility, the Irish Embassy, IDA Ireland [the investment attraction authority] An Bord 
Trachtala [the trade board], Bord Fdilte [tourism promotion] and FAS [the training authority].
As with Denmark, the Irish economy is liberally accessible in terms of trade.84 Ireland was 
as supportive of neo-liberal causes in the European Council as Denmark; opposing the 
extension of anti-dumping measures on component parts and supporting the UK in blocking 
the introduction of non-binding inbound FDI guidelines desired by the EC Commission. In 
overall terms, Ireland and Denmark have not attracted a great proportion of Japanese-EC FDI. 
However, due to their open trading relationship with Japan, these two states support the UK- 
Dutch alliance on Japanese FDI unequivocally.
Germany
Mr. Eiji Toyosaki of Canon Inc. referred to the "different competitive strength of nations 
within the EC."85 In the case of Germany, it is this competitive strength which is the 
defining characteristic of its relationship with Japan in the EC context. Although sometimes 
assumed to be as liberal as the UK and the Netherlands, Germany’s de facto disposition 
towards inbound FDI is not unquestioning.86 Whereas the UK government was willing to 
graft Japanese production onto declining industrial sectors, a combination of competitive 
strength and regulations such as those governing mergers and acquisitions87 make investment
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84 "Our market as far a Japanese products is concerned is totally open." Interview, John 
Doherty, Director - Far East, Industrial Development Authority of Ireland, Tokyo, 13 July 
1993.
85 Interview, Tokyo, 15 June 1993. Jean-Pierre Lehmann writes that "Competition is the 
operative term to describe the response by German government and German industry" [to 
Japanese competition]. ‘France, Japan, Europe, and industrial Competition’ in International 
Affairs, Vol.68, Number 1, January 1992.
86 Michael Bomis and John Zysman state that "initial German opposition to the [1991] 
auto quotas reflected the small but highly profitable export position of Mercedes-Benz and 
BMW in Japan and their confidence in holding position in the European market. The German 
position then reportedly shifted shortly after a careful evaluation of the Lexus (Toyota) and 
Infiniti (Nissan) entries in the luxury market." ‘Industrial strength and regional response: 
Japan’s impact on European integration’ in Gregory F. Treverton (ed.) The Shape of the New 
Europe, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1992. p. 178.
87 The Asahi Evening News stated that "Germany’s close-knit business groups make 
investing there as difficult for the Japanese as Japan’s economic structure does for foreign 
companies that want to invest here." 19 June 1991. p.7. Japanese firms have however 
adopted flexible strategies. Mr. Eiji Toyosaki of Canon Inc. stated that his firm’s decision 
to open a cartridge recycling plant in China was a direct consequence of German 
environmental laws. Interview, Tokyo, 15 June 1993.
more complex than in the five states treated above. Gunther Rexrodt, Economics Minister 
has written that "The government of the Federal Republic of Germany has always vigorously 
maintained this liberal position in Brussels. We are of the opinion that we have been 
successful as a rule in defending this position - often in the face of very substantial 
resistance."88 However, Germany has not promoted a political economic alliance with Japan 
within the EC, largely because it does not need to - a function of the power of its own firms 
within the relationship.89
DeAnne Julius describes the German FDI stance as "ostensibly neutral, neither welcoming nor
discouraging"90 while Simon Reich identifies "unlimited access and discriminatory
intervention"91 regarding, respectively; FDI access and support for domestic industry.
Germany was a favoured destination for R & D projects, ranking second only to the UK as
of the end of 1993.92 Jonathan Morris found that
Advantageous factors [in favour of West Germany for Japanese FDI] included 
extremely positive views of the German industrial relations system, a favourable 
response to the levels of skills and education of its workers and its central 
geographical position within Europe.. The main negative feature associated with 
locating in West Germany cited by the respondents is the extremely high cost of 
labour and, in the southern German states., labour shortages.93
The question of whether Japanese FDI would become spread more evenly throughout the
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88 Mainichi Daily News, 9 May 1993, S.22.
89 BMW is the leading automobile import in Japan. An exception to this proposition was 
the manner in which Chancellor Kohl appeared to down-play the EC-Japan trade deficit 
during a visit to Tokyo in 1993. This came as the EC delegation in Japan was warning that 
the deficit was a ‘time bomb.’
90 Julius, DeAnne Global Companies and Public Policy, RIIA/Pinter, London, 1990. p.48.
91 Reich bases his finding on the (largely American) West German inbound investment 
experience in the automobile sector. Reich, Simon ‘Roads to Follow: regulating direct foreign 
investment’ in International Organization 43, 4, Autumn 1989. p.562.
92 JETRO, The 9th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies in the 
Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo, 1993. p.3.
93 Morris, Jonathan ‘Japanese foreign manufacturing investment in the EC’ in Morris, 
Jonathan (ed.) Japan and the Global Economy, Jonathan Morris (ed.) Routledge, London,
1991. p.199.
Community came to focus on Germany following the events of 1989/90. The expectation that 
(due to opportunities in Eastern Europe and the expanded German market) Japanese investors 
would lessen their preference for the UK have not materialised to the extent expected by 
Kobori,94 Bain95 and Motono.96 The view of B. Nino Kumar has proven more realistic:
Taking into account that firms with such oligopolistic assets are, by definition, 
relatively few, and that the fundamental objective of Japanese firms is to defend their 
export markets in West Germany, we can draw the conclusion that Japanese 
manufacturing direct investments in this country are likely to remain limited in the 
future.97
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The Toyota and Honda decisions to locate in the UK, following Nissan rather than 
diversifying Japanese investment across the Community was crucial. The establishment of 
a ‘flock pattern’ in the behavior of Japanese firms entering the Community, confirmed that 
bi-lateral political economic bargains with liberal states were stronger than the geographical 
pull of locating in central European destinations.98
94 Shinzo Kobori, Deputy Director of economic research at C.Itoh & Co., Japan Economic 
Journal, 7 April 1990. p.l.
95 G.Bain, ‘European Business and the influence of Japan,’ Journal of the British 
Chamber of Commerce in Japan, Vol.5, No.4, 1991. p.5.
96 Moriyuki Motono, former of Japan to France, ‘The Japanese Business Community’s 
Perception of 1992’ paper FOURTH A n n ual EC-JAPAN CONFERENCE OF JOURNALISTS, 
Brighton, 20 September 1990. p.9.
97 Kumar, B. Nino ‘Japanese direct investments in West Germany’ in Morris, Jonathan 
(ed.) Japan and the Global Economy, Routledge, London, 1991. p.221. This view is 
supported by Azusa Oshima, general manager of the Bank of Tokyo’s USSR and East Europe 
department. Japan Economic Journal, 7 April 1990. p.l. As of 1993 "Because Japan and 
Germany are in the midst of severe recessions and because what used to be East Germany 
lacks some basic infrastructure, Japanese leaders have little expectation of enormous advances 
in direct investment immediately." Nikkei Weekly, 8 March 1993, p.3. Germany’s use of 
merger and acquisition regulations has (like Japan herself) limited non-greenfield FDI.
98 Japanese firms were aware of the political sensitivity of these locational decisions: "A 
day before the decision [by Toyota to locate in Derbyshire] was made public, Toyota’s 
chairman faxed the Tokyo office of DATAR, the French industrial development agency, a 
copy of a letter expressing his regrets that Toyota had rejected plant sites in France. The 
letter included a promise that the company would encourage Toyota parts suppliers to open 
facilities there instead." Asahi Evening News, 5 December 1989, p.5.
France
France has had a long tradition of government economic intervention." Among Japanese 
investors, and particularly since the ‘Poitiers Affair’ in 1982, France has been viewed as a 
protectionist state.100 One authority classifies France’s disposition to FDI in the auto sector 
as permitting "limited access".101 However, France underwent a gradual change in its 
disposition towards inbound FDI due to the constitutional limits on Commission action in the 
realm of FDI, and the success of liberal member states in alliances with Japanese firms. 
The change was not total - indeed the Cresson premiership briefly reversed its course - 
however France’s disposition towards inbound FDI was more open towards Japanese firms 
in the mid-1990s than the early 1980s. An important difference between France and Italy (the 
other ‘resistant’ state) was the presence of French sub-state regional offices in Tokyo, 
encouraging and facilitating Japanese FDI. DeAnne Julius states that "until about 1985, 
inward FDI was positively discouraged both by the conservative government of Giscard 
d’Estaing and under the various incarnations of the Mitterrand presidency. This official 
attitude was reversed in 1985 [1986] by Prime Minister Chirac.."102
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99 See Stopford, John M. ‘European Practices and Policies,’ Ch.4 of Robinson, Richard 
D. (ed.) Direct Foreign Investment: costs and benefits, Robinson, Richard D. (ed.) Praeger, 
New York, 1987. p.73. Michèle Schmiegelow has written that: "Colbert carried out a 
comprehensive program of economic reconstruction that helped make France the dominant 
European power of that time... Somehow, his record sounds like a summary of the debates 
on "competitiveness" of various members of today’s G7," ‘Asia’s Pragmatic Challenge to 
Europe: mercantilist, capitalist, corporatist, Confucian or otherwise?’ paper EUROPE IN THE 
Asia/Pacific REGION conference, European University Institute, Fiesole, March 1994. p.4.
100 Moriyuki Motono has stated that "it has to be admitted that, in the Japanese business 
circles, France is generally considered to be a "difficult" country to invest in.." ‘The Japanese 
Business Community’s Perception of 1992’ paper FOURTH ANNUAL EC-JapAN CONFERENCE 
of Journalists, Brighton, 20 September 1990, p.9. Jean-Pierre Lehmann notes that 
"economic policy in France has been and remains ideologically oriented and highly 
politicized." ‘France, Japan, Europe, and industrial competition’ International Affairs, Vol.68, 
Number 1, 1992. p.39.
101 Reich, Simon ‘Roads to Follow: regulating direct foreign investment’ in International 
Organization 43, 4, Autumn 1989, p.553.
102 Julius, DeAnne Global Companies and Public Policy, RIIA/Pinter, London, 1990. p.48. 
President Mitterrand discussed Japan-French FDI favourably with Prime. Minister Nakasone 
at the G-7 in 1987. Kyodo News Service, 10 June 1987.
A further incentive to the change in policy was the settlement of the Nissan Bluebird case in 
1989, which brought the true meaning of free movement principles home to many French 
officials [Ch.V.6]. Also the GATT ruling against anti-dumping on parts appeared to give the 
imprimatur to EC neo-liberalism and the Fujitsu/ICL deal of 1990 highlighted that corporate 
alliances were not bound by EC territory. Japanese investment in France was three times 
greater between 1988 and 1992 than the period 1951-1987.103 National and local 
governments (sometimes reluctantly) accepted the view that France was missing job creation 
opportunities while UK/Japanese products were accessing the French market.104 Meanwhile 
Nissan,105 Toyota106 and Honda107 all stressed the increasing levels of local content in 
their UK produced automobiles. Although the French and Italian governments had no legal 
basis to keep such UK produced automobiles out of their markets, Japanese producers adopted
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103 JETRO/77ie Japan Times, 14 July 1993. Although FDI was by no means completely 
liberalised. Takashimaya was blocked by the government from buying a stake in Leroy which 
was co-owner of the prestigious Burgundy Romanee-Conti vinyard. Mainichi Daily News, 18 
September 1988, p. 7.
104 The Asahi Evening News, wrote that "Suddenly, governments like those of France and 
Italy, which once tended to view foreign investment with disdain, have discovered that the 
integration of the European market obliges them to chase after Japanese investment with the 
same shameless zeal as their American cousins." 5 December 1989, p.5. This was more true 
of France than Italy, in large part due to the aforementioned flexible French investment- 
seeking structure in Tokyo. Mr. Michio Sasamori, Manager, European Business Development 
Dept., Hitachi, Ltd., Tokyo, said that "The French government and investment authorities felt 
they had to do the same [as those in the UK and the Netherlands]." Interview, Tokyo, 30 June
1993. Roger Fauroux stated that "it is better to have Japanese photocopiers made in France 
than imported from Japan." The Financial Times, 1 February 1990, p.6.
105 Nissan claimed throughout the Bluebird controversy that its local content was 
increasing, but that the firm should not be pressed on such increases by EC or national 
timetables. The UK government supported this stance.
106 Toyota planned to reach a local content level of 70% by late 1993 in order to make 
smoother its exports to other parts of Europe. In the early stages of its UK operation the 
company largely supplied the UK, German and Nordic markets. A Toyota official stated that 
the increase in local content would make arguments against UK-Toyotas being imported to 
France and Italy, groundless. The Japan Times, 8 June 1993, p.12.
107 Interview with Yoichi Harada, Honda Motor Co., Tokyo, 1993. As of 1993 he pointed 
out, local content in UK production was at 80%. The equivalent for Ohio-built Honda 
Accords was 75% local content. Los Angeles Tunes supplement in the Daily Yomuiri, 22 May
1993, p. 10(a).
a soft approach to these markets until local content increased.108
In Tokyo M. Jean-Pierre Dubois stated that the French embassy assists French companies 
through the French chamber of commerce and also has regular contact with ministries. 
Inbound investment had been liberalised and the embassy was organising investment seminars. 
A European investment policy would be difficult to administer since "inward investment is 
a very confidential matter." Regarding a co-ordinated European policy to promote market 
access in Japan he stated that "We have a lot of co-ordinated activities to improve the 
penetration of European goods in Japan but nevertheless I have the feeling that each member 
state is also working with its own priorities."109 French government policy towards 
Japanese FDI remains part of France’s overall stance on trade and industrial policy. Although 
this policy during the second Mitterrand presidency became more moderate; France vigorously 
promotes its own vision of external economic relations at Community level which contains 
strong elements of its own historical dispositions.
Italy
Italy’s disposition towards Japanese FDI remained broadly consistent throughout the period 
1985-93, with no dramatic increase in her share of accumulated Japanese FDI. By the end 
of 1993 this G-7 state had attracted a greater amount of Japanese FDI than Ireland, but less 
than Belgium. Japanese products had achieved a low penetration of the Italian market. The 
scheduled liberalisation of the EC automobile market in 1999 is expected to be an important 
watershed in Japanese import penetration. It is possible that Italy will press for the 1991 
‘elements of consensus’ to be renegotiated. Even in 1992, with Japanese producers claiming 
high local content ratios for European production, Giovanni Agnelli stated: "We will have to
108 According to JETRO’s 9th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies in 
the Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo, 1993: "76.1% of all Japanese manufacturers operating in 
Europe have achieved local contents of more than 50% in this area. This figure shows a 
steady increase, 2.9 points up from 73.2% at the time of the previous survey." p.6. An 
increasing number of Japanese marques are assembled within the EC. The Association of 
European Automobile Makers reports that in 17 European states [EU, Norway and 
Switzerland] 13% of Japanese cars were assembled in Europe in 1991; 15% in 1992; 25% in 
1993 and 32% in 1994. International Herald Tribune, 29 June 1995.
109 Interview, Jean-Pierre Dubois, Commercial Counselor, French Embassy, Tokyo, 21 
July 1993.
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see if this is going to be total production or if it will be part assembly."110
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There is no regional Italian representation in Tokyo - itself a strong indicator of predisposition 
to Japanese investment Mr. Antonio Verde of the Italian Embassy in Tokyo stated: "We do 
not have regional representations. The structure of the Italian presence in Japan is organized 
by the economic and commercial office at the embassy."111 The Italian Chamber of 
Commerce cooperates with the European Business Council and the Italian Trade Commission 
organises trade fairs. Particularly with the decline in overall levels of new FDI from Japan 
to the EC, there is no indication that Italy will increase its share of this investment.
Spain
Spain has given preference to joint-ventures in Japanese investment. According to the JETRO 
1993 survey, such ventures had a higher than average number of employees.112 Camilo 
Barcia, Ambassador of Spain to Japan stated: "..the EC would like to see more investment 
in real complex manufacturing activities and see more research and development centers being 
set up in Europe."113 Spain’s clear preference for joint ventures represents an important 
state prerogative in inbound investment regulation.
Belgium, Portugal and Greece
Belgium has a much lower proportion of Japanese investment than the Netherlands. Mr. 
Horikoshi of the Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (Europe) S.A. in Brussels, suggests that this may be 
due to three regional representations dealing with inbound investment.114 However, the
110 Sen. Giovanni Agnelli, Conferenze Jean Monnet European University Institute, 
Fiesole. 5 November 1992.
111 Interview, Mr. Antonio Verde, Second Secretary (Commercial) Italian embassy, Tokyo,
16 July 1993.
112 JETRO, The 9th Survey of European Operations of Japanese Companies in the 
Manufacturing Sector, Tokyo, 1993. pp.11/12.
113 Speech to EC-Keidanren Forum, 14 November 1988.
114 Interview, Brussels, 22 July 1992. The Irish IDA, Danish and Luxembourg embassies 
in Tokyo all reported advantages of centralised inbound investment decision-making. This 
would suggest that small states should centralise inbound investment activities.
amount of Japanese FDI is not negligible comparative to Belgium’s size. Additionally, 
Belgium is the centre for many Japanese ‘antennae’ offices which are concentrated in 
Brussels. Japanese FDI in Portugal has existed at a low level. Mr. Rui Boavista Marques 
stated that "We see Portugal as a good location for a second production plant in the EC."113 
This is similar to the strategy of Ireland, which emphasises its proximity to primary 
manufacturing producers in the UK. Portugal has also attracted a small number of Japanese 
firms who were originally based in Brazil and who were interested in gaining a European 
foothold. Mr. Marques made that point that feasibility studies conducted by Japanese firms, 
even where the investment had gone elsewhere, were a valuable source of upgrading 
information for the host region. While Greece has welcomed Japanese investment, the central 
task of its representation in Japan is to promote exports and Greece as a tourist 
destination.“6
IV .7 T h e  J a pa n e se  st a t e  in  EC-J a pa n  FD I r e la tio n s
In the decades since the 1960s, Japan has gradually relaxed its controls on out-bound 
investment. Presently, only notification to the Ministry of Finance is required; sums less than 
$5,000 being exempt. During the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of government initiatives 
to facilitate inbound FDI were launched.117 The efficiency of these has been doubted by 
the European Business Council and some European business executives.118 More significant
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115 Interview, Rui Boavista Marques, Manager, Investment Dept., Investimentos, Comercio 
e Turismo de Portugal, Tokyo, 8 July 1993.
116 Mainichi Daily News, 9 May 1993, S .ll.
117 MITI set up a section for the promotion of inbound FDI in 1984. Julius, DeAnne 
Global Companies and Public Policy, Pinter, London, 1990. p.57. In June, 1993, MITI 
launched FIND [Foreign Investment in Japan Development, Inc.] a centre in Tokyo to assist 
foreign companies wishing to invest in Japan.
118 The Kyodo News Service reported in 1987: "Despite MITI minister Tamura’s advice 
to EC firms to invest in Japan, Umberto Agnelli, Chairman of Fiat Auto S.P.A... said his firm 
encountered vigorous Japanese opposition to its investment scheme here [in Japan] in 1962- 
63. He said his meetings with Japanese bankers in the past two years have made him 
extremely sceptical about making a full-fledged commitment into the Japanese market."
however is the inability of government to significantly effect the volume and timing of FDI.
The role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry has changed vis-à-vis industry 
in Japan. Chalmers Johnson accords a central role to the MITI in the development of modern 
Japan.119 Daniel Okimoto places industrial policy in the context of the strength of the 
Japanese private sector and macroeconomic policies.120 Kumaraswamy Velupillai argues 
that the role of MITI has been much exaggerated.121
Mr. Yoichi Harada of Honda Motor Co. indicated at interview that the Japanese government 
had not approved of Honda’s initial plans to invest abroad in the 1970s. In more recent times 
however, the government had been favourable to outbound FDI.122 With increased FDI, 
firms such as Honda have become responsible for their own information gathering abroad. 
Large Japanese firms maintain ‘antennae’ offices in Brussels for the purpose of such 
information gathering. The MITI, in recognition of this inevitability has issued non-binding 
guidelines for Japanese firms investing abroad. The neomercantilist view of Japan espoused 
by William Nester is thus inaccurate.123
This empirical evidence would suggest that the Johnson thesis is correct for the period which 
it refers to, viz. 1925-1975. However, the evolution of the world economy - particularly the
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Kyodo News Service, 4 December 1987.
119 Johnson, Chalmers MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the growth of industrial policy, 
1925-1975. Stanford University Press, [1982] 1990.
120 Okimoto, Daniel I. Between MITI and the Market, Stanford University Press, 1989.
121 Forthcoming.
122 Interview, Yoichi Harada, Assistant manager, Public Relation Division, Honda Motor 
Co., Ltd. Tokyo, 24 May 1993.
123 Nester writes: "Japan’s development strategy is neither liberal nor socialist but 
combines the most progressive aspects of market-led and state-led capitalism. Japan’s cultural 
values, of the group over the individual and cooperation over competition, obviously give the 
Japanese an important advantage in organizing and running a complex modern economy. 
Japan is the quintessential neomercantilist state..." Nester, William R. European Power and 
the Japanese Challenge, Macmillan, London, 1993. p.175.
empowerment of Japanese firms in the global market - requires an evolutionary and flexible 
evaluation of the role of the MITI. This thesis finds a continued role for the MITI in the 
period 1985-93, but with firms - rather than the Ministry - playing a lead role in external 
commercial relations.
The Japanese government has reacted to ‘deficit diplomacy’ from the EC Commission by 
encouraging firms to invest abroad.124 Such encouragement cannot be considered a serious 
incentive in firms’ decisions to invest abroad in an age of greatly enhanced firm information- 
gathering capabilities and the liberalisation of capital flows. However the bureaucracy is also 
conscious of problems which might arise with firms investing abroad and "not coming 
back."125 Such concerns are also present within industry itself. A Long-term Credit Bank 
of Japan survey in July 1987 found that outbound investment "could have an increasingly 
adverse effect on domestic investment and employment".126
Finally, the Japanese government failed to influence the state distribution of FDI within the 
European Community. One industry locational specialist stated that "In the case of Japan, 
there is a sense of gently political pressure from MITI on Japanese companies not to favour 
Britain as much as in the past."127 However, as the statistical representation above shows; 
in the EC-Japan ‘era of investment’ there was no significant trend away from liberal locations.
C o n c lu sio n
The presence of foreign firms poses a greater challenge to coordination within an integrating 
political regime, than it does to the authority of the state itself. The preceding treatment of
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124 MITI encouraged the Japanese photocopier sector to "increase its overseas production 
to ease trade friction." Mainichi Daily News, 3 June 1987, p.7.
125 Interview, Yuji Hosoya, Deputy Director, International Business Affairs Division, 
Industrial Policy Bureau, Mm, Tokyo. 16 June 1993.
126 The Japan Times, 19 September 1987. p.5.
127 David Rees as quoted in The Financial Times, 9 March 1993. p.15.
EC member states’ policies toward EC-Japan foreign direct investment reveals a considerable 
divergence between member states’ perspectives over bow to enhance EC economic welfare. 
States remain greatly influenced by their historical regulatory dispositions towards external 
investment. France’s preference for ‘statist’ intervention and the UK’s preference for total 
openness to Japanese FDI, were both policies based on the judgements of legitimate political 
authorities. Change in dispositions of non-liberal member states was greater than that in 
liberal states, who capitalised on the rise in FDI flows at an early stage, reinforcing historical 
propensities. The prevailing liberal evolution of the single market, in so far as policy towards 
FDI was concerned, was driven by bargains between Japanese firms and liberal states, and 
acted as a catalyst to reluctantly (although belatedly in terms of gains) moderate the prior 
French and Spanish dispositions. Italy was largely resistant to EC-wide liberal change in this 
regard.
In their relations with one of the dynamic forces of global economic integration (foreign direct 
investment) EC member states played a central role in EC policy formulation and in setting 
the constitutional limits of certain EC competencies. The alliance of Japanese firms and 
liberal Community states (and sub-states) regarding FDI matters, was one of the pivotal 
determinants in putting the Single Market Programme on a liberal trajectory. The shift from 
trade to trade plus investment in the global political economy - led by large Japanese firms, 
implied a central role for European states due to the demarcation of trade/investment 
competence within the EC. Additionally, whilst the Commission negotiated trade agreements, 
states retained trade promotion. Options for EC institutional reaction were curtailed due to 
the economic ‘membership’ status of Japanese firms - a result of FDI bargains with liberal 
states. The Commission repeatedly called for more conformity regarding inbound FDI 
attraction incentives. At the close of the period, the Council (The UK and Ireland) blocked 
Commission attempts to even have non-binding guidelines for FDI brought under Community 
competence. The dispositions of several member states (and sub-states) undermined the 
‘internal’ logic of the new western European market space. Simultaneously an unprecedented 
era of multi-leveled EC-Japan co-operation was facilitated by Japanese FDI. Economic 
integration adopted to the bargaining channels of the political economic integrating unit to 
further spread global economic integration. The following chapter examines the extent to 
which economic integration supersedes and even undermines regional political integration.
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CHAPTER V EC INSTITUTIONS AND JAPANESE INVESTMENT
In t r o d u c tio n
Foreign direct investment is a firm-originating phenomenon with important systemic 
consequences. This thesis focuses on the implications of Japanese foreign direct investment 
for the European Community, and analyses European integration as revealed in its reaction 
to Japanese firms, 1985-93. This chapter focuses on EC institutional-level actions and 
reactions towards increased FDI from Japan.1
Foreign direct investment involves negotiations between TNCs and host territorial authorities. 
The preceding analysis shows that such bargaining is multi-leveled - even within states. The 
increased volume of FDI draws attention to the trans-state strategies of firms, underlining that 
FDI and trade (although frequently influenced by host conditions) are essentially firm 
originating phenomona.
The structure of the EC, and the demarcation between trade and investment policy in 
European Commission legal competence are important conditional elements in EC-Japan 
affairs. Trade and trade policy constitute a prelude and context for investment by Japanese 
firms. The application of EC trade policy in the period was largely reactive; the Single 
European Market programme an active measure. The evolution of the Single European 
Market programme and the Commission’s attempts to regulate Japanese FDI were closely 
intertwined. Japanese and other external firms played a direct political role in the evolution 
of the market in a neo-liberal direction. Due to their competitive position, Japanese firms 
were among the first to test the applicability of the Freedom of Movement principle to 
exogenous firms (1988/89), which strongly influenced France’s position on FDI. The 
Commission attempted to regulate the component sourcing of Japanese firms within the EC 
territory by an extension of anti-dumping rules in 1987, which drew a GATT ruling in favour
1 ‘EC level’ connotes the Commission of the European Communities, the Council, 
COREPER [the committee of permanent representatives in the Council of the EC] and the 
European Parliament.
of Japan in 1990. Attempts to reinterpret the Community’s rules of origin seriously divided 
the Council in 1989. The limited Commission competence in the sphere of FDI regulation 
had direct implications for the exercise of trade policy.
The lack of FDI regulatory powers can be traced to the era of the preeminence of trade 
policy, when global FDI volume was much lower than in the 1980s. The Commission’s 
attempts to strengthen its position in this regard was challenged not only by liberal states, but 
by the alliances between liberal states, sub-states and global capital and production. 
Negotiating European FDI access in Japan emerged as one area in which the Commission 
enhanced its powers.
V.2 T h e m e s
Japanese political elites and firms have experienced varying degrees of understanding and 
confusion regarding the evolution of the Common Market and its nominal successors. The 
Japanese government expressed concern regarding access to European markets following the 
Treaty of Rome. However such anxiety eased following the collapse of Britain’s first 
accession attempt. In an interview in 1992, Mr. Masae Harashima, Manager at Price 
Waterhouse in Brussels said: 'The Japanese are beginning to understand what the EC can do 
and what the EC cannot do."2
Through the 1980s, and in particular following their investment experience in the U.S., 
Japanese firms became more adept at information gathering on their own account - effectively 
reducing the role of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in their 
international strategies. The political analysis of EC-Japan relations thus cannot be limited 
to EC Commission-MITI dialogues. As indicated by Mr. Harashima, firms are aware of 
where regulation rests and are aware of where and when to deal with different levels of 
political authority, whether the Commission of the EC, member states, sub-state regions or
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EC-Japan relations since 1985 have been radically transformed by the growth of investment, 
which renders obsolete an approach to international relations founded completely on inter­
state relations. Investment has introduced Japanese firms and European regions to the 
forefront of the relationship. Theories of European integration are useful in focusing attention 
on medium and long-term trends within the EC. In this analysis, no single theory of 
integration is found to be sufficient. The conclusion will examine the extent of integration, 
and the extent to which political integration may be superseded by global economic 
integration.
Functionalism, which implies an almost ‘natural’ progression towards integration, emphasises 
economic forces and the ways in which they must be, largely reactively, managed by 
governments and international organisations. Neo-functionlism, which as a theory is closer 
to explaining the evolution of the EC, places greater emphasis on political decision-making 
in the process of integration. In the EC-Japan relationship since 1985, neither of these 
theories neatly apply. There is no evidence that a common EC stance towards Japan is 
evolving automatically. The evolution of a communitaire competence in EC external trade 
policy has been continuous since the 1960s. This has been slow however, and was hampered 
from within the EC itself by the member states. Such a dynamic is prominently highlighted 
in inter-governmental explanations of the development of the Community. In the era of the 
Single European Act the trend towards a more unified EC approach to relations with Japan, 
has been challenged from an external source - firms which are capable of investing within the 
EC. Although Japan may have appeared to have been an initial ‘external federating’ force 
in prompting the competitiveness enhancing strategy manifest in the SEA; the actual evolution 
of the Single European Market has not had a federating effect.
An important feature of relations between the EC and Japan is the extent to which they are 
dominated by matters of economic diplomacy. On the Japanese side, there has been a 
consistent attempt to broaden the European agenda to include issues of a ‘purely’ political 
nature. The Commission’s agenda with Japan primarily concerns issues of economic concern.
The ‘high/low’3 distinction is methodologically useful in the analysis of the strategies and 
positions of the Commission and the Japanese ministries. The political nature of international 
economic activity has become more acute in the age of FDI. Robert Gilpin has written that 
"the phasing out of declining industries and creating of new growth sectors have powerful 
political effects."4 In this context, economic activity and regulation have played a major 
causal role in the constitutional evolution of the EC through the 1980s, occupying an 
important place in the ‘high’ political agenda.
Foreign direct investment has a tendency to internalise an external relationship - if relations 
between two states predominantly consist of economic affairs. That is, dealings with a 
predominantly exporting power, become transformed into a relationship of internal regulation 
when FDI becomes a major factor. There is thus a geographical shift in the locus of the 
relationship. Japanese firms maintained a far greater degree of collective behaviour than their 
European counterparts in the period 1985-93. The response of Japanese manufacturing firms - 
to trade measures such as anti-dumping, or SEA attempts to enhance competitiveness, were 
broadly in unison. However in the case of European firms - harmony between them has 
frequently broken down in the face of individual corporate alliances with technologically more 
competitive external firms.5
Corporate alliances are thus a vital aspect not only of international business, but of 
international relations. The nature of alliances in their impact on political authority has a 
significant geographic aspect. Thus far, Japanese firms have been better able to use the 
‘alliance geography’ to their advantage - largely due to their capacity for outbound investment 
and the difficulties encountered by foreign firms in investing within Japan.
EC-Japan relations can therefore be seen in the context of two forces of integration: political 
or de jure integration in western Europe; and the global, economic or de facto integration of
3 See Ch.II
«u
4 Gilpin, Robert with Jean M. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, 
Princeton University Press, 1987, p.32.
5 As exemplified by the breakdown of CECOM, the European photocopier pressure group.
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Japanese firms. In this paradigm there are two competing political ‘geographies.’ One based 
on twelve member states (1985-93) the other with few, if any boundaries.
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V3 S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  EC: r e l a t i o n s  w i th  J a p a n
Trade and investment dynamics are inextricably linked. External trade policy - along with 
the Common Agricultural Policy - is the most evolved legal competence of the EC. The 
experience of the Commission in attempting to harness state positions in the realm of ‘Japan 
policy’ was an important prelude to the advent of Japanese FDI in the Community. 
Commission action to enhance competitiveness through the Single European Market was 
prompted by a perceived lack of competitiveness vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japan.
Since the late 1980’s, large Japanese firms have established monitoring offices in Brussels. 
These ‘antennae’ missions constitute an important parallel to the official-level contact between 
the Commission, (DGI and other DGs in Brussels, the Tokyo Delegation) and the Japanese 
government (MITI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries, and the Japanese 
delegation in Brussels). On the EC side, relations with Japan are handled primarily by DGI6 
with the Council, COREPER, the 113 Committee7 and other committees such as that on rules
6 In mid-1993 DGI was reorganised in recognition of the Maastricht Treaty framework 
and the enhanced position of EPC/CFSP [European Political Cooperation/Common Foreign 
and Security Policy]. Under the new structure DGI dealt with external trade matters, as 
previously - whilst DGIa was in charge of non-commercial external relations. The 
demarcation was adjusted once more in October 1994 with the Brittan/Van den Broek 
portfolio carve-up. Hans van den Broek was given responsibility for both political and 
economic relations with central and eastern Europe, while Leon Brittan retained overall 
multilateral trade responsibility. (The Financial Times, 31 October 1994. p.2.)
7 This Committee is named for the Treaty of Rome article on the Common Commercial 
Policy. The 113 Committee is constituted of member-state officials and assists the 
Commission with coordination of external commercial policy. Rothacher, Albrecht Economic 
Diplomacy between the European Community and Japan 1959-1981. Gower, Aldershot, 1983. 
pp.26-27.
of origin also playing important roles.8 With steeply rising levels of Japanese direct 
investment during the late 1980s, the Competition (DGIV), Industrial Affairs (DGIII) and 
Single Market (DGXV) Directorates General became more directly involved in EC-Japan 
affairs. In addition to the formal structure of diplomacy, Commission officials and their 
Japanese counterparts meet at the WTO9, the G-7 and other international conventions. 
However the discussions in the margins of these assemblies tend towards the general, whilst 
Commission-MITI bilaterals treat specific issues. Additionally, the European Parliament and 
the Japanese Diet hold consultative inter-parliamentary conferences annually. Although this 
forum would appear to be ideal for bi-lateral exchange involving new constitutional players, 
the discussions tend towards the global and futuristic; for example giving issues such as UN 
reform approximately the same amount of agenda time as EC-Japan trade relations at the
1993 conference.10
In addition to these contacts, the Commission maintains a delegation in Tokyo, which is 
considered to be its second-most important external delegation after Washington DC.11 Prior 
to 1973, EEC matters were handled through the Belgian embassy in Tokyo. The Head of 
Delegation only attained the rank of Ambassador with the assumption of the post by 
Ambassador Leng in 1990. The daily business of the delegation involves matters of co­
ordination between member states, and communications with diverse Japanese ministries. On 
matters of high priority, negotiations are frequently conducted by Brussels- based Commission 
specialists. Such is the case for example with DGIII officials and the annual negotiations in 
the framework of the 1991 EC-Japan automobile elements of consensus. In times of 
particularly important negotiations, Commissioners may be present in Tokyo to support
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8 The most comprehensive account is by Simon Nuttall: ‘Foreign Policy Making in 
European-Japanese Relations: EC approaches’ in Von Heynitz, A. and H. Maull (eds.) 
‘European-Japanese Relations: the next phase', conference proceedings, Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, Ebenhausen. November, 1989.
9 GATT prior to 1st January 1995.
10 EC-Japan Inter-parliamentary Conference, Diet Building, Tokyo, 31st May/Ist June 
1993. Author’s notes.
11 Former heads of the EC delegation in Tokyo include one ex-Prime Minister (Van Agt) 
and one ex-Minister (Brinkhorst).
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negotiating officials.12
The difficulty of the task of member state co-ordination has been complicated with the advent 
of increased FDI, unevenly spread through the EC since 1985. Member state councilors at 
the embassies in Tokyo regularly meet their Commission counterparts at the delegation to 
discuss matters of mutual concern (usually by sector). An example of such is the Agricultural 
Councillors of the 12 who would meet the delegation councillor to discuss common matters. 
These meetings however, are largely consensual and ‘front line’ cooperation frequently 
exceeds that at the level of Council. The task of coherently orchestrating EC member state 
positions is one which falls more within the functional remit of the higher levels of DGI in 
Brussels, and consultations between the member states.13
The EC-Japan agenda overlaps with the competence of the EC Commission to a high degree 
in trade, but not in international investment matters. Trade policy and investment policy are 
not executed at the same level of political authority as the EC is constituted. The term 
‘policy’ is problematic when applied to investment matters since the EC Commission 
approach to investing firms is not enshrined in a stated ‘investment policy’ but is disfracted 
through the competence of many Directorates General. The Commission does not have a 
legal mandate to lay down such a policy, as is the case with external trade matters. Further, 
the disposition of the Commission underwent considerable change during the period under
12 Commission Vice President Bangemann’s visit overlapped with high level negotiations 
in March 1993.
13 The role of the delegation has been criticised by those who feel that attempts at 
coordination are inefficient. James Bourlet, then at Keio University, argued that EEC uniform 
trade policy had failed the member states and that the high profile of Commission criticism 
of Japanese market access had exacerbated the trade deficit by "frightening many European 
businesses away form the Japanese market or away from making the necessarily high 
marketing investment and commitment here." The Times, 11 August 1986. This illustrates 
the difficult role of the delegation in Tokyo, which is simultaneously criticised for not 
applying enough pressure to alleviate such problems. The build-up to the 1992 Programme 
enhanced the profile of the Community and its institutions. Some however remain sceptical 
that this reconstitution will lead to greater power in the international arena. One such is 
James C. Abegglen, Chairman of Gemini Consulting (Japan): "I don’t think the EC has a 
credible negotiating position here - that may be changing, but 1 don’t think so." Interview, 13 
April 1993.
review. There are two principal reasons for this, directly relevant to EC-Japan relations.
Firstly, the Single European Market ‘blueprint’ evolved in a neo-liberal direction; and 
secondly, Japanese firms, by allying themselves with liberal states and a plethora of sub­
states, had a direct impact on the evolution of the market and the ability of the Commission 
to respond to FDI. In the case of Japanese FDI, there existed a strong causal link between 
Commission initiatives and the decisions of Japanese firms to invest. In the implementation 
of an FDI ‘policy’ however, the Commission has a minor and indirect role - one which was 
partially limited by Japanese firms themselves.
Japanese direct investment in the Community existed at a low level before the 1980s.14 The 
Commission’s enhanced external trade powers - were used in part, and largely unintentionally, 
to drive Japanese firms into bargains with the member states and member state regions. This 
could be said to constitute a form of ‘counter-neo-functionalism’ whereby an EC orchestrated 
initiative actually accentuated bi-lateral relations with an external commercial power. More 
plausible however is that the advent of high volume global FDI facilitated such bargains.
The EC Commission in its relationship with Japan, relied on the development of a de jure 
trade competence through the 1970s and early 1980s. This development was succeeded by 
the de facto reality of investment - a form of economic integration, which posed a challenge 
to the structural, territorial, de jure approach to integration. While the Commission’s 
relationship with Japan relied on structure and legality, the ‘front-line’ realities outside of the 
legal competence - such as the sudden advent of Japanese FDI involved strong roles for the 
member states and sub-states.
At a time when trade policy and investment policy are being intertwined within member
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14 Mark Mason provides a thorough overview in ‘Historical perspectives on Japanese 
direct investment in Europe’, in Mason, Mark and Dennis Encamation (eds.) Does Ownership 
Matter? Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. Chapter 1.
states15 the lack of a formal Commission investment policy could represent a limit to 
integration in the formerly leading integrative sphere of external commercial policy. As will 
be argued below, there is even the possibility that the lack of a Commission policy on FDI 
could lead to the unravelling of the Commission’s trade competence with Japan.
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V.4 Trade and trade policy: prelude and context for FDI and FDI response
"Foreign trade is a war in which each party seeks to extract wealth from the other."16 This 
oft-quoted line of Honda Toshiaki serves as a reminder that the stakes in international 
commercial transactions have long been recognised and contested. In recent times, this axiom 
has been applied to EC-Japan trade deficits, investment imbalances and market access 
conditionalities. Tensions over such issues have frequently been expressed in Commission 
statements which have stressed the gains which Japan and Japanese firms have made under 
the liberal international economic system.17 The Commission has contrasted such liberalism 
with the relative closedness of the Japanese domestic market. At the delegation in Tokyo,
15 At interview, Mr. Rui Boavista Marques, Manager, Investment ¡Department, 
Investimentos, Comercio e Turismo de Portugal (¡CEP), said that previously his office had 
only dealt with trade matters, but now 1CEP assumes responsibility for inbound and outbound 
investment, tourism and trade. This flexible measure is in response to the late 1980s boom 
in Japanese FDI. Interview, Tokyo, 8 July 1993. The ¡rish inbound investment authority 
(The IDA) and the Irish trade board (An Bord Trachtdla) consolidated their offices in Tokyo 
in September 1994.
16 Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821) quoted by Endymion Wilkinson, Japan Versus the West, 
image and reality, Penguin, 1990, p.160.
17 For example Vice-President Andreissen speaking in Tokyo in 1989: "Japan has become 
by now a major economic, financial and technical power. This dramatic transformation has 
only been possible because Japan was able to take full advantage of the free world trading 
system established after the war - in other words, its prosperity is based to a large extent on 
the openness of markets with a high purchasing power." Speech at the Foreign 
Correspondents’ Club, Tokyo, 6 October, 1989. EC News, PR 15/89. Emile Noel, Honorary 
Secretary General of the EC Commission stressed conditions for access to the Japanese 
market: "..outside Japan - and perhaps in the country too - it is felt that only a reform of the 
Japanese distribution system to make it more like that of other OECD countries can lead to 
a more balanced structure for Japanese foreign trade, closer to that of its chief partners." 
Speech at the Foreign Correspondents Club, Tokyo, 6 November 1989, EC News, PR 18/89, 
p.9.
Ambassador Jean-Pierre Leng identified "an evident misperception and mistrust 
overshadowing the EC-Japan relationship and impeding its deeper development."18 It is not 
surprising that the Commission dwelt upon trade difficulties when indeed trade has been its 
primary external concern; and when economic affairs constitute the bulk of the EC 
relationship with Japan. However, the shift in firm strategy from trade to trade plus 
investment, particularly in the second half of the 1980s, led to a greater overall cooperative 
regime between the EC and Japan. To the extent that political authorities were important to 
the evolution of this regime, the states and sub-states were to the fore. FDI, the biggest force 
for de facto EC-Japan co-operation therefore has occurred largely outside of the reach of the 
Commission.19
The EC-Japan trade deficit, and increased Japanese investment in the EC, are two of the most 
important features of EC-Japan relations in recent decades. The trade imbalance between 
Japan and the EC, which had become politically sensitive in the Community by the end of 
the 1970s, was caused more by the dynamic expansion of the Japanese economy than the 
relative stagnation of EC economies; although both factors are important. A Keidanren20 
position paper of March 1993 refers to a "comparative advantage [which] lies with Japan for 
product groups with particularly large markets, such as motor vehicles and electronics, and 
with the EC for product groups such as special purpose machine tools, chemicals and luxury 
goods, which have relatively smaller markets."21 The sectors of consumer electronics and 
automobiles are the two most contested between the Commission and Japan. Consumer 
electronics have been at the centre of the arguments regarding trade policy and its extension
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18 Japan Times, 26 September 1990.
19 The Japanese government continues to foster links with both the Commission and the 
member states: "Japan remains unsure of whether to limit its contact to the supranational 
institutions (the European Commission) or to retain strong bilateral links with individual 
member states.” The Politics of European-Japanese Relations in the mid-1990s, conference 
report by Penny Henson, University of Reading, 1995. p.6.
20 Japan Federation of Economic Organizations which represents about 1,000 Japanese 
firms.
21 Keidanren ‘Future Relations Between Japan and the EC’ position paper, Tokyo, March
1993. p.3.
into attempted local content regulation of parts (V.10 below) and rules of origin (V.ll); while 
the automobile industry was occasion for Japanese testing of the principle of free circulation 
of goods to external firms (V.6) and the major EC-Japan automobile agreement of 1991 
(V.12).
Japanese officials such as Ambassador Tomohiko Kobayashi, have placed the trade deficit in 
the context of other forms of exchange; the employment benefits of FDI - essentiality the 
recycling of the trade-generated surplus - and greatly increased Japanese tourism in EC 
member states.22 The Commission stressed throughout the period that it was not occasional 
deficits per se which were of concern, so much as a structural, annual deficit with Japan.23 
However, the negative nature of deficits has been sharply contested. Paul Krugman has 
asserted that "..in both theory and practice a trade surplus may be a sign of national weakness, 
a deficit a sign of strength."24 For the EC Commission and to varying degrees, EC member 
state governments, the recurrent trade deficit with Japan is essentially a negative phenomenon; 
and the concept of trade deficit has long since entered the political arena as anathema. It is 
this reality - even though it may be a reality of perception - which has remained in the 
European political agenda of EC-Japan relations since the late 1970s.
One of the contested areas of the negative impact of deficits debate, is the alleged relationship 
between deficits and unemployment. This link is one which EC Commission officials 
consistently have alluded to or openly claimed, and one which Japanese officials have 
persistently denied. The European Parliament has also addressed the matter. James 
Moorhouse, an MEP who produced two substantial reports on EC-Japan affairs (1986,1993) 
stated at the 1993 EP/Diet inter-parliamentary meeting: "While on the one hand the economic 
pundits say that this is a matter of little concern; those of us in politics are very concerned
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22 Kobayashi, Tomohiko ‘Tokyo looks for closer ties with a stronger Europe’ The 
Financial Times, 3 July 1992. p.2.
23 Horst G. Krenzler, DGI, Director General External Relations, EC Commission, news 
conference, EC delegation, Tokyo, 20 April 1990.
24 ‘Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession’ in Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994, p.31. 
James C. Abegglen concurs: "Bi-lateral deficits are not necessarily bad." Interview, Tokyo,
13 April 1993.
about the impact [of the deficit] on employment in Europe."25 On the Japanese side, the 
matter of deficits and unemployment is sensitive, and Japanese officials and firms have been 
keen to stress the job-creating dimension of FDI. Interviewed in April 1993, Mr. Teruhiko 
Mano26 who led a Keidanren mission to Brussels and authored an influential report on EC- 
Japan economic matters; vigorously denied any link between the trade deficit and 
unemployment in Europe and made representations to this effect directly to President 
Delors.27 Nevertheless, concern about the trade deficit was the priority on the EC side. In 
the words of Shigeru Horikoshi, adviser, at a Japanese commercial bank in Brussels in 1992: 
"governments interfere when there is a problem. And of course there is a problem with the 
trade imbalance."28 Since external trade policy has been within the legal competence of the 
EC Commission, this has been the most visible area of EC representational activity in EC- 
Japan relations.
The situation regarding trade policy differs substantially from that which prevails in the realm 
of inbound FDI ‘policy’ - where competence is retained by the states. Japanese firms and the 
Japanese government played a role in the bargaining which sustained the limited EC-level 
competence in inbound FDI matters. Before turning to that evolution, it is firstly necessary 
to look at the specific exercise of trade policy towards Japan in the years leading up to the 
surge of FDI.
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25 James Moorhouse, Euro-MP for London South & Surrey East, speaking at the 14th 
EP/Japan inter-parliamentary meeting, Diet Building, Tokyo, 1 June 1993. Author’s notes. 
EC ambassador in Tokyo, Jean-Pierre Leng concurred: "It is impossible to conceive that in 
a very serious crisis in Europe, especially with high unemployment that there will not be a 
backlash against Japanese trade." Press conference, EC delegation, Tokyo, 17 June 1993. Dr. 
Malcolm Trevor, Director of the EC-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation, said that the 
deficit "was becoming very dangerous." Interview, 31 March 1993.
26 Advisor to the President of the Bank of Tokyo.
27 Interview, Mr. Teruhiko Mano, Tokyo, 7 April 1993. This position is shared by a 
Japanese Ministry of Finance official, Masaki Omura. Discussion at Canon 
Foundation/European University Institute conference, Fiesole, June 1994.
28 Interview, Shigeru Horikoshi, adviser, Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank (Europe), Brussels, 22 July 
1992.
V.5 A n t i-d u m pin g : l eg a l  in stru m en t  as r e a c t iv e  tra d e  po l ic y
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In 1948 anti-dumping measures were agreed by GATT to be a legitimate means of protecting 
‘free trade.’ Firms are deemed to be dumping if it can be demonstrated that they are selling 
in an external market at prices lower than their domestic market. The EC’s anti-dumping law 
(which has undergone several revisions) dates from 1968.29 Although the U.S. has used anti­
dumping measures30 the main thrust of Japan policy has involved both explicit and implicit 
critiques of the endogenous features of Japanese markets and society. An example of such 
a policy is the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). By contrast, the EC Commission has, 
in trade policy, been largely reactive and has relied on measures such as anti-dumping 
duties.31 The instrument of anti-dumping became even more important in EC-Japan affairs 
with the controversial EC decision to extend its usage to cover component parts.
The Commission also increased its export promotion drive in the 1980s. The Export 
Promotion Programme for Japan and the EC-Japan Centre for Industrial Co-operation32 were 
established to attempt to redress the massive imbalance in trade between the Community and 
Japan. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Japanese goods became increasingly visible in the 
European market, but up until the mid-1980s Japanese investment in the EC was 
comparatively low. Two major EC developments were influenced by external competition 
from Japan - the evolution of the Single Market Programme and the increased use of anti­
dumping measures. Japan was not the only spur to these developments. However, Japanese
29 Van Bael, Ivo and Jean-François Beilis Anti-Dumping and other Trade Protection Laws 
of the EEC, 2nd ed. CCH editions, Bicester, 1990. p.23.
30 Simon Reich writes: "The issue of America’s uncompetitiveness is often reduced to 
congressional accusations of dumping being leveled against foreign producers who, it is 
claimed, are cheating at some mythical "rules of the game" - a tactic designed to intimidate 
both foreign firms and their governments in order to encourage the firms to shift part of their 
manufacturing production to the United States. In this context, "foreign" is often the 
euphemism for Japanese." ‘Roads to Follow: regulating direct foreign investment,’ in 
International Organization, 43, 4, Autumn 1989. p.545.
31 Mr. Peter Doyle, Press Secretary, EC Commission delegation, Washington D.C., 
stressed this aspect of the EC approach. Presentation, E.U.I., October 1991.
32 Founded in 1979 and 1987 respectively.
firms, by increasing market share, exposed the low level of European competitiveness. As 
Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann have written: "decisive moves toward the Single 
European Act were delayed until the perception of crisis was widespread."33 However, the 
Commission cannot be faulted for the degree of reaction in its policy towards Japan, since 
it had been advocating an active unified EC approach from the early 1960s when it was 
jealously denied a negotiating mandate by the Council.34
Anti-dumping was not the only measure which could provide protection for European 
industries. However, since anti-dumping (a Community competence) was increasingly applied 
in the 1980s, it became the most important aspect of the EC’s response to Japanese expansion 
into European markets. Strictly defined, anti-dumping is a legal instrument. In this period 
however, it was used as an instrument of EC trade policy. Anti-dumping has not been used 
against Japanese firms alone, nor disproportionately to Japan’s trade volume.35 Japanese 
firms are however among the few anti-dumping defendants to be in a position to significantly 
effect the EC and EC regulation, through foreign direct investment. The increased and 
broadened use of anti-dumping actions led to the growing internalisation of Japan’s 
relationship with Europe; a development which has greatly increased the complexity of EC- 
Japan relations.
One sector in which the anti-dumping policy was fully played out was that of photocopiers. 
At the beginning of the 1980s there were nine indigenous photocopier manufacturers in the 
Community. Ten years later, only Rank Xerox (UK) and Oce (The Netherlands) were fully
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1980s’, in R.O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann (eds.), The New European Community: decision­
making and institutional change, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991. p.23. The principal architect 
of the Single European Act, Jacques Delors stated: "We have to move fast, or Europe will 
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34 Rothacher, Albrecht, Economic Diplomacy between the European Community and 
Japan, 1959-1981, Gower, Aldershot, 1983. Chapter 4.
35 Yoshitomi, Masaru and the Sumitomo-Life Research Institute, Japanese Direct 
Investment in Europe, Vol. II of the Joint Project on Japanese Investment in Europe, Avebury, 
Aldershot, 1991, p.32.
independent or non-reliant on Japanese manufacturers. Even these had distribution links with 
Japanese manufacturers by the early 1990s. European manufacturers of photocopiers reported 
in 1985 that the Japanese share of the ECUlbn. EC market had increased from 50% in 1980 
to 85% in 1985.36 A group of European firms formed the Committee of European Copier 
Manufacturers (CECOM) in March, 1985, "with the sole purpose"37 of pressuring the EC 
Commission to investigate the possibility of dumping by Japanese manufacturers on the 
European market. The five CECOM firms, Rank Xerox (UK), Olivetti (Italy), Oce (The 
Netherlands), Develop (West Germany) and Tetras (France); "by making a joint approach to 
Brussels, increased their credibility by arguing from a common position instead of appearing 
as individual companies each trying to protect its private commercial interest."38 The EC 
firms in this group presented the Commission with pricing information which could be used 
in determining whether or not Japanese photocopier manufacturers were in fact engaged in 
dumping.39 If the industry complaint were substantial, the Commission would find it 
difficult not to take action. Such information as is reviewed by the Anti-Dumping Directorate 
in DGI is of a ‘commercially confidential nature.’40
While the percentage share of the European photocopier market held by European firms was 
only 15% at the time CECOM presented its case to the Commission, according to Rank 
Xerox a successful dumping action would "result in regaining opportunities for the remaining 
European manufacturers."41 Trade lobbying became an important part of commercial 
strategy for European firms whose market share was diminished by Japanese competition.
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37 Interview, David Whibley, legal department, Rank Xerox (UK), 31 March 1992.
38 Philip, Alan Butt, ‘Pressure Groups in the EC and Informal Institutional Arrangements’, 
in Beuter, Rita and Panos Tsakaloyannis (eds.), Experiences in Regional Cooperation, 
E.I.P.A., Maastricht, 1987. p.83. Also, Lodge, Juliet ‘EC policymaking: institutional 
considerations’ in Lodge, Juliet (ed.) The European Community and the Challenge of the 
Future, Pinter, London, 1989. p.52.
39 The Financial Times, 2 June 1986, p.23.
40 Fielding, Sir Leslie, letter to The Financial Times, 19 June 1986, p.23.
41 Bake, James, letter to The Financial Times, 10 June 1986, p.23.
Since the anti-dumping instrument is exercised by the EC, European firms frequently look to 
Brussels rather than their home government when formulating a strategy to seek protection. 
Very often, as was the case with the UK and the Netherlands, such firms are bypassing 
unsympathetic national governments in the pursuit of protection.
The calculation in anti-dumping investigations is complex. In determining whether or not 
dumping is taking place, the Commission can use ‘constructed’ prices. The reconstruction 
of the cost chain back to the Japanese manufacturer, and the way in which such reconstructed 
prices are compared have been challenged.42 One analysis finds that "Japanese pricing 
reverses western practice."43 Whereby Japanese firms begin with a targeted market share, 
and trim costs of manufacture in order to compete effectively for that share. European firms 
tend to add up costs to determine entry price. With a great deal of interpretation available, 
such a process becomes inevitably political. The ultimate decision on whether or not to 
proceed with the imposition of anti-dumping duties on Japanese imports, is made by the 
Council, after the Commission’s recommendation which is prepared with the knowledge of 
the member states’ permanent representatives in Brussels. The Commission’s investigation 
is made within DGI.44
In August 1986 the Japanese firms investigated in response to CECOM accusations were 
declared to be dumping photocopiers and fined up to 15.8% in duties, increased to 20% in 
February of the following year.45 Advocates of anti-dumping point out that such measures 
prevent the further erosion of European firms’ market share and provide opportunities to
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42 For example Messerlin, Patrick A. and Noguchi Yoshiyuki ‘The EC Antidumping and 
Anticircumvention Regulations: a costly yet futile exercise, the case of photocopiers’ draft 
working paper, Paris, 1991; and Curzon-Price, G. and V. ‘Follies in European trade and 
relations with Japan’ in The World Economy, Vol.10, No.2, 1987. pp.155-176.
43 The Economist, 4 April 1992, p.20
44 DeAnne Julius has questioned the structural demarcation of EC institutional activity in 
this area; "the burden of proof and enforcement in such cases should rest with competition 
policy, not with trade or FDI policy." Global Companies and Public Policy: The growing 
challenge of foreign direct investment, RIIA, Pinter, London, 1990, p.99.
45 The Financial Times, 26 August 1986, p.l, and 24 February 1987, p.6.
increase that share. On the other hand, a 1989 UK House of Lords report on EC-Japan 
relations, concluded that although protection was sometimes needed "some industries have 
been given ‘illegal’ protection, in a haphazard fashion, under the cover of anti-dumping rules 
and voluntary restraint agreements."46 Opponents of anti-dumping point out that such duties 
are against the European consumer interest by increasing the unit price of the ‘dumped’ item. 
The application of protection may also compromise EC efforts in Japanese ‘market access’ 
negotiations. In the 1970s, the arguments for greater European access to the Japanese market 
were weighty. Japan was exporting to the EC, unaccompanied by major investment, and her 
own market was more inaccessible than in the early 1990s.
Anti-dumping actions can have an adverse affect on firms which act solely as distributors of 
Japanese products. Many of these are of long standing within the EC. The Joint Chairman 
of Gestetner Holdings, a UK distributor of Japanese photocopiers has even gone so far as to 
suggest that firms which pressure the Commission into anti-dumping investigations are simply 
being litigious in pursuing individual firm goals.47
In 1987, while surveying the legal instruments available to the EC’s external trade directorate, 
Marco Bronckers stated that "Japan has opted for quiet though persistent diplomacy. Yet, as 
a matter of law, nothing in the GATT precludes Japan from formally disputing important 
restrictions on its products in the future."48 In an interview with the President of Canon 
Italia SpA, the point was borne out: economic problems tended to become political, and MITI 
requests Japanese companies abroad to "harmonize the international relationship."49 Japanese
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the Community and Japan [13th Report, session 1988-89], Report, p.26.
47 In the view of Jonathan Gestetner, "yesterday’s patent suit is today’s anti-dumping 
action." Letter to The Financial Times, 4 June 1986, p.25.
48 Bronckers, Marco C.E.J., ‘A legal analysis of protectionist measures affecting Japanese 
imports into the European Community - revisited’, p.92, in J.HJ. Bourgeois et al (eds.), 
Protectionism and the European Community: import relief measures taken by the European 
Economic Community and the member states, and the legal remedies available to private 
parties, 2nd ed., Kluwer, Deventer, 1987.
49 Interview with Mr. Takashi Saegusa, President, Canon Italia SpA, Milan, 7 April 1992.
criticism of anti-dumping in the mid-1980s focused on the constructed market price used by 
the Commission and a perceived ‘political’ element in the application of anti-dumping rules. 
Bronckers’ 1987 assessment that Japan could have recourse to GATT was prophetic. As 
discussed below, Japan won an important GATT panel ruling against the EC on the issue of 
the extension of anti-dumping measures to cover components used in Japanese plants within 
the EC. (V.10 below)
With some anti-dumping investigations, the threat of duties is withdrawn following Japanese 
firm ‘undertakings’ to adjust prices. Where it is obvious however that an investigation will 
lead to duties being imposed, a Japanese short-term response in the photocopy sector was to 
stock up on photocopier units in advance of the imposition of duties. However, the main 
consequence of anti-dumping for Japanese firms was increased FDI. Pat Choate, analysing 
Japanese lobbying efforts in Washington, stresses the policy-influencing efforts of Japanese 
firms and their lobbying agents.50 The main ambition of Japanese representatives in Brussels 
was not so much to influence EC policy directly, but rather to gather information for use in 
firm (location, relocation or exit) strategies. Firms with large resources and complex trans­
national interests, devoted greater effort to avoiding, or preparing for unfavorable conditions 
in national and international jurisdictions. Such resources are impressive; placing regulatory 
organizations in a reactive position when trying to ‘contain’ their activities.
In the late 1980s Hitachi51, Fujitsu, Victor, Mitsubishi Electric52 and other Japanese firms 
set up representative offices in Brussels. This strategy was partly motivated by the need for 
information relating to the 1992 programme. It was also aimed at assessing the impact of EC 
regulations, standards and competition policy on firm activity - including what we may call 
‘new zone’ regulatory activity of the Commission in areas such as the extension of anti­
dumping to component parts and the reinterpretation of rules of origin. According to Higashi
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Development Dept., Overseas Operations Promotion Office. Tokyo, 30 June 1993. "We 
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52 The Japan Economic Journal, 19 August 1989, p.7.
and Lauter "MITI is encouraging companies to set up ‘antenna offices’.... in Brussels to 
follow the various developments more closely."53 This is indicative of the changing role of 
MITI in the EC-Japan relationship. In former decades, MITI was the primary collector of 
such information, making it available to firms. By the late 1980s, the emphasis was on firm- 
based information gathering, with MITI encouragement.
Lack of consensus between member states on issues of common commercial concern towards 
Japan are likely to arise in the EC anti-dumping committee, the rules of origin committee, 
COREPER, or the Council. The position of national governments on anti-dumping is largely 
determined by the prevailing view of industrial and commercial policy in individual member 
states.54 By virtue of its presence in five countries, CECOM, the European photocopier 
manufacturers’ group, was in a position to gauge the possible pro or contra stance of 
individual states to its proposed strategy of persuading the Commission to impose anti­
dumping on its Japanese competitors.
Anti-dumping is not the sole means by which the EC can regulate imports. In 1983 the 
Japanese government agreed to negotiate voluntary export agreements on a Community-wide 
basis.55 The 1991 automobile agreement is one such agreement, resulting in voluntary 
‘monitoring’ by the Japanese. Voluntary restraint, or ‘gentleman’s agreements’ also take 
place between European and Japanese industries and industrial associations. Some measures 
have been affected by the Single Market Programme. Seamus O’Cléireacâin, has pointed out 
that other measures, such as the Article 115 safeguard clause which grants exceptions to free 
circulation of external goods within the Community to protect certain state markets, "should 
be expected to disappear eventually in a complete internal market."56
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In the UK, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission recommended the ending of VERAs and
Interviewed in 1992 Mr. Christopher Norall, a lawyer in Brussels said "The intellectual 
climate has changed away from anti-dumping. As a device to keep out imports it didn’t 
work. The logic of economic high-tech survival, especially in hi-tech is multinational [firm] 
cooperation."57 The disintegration of CECOM, the photocopier lobby group, under the 
weight of such firm-firm cooperation, is one example of how private trans-national relations 
provided an alternative to the exercise of broad international ‘industrial’ policy in the form 
of anti-dumping, confirming Norall’s general view. This has been partially recognised at the 
highest levels of the Commission: "Anti-dumping is a short run response, but to really 
improve competitiveness you need a much stronger restructuring strategy."58 The most 
important effect of bringing the technically legal instrument of anti-dumping to the fore of 
EC external policy was to bring the ‘Japan issue’ closer to home. This occurred by virtue of 
a massive increase in Japanese FDI in Europe during the period under review. The role of 
the Japanese firm as primary manifestation of Japan, emerged as a central theme in the 
relationship between Japan and the EC.
In ‘the age of investment’ in EC-Japan relations, the EC Commission formulated a new 
approach in trade policy. This is the Trade Assessment Mechanism (TAM) which is a joint 
exercise between the Commission and Japanese ministries, to study medium and long-term 
trade imbalances between Japan and the Community. This cross-sectoral study aims to 
identify specific problem sectors and arrive at mutually-agreed initiatives for change. The 
TAM has been described thus: "The approach is analytic and non-confrontational, and 
designed to lead to improved market access by mutual agreement."59 In Tokyo, the
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VERA, may be unilaterally abandoned before the expiry date of 1999.
57 Interview, Mr. Christopher Norall Esq., Forrester, Norall and Sutton, Brussels, 16 July
1992.
58 Interview, Alexis Jacquemin, Cellule de Prospective, EC Commission, Brussels, 23 July
1992.
59 EC News, PR 16/93, Tokyo, 20 April 1993.
Commission now regularly rejects the "ritual exchange"60 between Japanese and EC officials 
that European exporters were not trying hard enough. Ambassador Leng in Tokyo said of the 
TAM in mid-1993: "We cannot stay in the analysis stage forever. We have to move from 
analysis to the selection of products... and then to the solution."61
This approach is quite different from that of the U.S. towards Japan. Firstly, the Commission 
in the 1990s has repeatedly stated that it opposes sectoral numerical targets. This has 
particularly been the case since the Commission’s vociferous opposition to the U.S.-Japan 
semi-conductor agreement.62 The EC’s approach in the early 1990s encourages the Japanese 
government to increase domestic growth in order to stimulate imports; the TAM serves to 
tackle areas of specific difficulty and the EC persistently asks for greater consideration in 
large government procurement projects.
Theoretically, the stabilising role of the Japanese ministries ought to favour the EC 
Commission’s approach to Japan over that of the United States. The EC Commission, 
through the TAM is involved in an on-going exercise with MITI and others, which is - at 
least on the surface - a co-operative exercise. The U.S. approach, advocated by Special Trade 
Representative Kantor and others, is directed more towards cabinet-level actors and demands 
a specific political intervention in market sectors. This tends to result in communiques which 
are subject to vigorously different interpretations. Such occurred at the US-Japan bilateral 
meeting immediately before the 1993 G-7 meeting in Tokyo, with both sides having varying 
interpretations of what ‘objective criteria’ actually meant.63
The EC trade strategy towards Japan has thus moved from the more confrontational climate
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reflected on U.S. negotiating experiences with Japan thus: "When agreements were finally 
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of 1983-1989 to a more co-operative approach, which is largely founded in the realities of 
increased investment from Japan to the EC since the mid-1980s.64 Throughout this 
transition, the Commission was largely in an ad hoc reactive position. Japanese firms played 
an active role with the European states and sub-states playing the role of eager interlocutors.
One area in which the states are strongest actors, but in which the Commission has taken a 
recent but limited initiative is trade promotion. The EC Commission’s export promotion 
programme (EXPROM) provides "training, market information and commercial promotion"65 
for EC firms in Japan. The Executive Training Programme gives young European executives 
work experience and training in Japan. The sectors which were of particular interest were 
those in which the EC had experienced difficulties in accessing the Japanese market, such as 
processed foods, leather and textiles. That the states play the strongest role in export 
promotion is reflected at Community level, by the tendency for the Council to trim the 
Commission EXPROM expenditure request in the Community budget. The European 
Parliament consistently supports the Commission in this regard.
More recently, the Commission and the member states have turned their support activities 
towards Asia in general: "We as a community need to raise the consciousness of industry 
regarding the opportunities in the area."66 In mid-1994 the Commission, with strong support 
of the German Presidency67 issued a new communication, Towards a New Asia Strategy68
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reflecting a growing European awareness of the strategic importance of Asia in general.
V.6 The role of Japanese firms in the evolution of the European single 
market
Through the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was considerable flux in what was meant by 
a Single European Market; what it was intended to achieve; how it would actually be 
constituted and above all: what the prevailing political economic philosophy would be. From 
its conception, different member states and industrialists had different visions of what the 
market would be like. The dirigiste view was that ‘state-like’ intervention could be 
transferred to Community level. To neo-liberals, the market was an important opportunity 
for the expansion of Atlantic-style capitalism.
In a finely balanced neo-realist/neo-functionalist analysis of the evolution of the ‘1992 
Initiative’, David Cameron concludes (narrowly) that the Community "will remain a 
Community of states" - thus giving more emphasis to inter-governmental explanations.69 
Attempts to combine such differing theoretical explanations in EC scholarship have however 
been less than satisfactory. It is difficult to envisage the Community evolving in both 
intergovernmental and federal directions and it cannot be overlooked that theoretical mixing 
has emerged in a period of uncertainty concerning the EC’s constitutional destination. This 
research project stresses the distinction between economic integration and political integration 
as a useful conceptual matrix to understanding the evolution of the European single market 
in the era of globalisation. It is argued that the evolution of the relationship between the 
politically-inspired single market and the organic global market, has important implications 
for the European Community.
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The analysis of Grahl and Teague which stressed differences and evolutions in the market 
philosophy is accurate: "1992 can be given a neo-mercantilist interpretation, popular in France 
and to some extent even in Germany, as well as the neo-liberal interpretation which is 
preferred by the British government."70 Although Charles Oman of the OECD has suggested 
that "Single Market Europe was a response to Anglo-Saxon deregulation"71 it is more likely 
that the UK and the Netherlands constituted an aggressive force for such deregulation after 
the initial bargaining, as fault lines developed over such issues as Japanese inward investment.
The contest for control of the ‘blueprint’ of the Single European Market is an important 
context to the evolution of EC-Japan investment relations in the period from 1985 to 1993. 
In particular, it is important not to view the SEA and the ‘1992 initiative’ as static, rules- 
based realities. The intertwined history of the development of the single market programme 
and Commission reaction to Japanese firm globalisation illustrates an evolution from 
Commission scepticism concerning Japanese FDI towards a more open stance. The evolution 
was driven not so much (although certainly influenced) by the dirigiste/neo-\ibcr&\ debate - 
as by the larger question of the ability of public authorities to regulate firm globalisation. In 
the case of the SEA and the 1992 Programme, the Commission was active. With regard to 
‘new zone’ attempts to regulate FDI, the Commission was not only reactive, but was largely 
thwarted by firms in its attempts to respond to extra-jurisdictional developments in the 
commercial realm. Jonathan Story has stressed that the Single Market Programme was 
intended to "restrict member states’ protectionist propensities and to open up intra-EC
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markets, as the precondition to strengthening its negotiating position against non-members".72 
This assessment pinpoints the Commission’s assumptions of scale-efficiency and its somewhat 
simplistic concepts of European/non-European market participation.73 The failure of the 
Commission to establish itself as the ‘gatekeeper’ of market participation [V.9, V.10, V.ll 
below] undermined the political integrative ‘dividend’ from the Single Market Programme.
A comprehensive statement of Commission views on inward FDI at the end of the period 
under review, was given by Sir Leon Brittan in his Jean Monnet Regional Lecture in March 
1993:
Japanese investment in Europe gets a lot of attention. The Commission welcomes it. 
Increased direct investment in both directions is good for jobs, good for reducing trade 
imbalances and trade frictions, good for our cultural understanding of each other. We 
encourage Japanese and all other inward investors to integrate fully in the European 
economy, by locating research, development, marketing and management here 
alongside the manufacturing, sales and service functions... So the EC needs foreign 
investors and must treat them well. We [the Commission] control investment subsidies 
in Europe on the same basis, whether they are offered to Japanese, American or 
domestic promoters... The Commission cannot and must not tell businessmen where 
to set up... We do want to reduce state aids progressively and to reduce competitive 
subsidy offers among member states all chasing the same business. But we have no 
desire to spread FDI around the Community according to some bureaucratic vision of 
what is equitable or expedient.74
This is a clear and comprehensive statement of the EC Commission position on inbound FDI 
at the close of the period under review. Such a position encapsulates the neo-liberal outcome 
of the protracted ‘dirigiste’ versus ‘neo-liberal’ debate, which was contested from the 
inception of the SEA until the early 1990s. The Commission did not always hold so liberal 
a position towards Japanese FDI. The period was marked by a neo-liberal unfolding and de
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72 Story, Jonathan ‘Europe in the global state and market system’ in Jonathan Story (ed.) 
The New Europe: politics, government and economy since 1945, Blackwell, 1993. p.52.
73 Stephen Young and Neil Hood write that "in the discussions and implementation of the 
Single Market, virtually no reference was made to TNCs, the assumption apparently being 
that international production and trade were undertaken by uni-national firms." ‘Inward 
Investment policy in the European Community in the 1990s’ in Transnational Corporations, 
Vol.2, No.2, August, 1993. p.43.
74 Sir Leon Brittan, , ‘Shaping a framework for global trade: the challenge for the 
European Community,’ Jean Monnet Regional Lecture, Hallgarth Hall, Darlington, 19 March
1993. EC Rapide, ref: Speech/93/30, text, p.6-7.
facto, limitations on the options of the Commission for response to changes in global 
production and finance.
Speaking at the Sixth EC-Japan Symposium on industrial co-operation in Tokyo in 1987
Umberto Agnelli outlined a position which, in the early stages of the contest regarding the
shape of the single market, represented a common view in France, Italy and even within the
European Commission. In some ways, Agnelli’s position represents not so much a strict
dirigiste line, but rather a communitaire-consistent logic which claimed that gains from
internal political bargains on matters of economic coordination and reconstitution should be
reaped more by Europeans than others. It was this "natural institutional priority" which global
capital and productive mobility undermined over the ensuing six years:
Before long the EEC will become a single European market. And that offers growth 
opportunities for us all. However it must be clearly understood that the single 
European market is primarily designed for the benefit and development of the 
European productive system. It would be an illusion and above all a grave mistake 
to believe that the single market could be exploited to the detriment of this obvious 
natural institutional priority. The fact that the EEC has opted for free trade does not 
mean it will ever fail to protect European interests. That after all is the principle you 
[Japanese] yourselves wanted respected back in the sixties when our car industry could 
have posed a serious threat to the development of yours.75
In the mid-1980s the Commission’s position was not wholly different from Agnelli’s. The 
view of Sir Leon Brittan (1993) should not be understood in the context of a completely 
voluntarily - arrived at position. Industrialists such as Agnelli and Jacques Calvet (and Rank 
Xerox in lobbying for anti-dumping suits) attempted to establish a rationale for the exclusive 
administration of EC competitiveness stimulants to ‘European’ firms, precisely at a time when 
FDI was beginning to undermine the geographical enforceability of such preferential 
competitiveness enhancement.
The impression of ‘Fortress Europe’ which existed in Japan during the late 1980s appears
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75 Emphasis added. Umberto Agnelli, Sixth EC-Japan Symposium on industrial co­
operation, speech, Tokyo, 4 December 1987.
only to have subsided in the recent past.76 However, Japanese industrialists did expect the 
removal of internal barriers to be accompanied by a ‘hardening’ of the external frontier.77 
The options for EC institutional reaction were curtailed due to the growing ‘insider status’ of 
Japanese firms and their bargains with liberal member states and a myriad of sub-states.78
In the mid-1980s the EC Commission suggested rapid approval for directives which would
bring the Single Market into immediate effect in certain areas. This proposal was opposed
by the French in Council since this "would benefit products from producers outside the EC
as much as those from within."79 Yet such an outcome was a logical implication of the
Single Market Programme which could not deny external firms’ rights as enunciated in the
Treaty of Rome. The EC Commission was in a difficult position vis-à-vis the evolution of
Community strategy. While recognising the need to make the Community "more attractive
for inward investment in the industrial sector" Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Head of the
Commission Delegation in Tokyo in the mid-1980s, also referred to the need for
a greater convergence of government policies towards inward investment. Conditions 
for inward investment and the extent of technology transfer to and from third countries
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76 Takehiko Nishiyama, Ambassador of Japan to the European Communities stated in a 
1990 speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs: "A recent opinion survey 
conducted among Japanese business leaders indicates that Japanese anxiety over fortress 
Europe has been somewhat assuaged but it seems to be still too early to say "goodbye to 
fortress Europe." ‘Goodbye to Fortress Europe? Current concerns: a Japanese viewpoint,’ p.l. 
A similar wave of concern arose in Japan in the early 1960s regarding the Common Market. 
By 1991 one news magazine declared: "Europe’s fearsome fortress is beginning to look like 
Swiss cheese." Business Week, ‘The Battle for Europe’, 3 June 1991, p.16.
77 One such was Kenjiro Ishikawa of the Mitsubishi Research Institute: "Because one of 
the motives behind the integration is to guard and support domestic industries, such as autos 
and electronics, Japan is likely to be forced into a difficult position." Japan Times, 22 October 
1990, p.24.
78 Yannopolous has written: "When non-tariff barriers are eliminated in the internal 
transactions of the customs union, there is no directly equivalent instrument to use in the 
common external commercial policy." ‘Foreign Direct Investment and European Integration: 
The Evidence from the Formative Years of the European Community,’ Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. XXVIII, No.3, 1990, p.255.
79 Fligstein, Neil, The Cultural Construction o f Political Action: The Case of the European 
Comm unity’s Single Unitary Market Program’ paper A n n u a l  M ee tin g  of t h e  A m erican  
S o c io lo g ic a l  A sso c ia tio n , Miami, Florida, 1993. p.29.
must be actively studied. Member states must take into account a Community
perspective and Community priorities in this respect.80
The only strong EC-level investment regulation which could be termed ‘inward investment 
policy’ is the post-facto investigations which the Commission is authorised to conduct if it 
suspects that state or regional aids have had an anti-competitive effect. Both Sony (Berlin) 
and Toyota (Derbyshire) have been investigated in this regard.81 This power is not reserved 
exclusively for external firms; European firms have been investigated and have been ordered 
to pay supplemental amounts when they have been deemed to have underpaid for sites. From 
a Commission perspective, eliminating all investment host ‘inequities’ would be desirable. 
But this is impractical if not impossible. Differing levels of taxation in the Community82 
are likely to remain, while infrastructural spending and other incentives are frequently difficult 
to link to specific Japanese investment projects.
It is thus evident that the Commission - although also opting for a ‘liberal’ stance for positive 
reasons, found it exceptionally difficult to implement any alternative. The emerging design 
of the Single European Market was subject to the outcomes of ad hoc skirmishing and a 
somewhat belated realisation by the Commission that (in principle) Japanese firms had an 
exceedingly strong legal case to participate in the market once inward FDI had been permitted
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80 Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Head of Delegation of the Commission of the European 
Communities in Japan, Rotterdam Seminar, 14 October 1985. Text, p.4. Emphasis in 
original.
81 This recourse is largely intended to discourage national authorities, regions and 
municipalities from offering subsidies which could be deemed ‘distortive.’ As David Whibley 
pointed out; "Derbyshire is not an underdeveloped area." Interview, Rank Xerox legal 
department, Marlowe, 31 March 1992. The number of cases investigated has been small, and 
the actual penalties are not severe - the main intent being preemptive discouragement. Both 
Japanese firms and the localities with which they are bargaining are negatively disposed 
towards Commission involvement. Nikkei Weekly quoted a Japanese industry source in the 
Sony/Berlin case thus: "Getting approval for projects in Germany is a drawn-out process in 
any case, and there are still residual administrative complications as a result of unification.. 
The last thing you need on top of this is an investigation by the European Commission." 12 
October 1992, p .ll ‘Japanese firms alarmed over Sony HQ snag in Berlin.’
82 Vigorously defended by Jacques Santer while premier of Luxembourg.
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at all.83
Further, Japanese FD1 decisions were influenced by EC trade policy and constitutional change 
in the first instance. Most notable among these policies was the increase in the use of anti­
dumping actions as a policy option against Japanese firms in the mid-1980s. The Single 
European Act itself created an additional incentive for Japanese firms to invest.84 The 
Commission resolved to establish the ‘four freedoms’ of movement for people, services, 
goods and capital; with a view to reducing the costs of internal transactions and enhancing 
the EC’s competitive position with the U.S. and Japan.85 The free movement of goods was 
quickly tested by external firms. This issue arose most visibly in the context of the Nissan 
Bluebird local content confrontation between the UK and France. In this instance, Japanese 
involvement did not so much change the shape of the market • the free circulation of goods 
was a fundamental ‘freedom.’ Rather, a Japanese firm with a high degree of international 
competitiveness, was the first major external investor to test and affirm Treaty of Rome
83 Laura D’Andrea Tyson has pointed out the ‘case-by-case basis’ on which the 
Community treats decisions on the participation of non-EC firms in Community R&D 
programmes. Paper, Japanese Direct Investment in a Unifying Europe: Impacts on 
Japan and the European Community conference, INSEAD, Euro-Asia Centre, 
Fontainebleau, 26 June 1992.
84 Mitsuo Matsushita has written that "..the year 1992 seems to be a political manifesto 
rather than the year in which the integration is finally completed." ‘A Japanese View of the 
European Integration of 1992’ in Oppermann T. and J. Molsberger (eds.) A New GATT for 
the Nineties and Europe ’92, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1991, p.291.
85 Wallace and Kline compare the U.S. with the EC in many respects. Wallace, Cynthia 
Day and John M. Kline EC 92 and Changing Global Investment Patterns. Vol. XIV, #10 
Significant Issues Series, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 
1992. Here however, U.S. states are compared with EC sub-states, and the U.S. with EC 
member states. Although the EC has little in common with NAFTA, such a comparison is 
more accurate than the convenient U.S./EC comparison. The implications of FDI attraction 
competitions are radically different between the U.S. and the EC. Inter-state tension in the 
U.S. over FDI ‘loading’ does not involve potential international conflict of interest. The 
federal system is not only more mature - but internal demographic movements have direct 
competitiveness effects. Freedom of movement of persons is an integral de facto facet of 
U.S. competitiveness; whilst in the EC, the ‘four freedoms’ constitute a de jure attempt to 
enhance competitiveness. In the U.S. such a circulation of persons can counter-balance FDI 
‘loading’. As such, the U.S. can be compared with EC member-states whose ‘anti-loading’ 
strategies are effective.
provisions as resuscitated in the 1992 Programme. In so doing, Japan’s involvement through 
foreign direct investment, served to underscore clearly a principle which does not seem to 
have been fully thought through by the Commission or the French and Italian governments. 
The affirmation of freedom of circulation which Nissan sought from the Commission, was 
exceedingly slow in forthcoming. The Nissan investment of 1986 was a landmark in western 
Europe; vigorously sought by the UK government and looked upon suspiciously by European 
producers in this important and sensitive European industry. The French government and auto 
industry was at this time sceptical about Japanese investment in France, but was unable to 
affect Japanese investment in other member states since the Commission could not enunciate 
EC-wide inward investment policy.
In 1988 the French government announced that Nissan automobiles imported from the UK 
should contain 80% EC-sourced content. The British government stated that it was itself 
interested in increasing local content levels but was opposed to regulating investing firms on 
product sourcing decisions. Local content requirements were not stipulated by the 
Commission for products made by Japanese owned or controlled firms within the EC. By the 
time of the coming into effect of the 1992 Programme, the only significant local content 
requirements on Japanese firms were negotiated with individual member states. One of the 
hallmarks of the Nissan dispute was the long delay in there being any resolution. The 
Commission delegation in Tokyo was persistently asked for the Commission’s position but 
could only say that the matter was under consideration in Brussels and European capitals. 
The Commission was placed in the position of persuading France to concede that Nissan 
Bluebirds should be allowed entry to its market. An EC Commission press release of 18 
April 1989 stated:
In reply to a request by Vice-president Bangemann, the French authorities have 
indicated that the administrative measures required to ensure free access to the French 
market for Nissan UK Bluebird vehicles, starting at the end of 1988, have been taken. 
The French Government has confirmed that these imports from the UK will not affect 
the traditional imports of Nissan vehicles from Japan. Vice-President Bangemann has 
informed the British government about the insurance given by the French 
authorities.86
The Commission had been placed in the position of supporting the logic of its own market
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86 EC Commission press release, IP (89) 257, Brussels, 18 April 1989.
programme on behalf of the UK government and Nissan. The French government was 
reluctant to concede the principle, but found itself arguing against the very logic of the 
Market Programme to which it had subscribed. The Nissan case clearly indicated that the 
evolution of the market was not solely determined by endogenous factors and decisions.
The Commission statement on the Nissan issue highlights that the de facto interpretation, 
course of application and impact of agreements, depends on the extent to which they are 
imbued with real power in the system. The case of access to the mainland European markets 
of UK Nissans illustrates that dynamics in such cases were not solely limited to de jure 
provisions. The evolution of the single market was subject to the gauntlet of conflicting 
interpretations throughout.
The confirmation that French authorities would not link free movement to ‘traditional’ 
Japanese imports was important, and is returned to below in the context of Commission 
attempts to extend trade policy into the investment sphere, where the advent of local 
production exposed the limited legal competence of the Commission in the rapidly
interlinking global equation of trade and investment.
Leon Brittan’s view appears to underestimate almost flippantly, the issue of inter-state 
tensions over locational and relocational decisions by MNEs. Most states in the Community 
have some element of the ‘bureaucratic vision’ of FDI guidance which Brittan refers to. This 
is primarily to defuse excess tension between regions. The ‘safeguards’ against investment 
‘loading’ in particular regions within the larger member states do not appear to be 
transferable to the Community level. Such a transfer would require the Commission to issue 
centralised guidelines to member states regarding one of their most sensitive political
economic functions: the creation of an environment for employment and growth through
inviting external FDI with a view to enhancing economic welfare. Such enhancement was 
the most important concern of the SEA. The evolution of the relationship between the 
Commission and the member states was directly effected by the involvement of external firms
- which bargained with the liberal member states, leading to a neo-liberal outcome in the
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contest for the blue-print of the market.87 The relationship between sub-state regions and 
states on one hand; and states and the EC-level institutions on the other was strikingly 
different. There is little which could be done to institute a consistency through EC levels of 
political authority in this regard. Regardless of the internal justifications for such a difference 
• the implications for external relations remain.
Exogenous actors cannot be excluded in the analysis of the evolution the debate on the Single 
Market.88 The original Treaty of Rome bargain was liberal, but this effectively meant liberal 
for American firms. The revitalised application of the bargain in the form of the Single 
Market Programme was applicable also to Japanese firms. The position of Agnelli was 
consistent with the implicit assumption in the SEA that there existed a nurturable relationship 
between EC territory and competitiveness. This basic logic of the economic dividend of 
integration was undermined by FDI (economic integration) - which provided a new avenue 
for EC-Japan cooperation and also provided states and sub-states with an alternative to 
centralised EC competitiveness enhancement strategies.
V.7 Integration as a  magnet for FDI
The Single Market Programme caught the imagination of Japanese business leaders, even if 
the exact implications of the programme were often viewed with caution or even suspicion. 
The newfound market momentum gave the EC a higher profile in Japan than had been the 
case for decades. Earlier scholarship has addressed the specific issue of whether or not a 
customs union/integrating bloc acts as a magnet for FDI. The question of the ‘magnetic’
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87 A 1994 UK government White Paper ‘Competitiveness: Helping business to win’ 
underlines a continued liberal perception of the European single market. In its discussion of 
the European dimention, the paper states that the government will work towards "trade policy 
based on fair and open markets" and "encouraging privatisation and liberalisation". Summary, 
DTI, London, 1994. p.2.
88 Robert Gilpin and Simon Reich have recognised the U.S. role in the shaping of 
favourable conditions for external firms in the Treaty of Rome. Reich, Simon ‘Roads to 
Follow: regulating direct foreign investment,’ International Organization, 43,4 Autumn 1989, 
p.547 and Robert Gilpin who is cited.
effect of customs unions or single markets on inward FDI, raises the question: Do FDI and 
its implicit host bargains pose positive, negative or no apparent political consequences for the 
process of regional political integration itself?
George Yannopoulos89 cautioned against the conclusion that there existed a clear diversion 
of American investment towards the integrating bloc in the early years of the Common 
Market. His work identifies pre-existing trends, and the coincidence of other developments 
which "were raising the locational advantages of the Member States of the EC (eg. the follow- 
up of German reconstruction)." The econometric approaches to the debate were by no means 
conclusive. Yannopoulos found that "the formation of the European customs union in the 
later 1950s coincided with a substantial increase in the foreign direct investment flows to the 
six original members of the EC."90
Thomsen and Woolcock have pointed to the region-building capacity of intra-European 
investment.91 Although external firms could behave in a manner which might enhance the 
cohesion of the bloc, regional differences imply variations in the modes of production, 
business practices, consumer taste, communications and the local strategy of Japanese firms. 
Japanese investments in the EC are part of overall outbound investment strategies by Japanese 
firms. These firms are flexible within the Community and continue to carefully research 
market evolution on the EC’s eastern flank. Whilst Japanese firms frequently have ‘EC 
headquarters’ (Amsterdam and London are favoured locations) these are responsible for 
operations in Europe as a whole. It would be false to assume that once within the 
Community, Japanese firms recognise the EC frontier as the limit of their commercial 
ambitions. The geographical space of firm activities is different from that of the territorial
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89 Yannopoulos, George ‘Foreign Direct Investment and European Integration: the 
evidence from the formative years of the European Community’ in the Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 1990, pp.236-7. In his contribution to Mayes, David (ed.) The External 
Implications of European Integration (Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1993) Yannopoulos 
extended his analysis to the European single market programme.
90 ibid. p.256-7
91 Thomsen, Stephen and Stephen Woolcock Direct Investment and European Integration, 
Pinter for RIIA, London, 1993.
space of the EC. Such firm activities occupy an economic space which is potentially global. 
From Common Market to the 1992 programme, politically-created blocs have had varying 
levels of influence on firm decisions to invest. The factor of reaction to EC trade policy 
appears to be the stronger of the two principal EC-generated policy influences on Japanese 
FDI strategies. Trans-national priorities in the building of integrated communities are 
markedly different from the transnational aims of the external firms attracted to them.
V .8 T h e  a d v e n t  o f  J a p a n e se  f o r e ig n  d ir e c t  in v e st m e n t  in  t h e  EC
In the past some authors stressed the reluctance of Japanese firms to internationalise 
production.92 For the purposes of examining the matrix for investment, such a proposition 
at least draws attention to the importance of host political authorities in creating 
conditionalities for such decisions. The EC Commission’s trade responses for example, had 
an important impact on Japanese firm decisions to invest in the Community.93 Trade and 
trade policy are important determinants of foreign direct investment. The phenomenon of 
Japan’s underlying trade strength is the most important source of heightened exchange 
between Japan and the European Community. The legal trade competence of the Commission 
is one of the most manifest motors of the strengthening of EC-level executive authority. The 
use of this authority in external trade matters had a significant impact on the investment 
strategies of Japanese firms. Trade and trade policy are thus important pretexts for Japanese 
FDI in the European Community.
As outlined above, the EC Commission received lobbying representations from the European 
photocopier sector to act against alleged Japanese dumping. In forming the CECOM lobbying 
group, such manufacturers assumed that trade would continue as the dominant form of
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93 Yoko Sazanami reports the findings of R.A. Belderbos, that "most of Japanese 
manufacturing investment in the EC has been a response to trade frictions." Belderbos, R.A. 
‘On the Advance of Japanese Electronics Multinationals in the EC: companies, trends and 
trade policy’, paper, Eighth conference of the Euro-Asia management Studies 
Association, October 1991.
industrial exchange between the EC and Japan. The central role of FDI however, quickly 
became apparent; as a strategy in response to EC trade policy and as a trade supporting option 
within firm strategy.
The advent of international alliances between Japanese firms and European counterparts 
weakened the bond between European industry and the Commission. In the case of greenfield 
sites, the Euro-Japanese co-operative axis is between states, sub-state units and Japanese 
firms. The term ‘internal market’ was proven to be less than accurate - since many of these 
European entities chose intercontinental bargains to enhance their welfare. This in turn 
guaranteed commercial participation for Japanese firms.
Following the upsurge in Japanese investment in the mid-late 1980s, CECOM membership 
was reduced. The West German firm, Develop was acquired by Minolta; Tetras of France 
was taken over by Canon, and Olivetti sold its photocopier production to Konishiroku and 
went on to form a 51% held partnership with Canon to produce new copier and other lines. 
Canon, with a plant in West Germany was the only firm with a pre-1985 production presence 
in the Community. By the end of the 1980s every major Japanese photocopier manufacturer 
was producing within the EC.94
V.9 EC RESPONSE TO JAPANESE FDI: THE LIMITS OF REGULATION
Japanese foreign direct investment in the EC has increased due to a number of factors, 
including: the success of Japanese firms in international trade; the globalisation strategies of 
these firms; the political economic reaction to Japanese trade success; and the politically- 
driven evolution of western European market design. The role of the European Community
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Matsushita started production in West Germany in 1986 and Konishiroku followed suit. 
Ricoh expanded its UK component operation in Telford to include copier assembly and 
announced plans for a French plant in 1987. Sharp, with grants from the Welsh Office, set 
up a photocopier production unit in Wrexham the same year. The Financial Times, 26 
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institutions as an important actor in the Japan-EC FDI dynamic is here examined with a view 
to determining the impact of Japanese FDI on the constitutional evolution of the European 
Community in the period under review. The focus is not so much the motivations and 
causality of FDI as the impact which FDI - a form of economic integration - has upon 
attempts by the Commission of the EC to promote politically integrative competitiveness 
enhancement.
The issue of advantages and disadvantages of FDI on host (usually state) territory, dominated 
the debate in the late 1960s and early 1970s.95 While it is interesting to compare the 
European response to increased American FDI in Europe in the 1960s with increased Japanese 
FDI in the 1980s and ’90s, there is a fundamental disjunction in such a comparison in so far 
as the importance of the EC ‘regime’ has greatly increased since that time, and global FDI 
levels have greatly increased. Importantly, the UK did not enter the Community until 1973. 
Some aspects of the earlier debate on FDI regulation continued into the mid/late 1980s among 
member states and at the European level. Advocates of anti-dumping and anti-circumvention 
measures claimed that the kind of jobs created by Japanese FDI were low-skilled and did not 
contribute high value added to European industry.96 The European Commission cannot be 
said to have had a grand scheme to ‘trap’ Japanese FDI within the Community. Had this 
been the case, the Commission could likely have pre-empted the GATTs objections to its anti­
dumping on parts initiative at a much earlier stage. The move into uncharted regulatory 
territory on parts anti-dumping, local content and rules of origin took place on an ad hoc 
basis.
In the Community opinion has been divided as to whether or not Japanese FDI is good for
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95 Some of the literature in this realm could be classified as ‘alarmist’ or even sees FDI 
in an ‘imperialist’ paradigm. Recently, a neo-Marxist approach to Japanese investment in 
Asia has been used by Robert Steven in Japan’s New Imperialism, Macmillan, London, 1990.
96 In the theoretical economic literature, Kar-Yiu Wong finds that quid pro quo FDI "may 
not improve the expected employment and may be detrimental to the economy" of host 
countries. ‘Optimal Threat of Trade Restriction and Quid Pro Quo Foreign Investment,’ in 
Economics and Politics, Vol.l, No.3, November 1989.
host economies.97 The opposition to Japanese manufacturing plants in Europe echoed many 
of the arguments against unrestrained Japanese imports. In some respects, the EC faced a re­
run of the early 1980s pressure to increase anti-dumping actions. By the late 1980s however, 
the picture was more complex. Any attempt to regulate Japanese operations in the EC would 
have required a wider armoury of legal instruments than dealing with a strictly ‘exogenous 
Japan.’ It would also have required a far greater coordination between Commission 
Directorates-General. The record shows frequent disagreement over what exactly a ‘European 
interest’ was, at what point such becomes critically jeopardised, and how best to respond. 
The EC Commission and its individual DGs, firms, sectors, states and sub-states had their 
own, often conflicting views on these issues.
A Keidanren position paper in March 1993 acknowledged the growth in FDI generated co­
operation between Japan and the EC.98 From an EC Commission perspective this change 
could be described as a transition from ad hoc attempts at regulation to a position of sceptical 
cooperation.
The EC institutional reaction to Japanese FDI, and the evolution of the Single Market 
Programme were closely intertwined. The central proposition advanced here is that Japanese 
firms had an important impact on the evolution of the extent to which the Community could 
exclusively control the economic dividend from what was initially a political bargain between 
the member states in 1985-86. By ultimately gaining equal access to this market (French
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97 A House of Lords 1989 report concluded that "there may come a time when Japanese 
investment in the Community in certain key sectors becomes a cause for concern, and its level 
should certainly be monitored. But at current levels, it would be perverse to discourage such 
investment," House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Relations 
Between the Community and Japan, 13th Report, session 1988-89, report, p.25. A Keidanren 
mission to Europe in 1991 was informed of opposition not only to Japanese exports but also 
to production in Europe. The Economist, 4 April 1992, p.19.
98 The paper states: "It cannot be denied, of course, that relations between Japan and 
Europe have never been as close as those between Japan and the United States or between 
Europe and the United States. In the second half of the 1980s, however, Japanese business 
began an active program of investment in Europe, and both the EC Commission and its 
member countries began to adopt a more positive, forward-looking approach to Japan and the 
Japanese market." Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) position paper, 
March 1993 ‘Future Relations between Japan and the EC’ pp.1/2.
government, 1988; GATT, 1990) Japanese firms played a political economic role in the 
evolution of the EC itself.
In the late 1980s DGI and some ‘continental’ states considered a number of responses to FDI 
and global firm activity. These measures could be referred to as ‘new zone’99 instruments 
insofar as they were not unambiguously within the armoury of the Commission in the manner 
of trade policy instruments. These measures essentially failed in their intended application 
as controls of Japanese FDI. This policy direction lasted from c.1986 to 1990. The ‘new 
zone’ strategy unfolded parallel to the growing liberalism of the single market itself.
Whilst the EC Commission does not have a mandate to formulate FDI policy, it does have 
some influence in this domain. Before examining the new areas of jurisdiction which the 
Commission sought to enter, it is necessary to recount those instruments with which the 
Commission can regulate inbound FDI. A number of different instruments, such as trade 
policy (indirectly), industrial policy (DGIII) competition policy (DGIV mandate to investigate 
state subsidies) and international standardisation, comprise a diffused Commission influence 
in inbound FDI matters. Such ‘instruments’ have usually not been designed with a view to 
Japanese firms or even FDI - but regulation of commerce in general.
In addition to these policy spheres, guidelines rather than strict regulation became the 
hallmarks of Commission strategy regarding the activities of Japanese and other external 
firms. In Tokyo, the European Commission Assistant trade Director outlined the Commission 
position: "This is not a question of law, but the growing sentiment in the Community is that 
Japanese investment should be better integrated in our economy".100 However, in the period
99 This term has no official currency. Erich Gundlach and Peter Nunnenkamp use the 
phrase ‘innovative protectionist measures’ in their paper ‘The European Union in the Era of 
globalisation’, Kiel Institute of World Economics Working Paper No.650. p.23. The term 
‘protectionist’ is however problematic. Some of the measures could be legitimate (literally) 
if dumping is actually taking place. ‘Protectionist’ thus has a completely political connotation
- not applicable where GATT endorsed anti-dumping measures are warranted.
100 Joseph Loeff quoted, Mainichi Daily News, 8 February 1989. As Competition 
Commissioner in the mid-1980s Peter Sutherland called for "a change in emphasis in the 
patter of Japanese direct investment in the EC, toward research and development and away 
from knockdown assembly of Japanese parts." Mainichi Daily News, 27 May 1986, p.5. Such
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of rapidly increasing Japanese FDI, the Commission did attempt to extend its authority beyond 
the aforementioned policy instruments. ‘New zone’ instruments were frequently prompted 
in response to Japanese firms. This was not as a result of the decision to target Japan in 
particular; rather a consequence of the fact that Japanese firms were in the technological and 
financial ‘front line’ and were first to pose a challenge to the territoriality of the EC single 
market and the policy instruments governing that market. Aside from the powers outlined 
above, the Commission did attempt to extend its authority over inbound FDI matters in a 
more direct way.
The issues, interpretations and actors which decided the course and neo-liberal outcome of 
the SEA were many and diverse. However, because of their advanced and visible 
technological momentum, Japanese firms and EC-Japan relations moved to centre stage in the 
evolution of the market and FDI regulatory responses. In a three-year period (1987-1990) the 
validity of the distinction between ‘endogenous and exogenous’ relative to a neo-liberal 
market was tested in a short burst of commercial, regulatory, legal, and quasi-legal activity. 
With the advent of FDI, the Commission was faced with a series of regulatory choices vis-à- 
vis increased FDI. As seen above, the Commission did not have the option of enunciating 
a unitary code on FDI. Rather it could, and did, exercise its authority through existing 
competencies. Secondly, it tentatively moved into areas of regulation in which it sought to 
extend its authority to deal with the real and perceived challenges of Japanese manufacturing 
systems within the EC territory. The following analysis of the evolution of Commission 
strategy in these areas illustrates how the measures of anti-dumping on component parts and 
rules of origin were contested between the member states, the Commission, Japanese firms 
and the Japanese government.
The most pertinent questions of EC regulatory power vs. firm power; and economic 
integration vs. political integration, were vigorously contested. In some ways these contests 
were the culmination of the pressure of Japanese competitiveness as expressed in successive 
trade deficits with the EEC from the 1970s. When the major issues were settled; largely in
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a positive development is occurring in the 1990s. Hitachi for example, has commenced 
advanced research in Cambridge and Dublin.
favour of Japanese interests with the strong support of liberal European states, the prevailing 
economic philosophy of the Community was in no doubt, and the participation of initially 
exogenous actors was guaranteed. The resolution also marks the beginning (in some 
European states and firms, the reluctant beginning) of the much-heralded cooperation which 
had been repeatedly called for. When such cooperation came, it was driven by the integrative 
power of multi-national firms and the outreach of states and sub-states.
V .10 C o m m issio n  P o w e r  a n d  J a pa n e se  P r o d u c t io n : t h e  r e g u l a t io n  o f
COMPONENT SOURCING AND LOCAL CONTENT
The most controversial of the new jurisdictional measures undertaken by the Commission was 
the extension of the anti-dumping authority of the EC to cover the importation of component 
parts by Japanese firms for assembly in their EC production facilities. By undertaking to 
extend the application of a trade policy instrument - heretofore used for EC imports - to cover 
investment production, the Commission was attempting an important extension of its powers. 
This represented an extension of regulatory power over a central manifestation of global 
economic integration, the mobility of production.101 The debate on foreign ownership of 
production is not new, and the merits and demerits of foreign ownership are not a primary 
concern here. Rather, the focus is the constitutional ability of the Commission to form policy 
in the face of such a challenge; and the relative and changing powers of the EC institutions, 
member states and sub-states in the European political constellation.
The EC Commission’s motivation in trying to exert regulatory authprity over inbound FDI 
largely related to concerns that such production was intended to circumvent trade measures. 
Secondly, hastily introduced production was said to be of low value-added. Japanese firms 
which set up production facilities within the EC in the wake of trade policy action against
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101 The Economist has recently commented on the shifting focus from trade to investment 
rules: ".. the new trade rules, though impressive compared with what went before, already 
look old-fashioned. They will have to be extended to deal with barriers to market access 
rather than conventional barriers to trade. In particular, there will have to be agreements on 
how countries treat international investment flows and on competition policies. [Emphasis 
in original] ‘A disquieting new agenda for trade,’ 16 July 1994, p.64.
them were accused of using ‘screwdriver’ operations in which European workers were said 
to do little except assemble imported parts. The 1987 change in the EC antidumping code 
permitted, under certain conditions, the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imported 
parts.102 Under the newly extended anti-dumping rules, a firm which had already been 
found guilty of dumping, which had moved into the Community or substantially increased 
production after the imposition of anti-dumping duties, and which was found to be dumping 
parts from its plants in Japan would now be subject to new duties on those parts. 40% of 
product value would have to be sourced locally. The Commission explicitly recognised in 
such an extension of powers, that FDI by Japanese firms had followed the initial anti-dumping 
actions on imports from Japan - thus acknowledging a causal link between anti-dumping and 
FDI.
In late 1987 the Commission commenced investigations into the parts operations of Japanese 
electronic typewriter and weighing machines firms with assembly operations within the 
EC.103 The Commission itself, in both DGIII and DGI, monitors such developments as anti­
circumvention; but normally does not act until it receives an industry complaint.104 In 
reality the process is an intermeshing of the European lobbies, expert committees and lawyers 
involved in such issues - out of which a ‘European’ response to anti-circumvention emerges.
The extension of EC powers caused serious concern in Japan. The MITI announced that "EC
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102 Council of Ministers, regulation 1761/87, OJ L 167/9. 22 June 1987. The regulation 
was slightly modified in July 1988.
103 EC Spokesman's Service, IP (87) 368. Brussels, 1 September 1987. The service 
reported: "The investigations have been opened following representations from Community 
industry which alleges that after the imposition of the anti-dumping duties on the imported 
products, certain exporters set up assembly operations in the Community of a very basic kind, 
in which components originating in Japan are put together with only a small proportion of the 
parts originating elsewhere. The added value is said to be marginal."
104 In early 1988, CECOM, the European photocopier manufacturers’ association (by now 
reduced in membership due to alliances with Japanese firms) complained to the Commission 
that Japanese firms were circumventing anti-dumping duties by assembling predominantly 
imported parts in their European plants.
ministers are requested to consider the proposed new rules most carefully"103 and threatened
to take the matter to the GATT. Akio Morita, Chairman of SONY, and Japan’s most
intemationally-prominent industrial figure was at this time Vice-Chairman of the Keidanren
[Japan Federation of Economic Organizations]. In the latter capacity, he wrote to the EC
Commission four months before the enactment of the new anti-dumping measure:
We believe that such a proposal, if adopted, would not only greatly hinder direct 
investments from Japan in the EEC Region but also would infringe GATT rules . . 
if adopted, the proposed legislation would create a serious inequity, in that anti­
dumping duties could be levied with respect to the parts and components imported by 
a Japanese firm for incorporation in products which it makes in the EC, whereas no 
duties would be imposed on the same parts and components from Japan when 
imported by an unrelated European company which performed simple assembly 
operations on them.106
This last point was confirmed in the photocopier sector - European firms (including those 
pressing for further litigation against Japanese imports and imported parts) could in principle, 
import as many Japanese component parts as they wished. Morita also voiced a persistent 
complaint from the Japanese firm side which was that the high percentage of imported 
component parts represented a stage in the investment when Japanese firms were learning 
about local conditions and evaluating local suppliers. This had been the experience with 
Japanese firms in the U.S. Morita concluded by referring to the extension of anti-dumping 
as "an economically distortive legislative measure" - a statement which dramatically (if 
unintentionally) reflected the tension between de jure regional integration and global 
economic integration.
Japanese firms vigorously opposed the local content provisions on the grounds that there 
existed legitimate problems of quality and cost involved in changing component suppliers. 
The President of Canon Italia SpA stated that component sourcing decisions should be based 
on considerations of "best quality and cost combinations"107 and regular supply; if a
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105 Daily Yomiuri, 12 February 1987.
106 Akio Morita, Vice Chairman, Keidanren, Chairman SONY, to President of the 
Commission, 5 March 1987. Other Japanese industry groups also made representations to the 
EC Commission on the matter, Japan Times, 5 March 1987, p.6.
107 Interview, Milan, 7 April 1992.
Japanese firm wished to import components it should be allowed to do so from whatever 
source, based on commercial judgement. Ricoh (which was to be at the centre of a major 
EC-Japan row on rules of origin in 1989) also reported difficulties with the EC approach on 
local content, saying that "many parts such as electronics are not available in the UK."108
In its assault on the Commission proposals, the Japanese Keidanren, with the active support 
of Toshiba, Canon and others, openly lobbied in Brussels109 and succeeded in having the 
acceptable European local content threshold fixed at 40%.110 The extension of anti-dumping 
measures led to increased local sourcing by Japanese firms wishing to avoid new anti­
dumping charges. Toshiba, Matsushita and Konica gave the Commission undertakings that 
they would increase local content levels.111 In October 1988, the Japanese government 
requested that the GATT rule on the disputed extension of anti-dumping to component parts. 
This was the first time that Japan had requested a GATT ruling in relations with the EC, and 
was seen as a shift from bi-lateral to multi-lateral problem solving.112 Sadayuki Hayashi, 
Head of the Economic Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan summed 
up the Japanese position: "Japan regards these arbitrary measures as hindering 
investment."113 The EC Commission defended its action in an article by the European 
Commissioner for External Relations which stated:
As the world’s largest exporter, as well as its largest importer, the European 
Community has a vital interest in maintaining a liberal system of international trade. 
But liberal trade is only possible, in practice, if industries can be sure that they are 
adequately defended against unfair trade practices. This is why anti-dumping has 
become an important feature of the Community’s trade policy and why the number of 
major decisions taken recently has attracted such attention... The Community’s main 
concern [in revising its anti-dumping powers], however, was to guard against the 
flagrant circumvention of anti-dumping duties while ensuring that the provisions did
108 Minoru Akiya, quoted in The Financial Times, 11 February 1987, p.l.
109 An unusual departure for Japanese firms which have almost exclusively focused on 
information gathering; illustrating the stakes in this case.
110 The Japan Economic Journal, 19 August 1989, p.l.
111 The Financial Times, 29 September 1988, p.6.
112 Japan Times, 8 October 1988.
113 Asahi Evening News, 23 November 1989, p.4.
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This is one of the few, if only, occasions in which anti-dumping is referred to as part of the 
Community’s trade policy which technically it is not - being a legal instrument. However, 
Commissioner de Clercq was accurately reflecting the reality of experience: anti-dumping had 
become an instrument of reactive trade policy.
On May 16 1990 a GATT panel found for Japan against the EC in the matter of anti-dumping 
on component parts.115 The failure of the extension of anti-dumping at the GATT marked 
a turning point towards co-operation in EC-Japan relations. The GATT ruling reflected the 
growing importance of FDI and the serious difficulty which an integrating political authority 
had in dealing with such increased flows. This differed from the experience of the states, 
whose ‘total’ experience with inbound FDI included a complex mixture of attraction 
incentives, bi-lateral ad hoc deals, and regulation. The main political role and dividend from 
Japanese FDI accrued to the state. By the inception of the ’92 Programme'16 the insider
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not deter genuine inward investment.114
114 Willy de Clercq, European Commissioner for External Relations, Financial Times, 21 
November 1988. Emphasis added.
115 GATT Activities 1990 reported: "The panel reached three central conclusions. First, 
it found the duties to be internal charges. Since the EC Regulations subjected imported parts 
and materials to such internal charges in excess of those applied to domestic products, they 
were contrary to Article III. Second, the panel found that the undertakings to inhibit the use 
of Japanese parts and materials • in order that the proceedings under the regulation be 
suspended - implied treatment to imported products less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin and were, therefore, also inconsistent with Article III. The third 
conclusion concerned the validity of Article XX(d) in this case. The panel saw the Article 
as allowing deviation from GATT obligations to prevent enterprises evading obligations 
imposed upon them consistently with the General Agreement - for instance, the evasion of 
an import duty. The provision did not permit contracting parties to prevent actions by 
enterprises designed to prevent an obligation coming into existence - for instance the 
importation of a substitutable product not subject to duty or the transfer of production to the 
duty-levying country. Since neither the EC’s anti-circumvention duties nor the undertakings 
served to prevent the evasion of the obligation to pay anti-dumping duties, they were not 
covered by Article XX(d)." Geneva, 1991. pp.56-57.
116 ie. 1 January 1993.
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status of Japanese firms had been clearly established.117 A Keidanren position paper of 
March 1993 stated:
The integration of the European market will provide a solid platform for the widescale, 
relatively unfettered development of business activities. It should also serve to prevent 
the emergence of a "fortress Europe," which may contribute to the stable development 
of the world economy. For these reasons, the Japanese business community stands 
firmly behind the integration of the European market.118
V . l l  C o m m issio n  Po w e r  a n d  Ja pa n e se  Pr o d u c t io n : r ules o f  or ig in
In the instance of the extension of Commission anti-dumping powers with new local content 
provisions (1987), the British government had only reluctantly agreed to the measure in 
Council. In the case of rules of origin (1989), the Council was deeply divided and the 
measure was passed by vote with the noted opposition of the British and West German 
governments who were supported by the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland. The struggle for 
the ‘blueprint’ of the market was now (and with the GATT decision in May 1990) coming 
to a climax. Japanese firms, driven by technological advance, competitiveness-induced 
deficits, and FDI were at the cusp of these developments as the US had been to the fore in 
the 1960s. Along with the anti-dumping component parts extension, and the Nissan case 
(1988/89); the issue of rules of origin was the third important site in the contest by Japanese 
firms to share in the benefits of the EC market.
With the advent of increased FDI, concerns over the quality of such FDI, and the ability of 
Japanese firms to circumvent EC measures by exporting to the EC from plants in third
1,7 In an interview Mr. Teruhiko Mano of the Bank of Tokyo stated: "We do not fear 
protectionism, we now have production within the EC." Interview, Tokyo, 7 April 1993. Mr. 
Christopher Norall, a Brussels-based lawyer commented on the overall trend away from 
regulation towards guidelines: "Because of ’92, more measures against the Japanese are being 
phased out." Interview, Christopher Norall, Forrester, Norall and Sutton, Brussels, 16 July 
1992.
118 Keidanren position paper, March 1993 ‘Future Relations Between Japan and the EC’
p.2.
countries, the EC reinterpreted its 1968 definitions concerning the origin of imported 
goods119; a definition which pre-dated high-volume global FDI. Following the decision of 
Japanese firms - notably Ricoh120 - to increase imports from US plants, the EC Commission 
sought the support of the Council to reinterpret the rules of origin. The reinterpretation of 
a 1968 regulation would permit the Commission - by introducing a tighter definition of where 
the technological value-added of the imported product took place - to deem products 
manufactured in the U.S. and elsewhere as Japanese. This can be seen as a Commission 
attempt to reestablish a more traditional trade ‘geography’ in the face of global financial and 
productive changes which were rendering such a logic obsolete.
The conflict between Japanese firms and the Commission revealed important differences 
among member states towards increased regulation of Japanese production. Secondly, the 
move into this area by the Commission, illustrated that it was not so much FDI financial 
flows per se which were now at issue - but rather the control of international production 
itself.
The locus for the division between the states was the Rules of Origin Committee, a group of 
national experts which meets under Commission chairmanship. The Commission wished to 
define Ricoh’s US output as Japanese by defining the country of origin as the place where 
the last sophisticated work, not assembly, took place. The Council, unable to agree, sent the 
proposal back to the Commission, with those countries opposing the measure unable to form 
a blocking minority. The Commission’s definition passed into being with a written protest 
from Britain and West Germany. Denmark, the Republic of Ireland and the Netherlands 
supported these two states in Council.121
119 Regulation (EEC) No.802/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968. Official Journal of the 
European Communities, 28 June 1968, No. L 148/1.
120 Ricoh’s photocopier imports from the U.S. were not subject to the 20% anti-dumping 
duty imposed on Ricoh’s imports from Japan. Ricoh claimed that the increased output from 
California to Europe was due to ‘product specialisation and division of labour, not 
circumvention.’ The Financial Times, 7 February 1989, p.4. The Commission denied that it 
was targeting a single firm; "the regulation is obviously designed to have a more general 
application than that." Europe, Brussels, 10 February 1989.
121 The Financial Times, 26 May 1989, p.2.
192
Following the Commission’s action, Ricoh expanded local production in Europe, opening a 
plant in France where industry minister Roger Fauroux commented that "it is better to have 
Japanese photocopiers made in France than imported from Japan."122 In this manner, both 
the Nissan and case and the ‘encouragement’ towards more economically integrated 
production between Japan and the EC can be seen to have ‘encouraged’ non-liberal states into 
alliances. While the French government was changing its rhetoric and its policy on Japanese 
FDI, the UK and the Netherlands who had actively facilitated Japanese FDI for over a decade 
had already won more than half the gains between them. The Japanese FDI boom would only 
last another 3 years.
By 1989/90 the Commission’s attitude to the emerging market was unequivocally liberal. 
This was clearly reflected in the EC Commission’s Tokyo delegation statements to Japanese 
industry. Speaking at the Sumitomo Marine and Fire Insurance Company in Osaka in 1989, 
Michael Lake, the head of Press and Information at the Tokyo delegation stated that "It is not 
in the EC’s own interests that our internal liberalisation should be accompanied by 
protectionism, as so many ill-informed sceptics predict."123 Just how liberal the 
Commission’s stance had become is illustrated by comparing this remark with Prime Minister 
Thatcher’s speech on 20th of September 1988, stating that "It would be betrayal if, while 
breaking down constraints on trade in order to create the Single Market, the Community were 
to erect greater external protection. We must ensure that our approach to world trade is 
consistent with the liberalisation we preach at home."124 The confluence of these views 
illustrates the victory of the British view, which had by the early 1990s become the standard 
Commission line. The political economic bargain between the UK and Japan on inward FDI 
had a direct and clearly evident impact on the change in the Commission’s approach to
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122 The Financial Times, 7 February 1990, p.6
123 Speech to staff of Sumitomo Marine and Fire Insurance Co, Ltd, Osaka, February 20,
1989. Published as ‘A Dynamic Market for Japan,’ in Speaking of Japan, August 1989, p.19. 
James Moorhouse MEP confirmed this line in a speech to the European Business Community 
[EBC], Tokyo, 7 June 1993: "The drive towards an internal market within the EC has been 
matched by a determination to carry the same philosophy into our external trade relations." 
text, p.6.
124 Thatcher’s statement is quoted by Michihiko Kunihiro ‘The External implications of
1992. I: a Japanese view’ The World Today, vol. 45, no.2, Feb. 1989, p.31.
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V.12 Limitations of Commission FDI Powers: implications for EC trade policy
While trade and investment strategies are inextricable for firms; it is also in the interest of 
political executives to have coherent policies on investment as well as trade matters. The EC 
Commission felt compelled to respond to changes in the global political economy manifested 
by FDI. However, TNCs and their allies within the Community made the extension of 
Commission competence problematic. In the European Community, the disjunction between 
trade and FDI policy is complicated by the power of states over the rights of access for 
Japanese firms. But the states themselves are experiencing a disjunction - de jure trade policy 
having been given over to the Commission while states control most of the FDI policy 
‘instruments’ plus, importantly, trade promotion. During 1993 a Commission proposal was 
circulated which would have created a formal exchange of non-binding guidelines on inbound 
FDI. Two governments, the UK and the Republic of Ireland effectively blocked the 
measure.125
In the age of Arm globalisation, it would appear that the bicycle theory of ‘thus far and no 
further’ in the extension of trade policy to FDI policy by the Commission, does indeed apply. 
For example, if firm alliances can circumvent VER’s, and if external firms can not only 
produce within the EC, but import from third countries as well: then trade policy itself is 
directly challenged. In the preceding section, the analysis focused on the (constitutional)
Japanese FDI.
125 Both the EC and APEC have failed to establish at regional level, any binding codes. 
The World Economic Forum, Europe/East Asia Summit Programme for Action of October
1994 stated: "Although the need for this [commonly agreed standards] is more acute in East 
Asia than in Europe, the European Union too would need to review its policies and practices 
in this domain. This process should include establishment of a comprehensive legal 
framework offering the crucial elements of predictability and transparency for foreign 
investors, and to address the issues of investment protection provisions and formal dispute 
settlement procedures.. In the same vein, European and East Asian governments need to 
undertake a systematic review to ensure the full transparency of national policies, regulations 
and administrative frameworks concerning FDI, the standardization of accounting and 
reporting systems." pt.2.B. p.3.
difficulties of using trade instruments in FDI matters. For the most part, EC ‘new zone’ 
instruments failed in the face of Japanese firm activities and claims (GATT, 1990). 
Globalisation not only creates tension between the constituent parts of the politically 
integrating entity; but threatens to unravel effective trade policy as well.126
In the exercise of some aspects of its external trade policy, the EC Commission (with the 
cautious consent of the Japanese government) has taken into account production within the 
EC in the negotiation of what are essentially trade restraint agreements. This is in the interest 
of the Commission, but strictly not within its mandate. The association between EC trade 
policy and FDI ‘regulation’ is therefore not so much a de jure preserve of the Commission, 
as a link which is subtly maintained with the consent of the MITI and the member states. 
Before examining the most important sector in which this is evident (automobiles), the 
discussion can be placed in a broader context.
The GATT addressed the issue of TRIMs (Trade Related Investment Measures) in the 
Uruguay Round. The EC, Japan and the US requested that the GATT include guidance on 
such measures, including local content requirements, export requirements and import- 
substitution requirements.127 A recent UN report states that many such measures are 
redundant "in the sense of simply accelerating the plans of firms to develop local suppliers 
and enter export markets."128 On the inclusion of TRIM regulations in the GATT, the
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126 In October 1994, the GATT/WTO transition brought forth questions regarding EC 
representation at the new body. Both France and Spain indicated that they would prefer to 
represent themselves directly to the new body on certain issues [such as non-merchandise 
trade]. Germany proposed a compromise in which member states could represent directly on 
issues where a common stance was not found. Belgium blocked this proposal to defend the 
Commission’s competence. International Herald Tribune, 3 October 1994, p.9. Global 
commercial forces and the appropriate regulatory response to such forces continued to raise 
questions as to the efficiency of a regional response in the most evolved EC competence. In 
November 1994 the French permanent representatives office in Brussels announced itself 
"satisfied" with a European Court of Justice ruling denying the Commission an extension of 
trade powers to cover non-merchandise areas such as financial services, ibid. 16 November 
1994, p.15.
127 UNCTC, The Impact o f Trade-related Investment measures on Trade an Development, 
UN, New York, 1991. p.2.
128 ibid. p.3.
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UNCTC report however cautioned that "the effort could be counterproductive if it simply 
moved conditional incentive packets from published regulations to negotiation behind closed 
doors."129 The Uruguay Round concluded in December 1993, made a cautious start with 
the issue of TRIMs:
The agreement recognizes that certain investment measures restrict and distort trade... 
To this end, an illustrative list of TRIMs agreed to be inconsistent with these articles 
[III & XI] is appended to the agreement The list includes measures which require 
particular levels of local procurement by an enterprise ("local content requirements") 
or which restrict the volume or value of imports such an enterprise can purchase or 
use to an amount related to the level of products it exports ("trade balancing 
requirements").130
The agreement also scheduled a staggered phase-out of TRIMs • two years for developed 
countries to seven years for least-developed countries. A form of ad hoc ‘TRIM’ 
trade/investment policy has been in evidence at the level of EC action towards Japanese firms 
during the past decade. This however appears to be significantly receding in the face of state 
and sub-state bargains with Japanese firms, and the internal-external liberalisation of the EC 
market to those firms which have the capability to invest.
A proposal by Ronald Dore suggests a structured solution to the problem of the diminution 
of industries under trade threat from more competitive external firms. Dore’s proposal, 
Investment Inviting Import Quantity Restrictions (IIIQRs) envisages a ceiling on the level of 
certain imports after which local manufacturing would effectively be the only means for the 
external firm to expand market share. Thus the domestic industry (if not specific firms within 
the industry) would have an opportunity to survive.131 Dore’s view, rather like that of
129 ibid. p.10. The report calls for the "establishment of a multilateral framework of 
norms and standards on foreign direct investment -which would doubtless be a stabilising 
force in the dynamic but volatile area of investor-govemment relations. The result could be 
a mutually advantageous ceasefire in the drift towards investment wars, in which TRIMs 
today play only a minor part.” ibid. p.10.
130 GATT Newsletter Focus, No.104, December 1993, p.8-9.
131 Dore, Ronald ‘Rethinking Free Trade’ in Morgan, Roger et al. New Diplomacy in the 
Post-cold war World, Macmillan, London, 1993. Saucier points to the divergent interests of 
governments and firms in Europe over the issue of inward FDI priorities: "Expansion of the 
Japanese market share may be considered as more acceptable by governments, although 
probably not by competing European firms, if it is acquired by FDI rather than by exports,
Robert Reich132 focuses on the presence and quality of employment and the education and 
training of the local work-force rather than the national origin of the firm. A problem with 
Dore’s scheme has been identified by Hans Maull who envisaged a situation whereby 
investments presently bound for less developed countries, would be re-directed towards more 
developed investment sites in the US and Europe.133 In other words, Dore’s scheme could 
well accelerate the hierarchical trend in the global political economy identified by Stephen 
Hymer, who envisaged a concentration of such activity among developed states.134 In light 
of the increasing attractiveness of unsaturated markets in South East Asia, the US and the EC 
would have no prior claim on surplus investment capital ‘returning’ to their economies. This 
is the ‘organic’ tendency of capital and investment which the IIIQR proposal would seek to 
stem. Further, such a policy could only be exercised at a central (EC Commission) level. 
The IIIQRs would be invoked in response to the impact of external trade trends. However, 
once Japanese firms reacted to such an EC-level policy (as they did with anti-dumping) the 
politically sensitive location of IIIQR-induced investments would be entirely out of the 
Commission’s hands. This is precisely what occurred with the application of anti-dumping 
measures against Japan in the 1980s.
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and commercial pressure is likely to remain a strong motive for investment strategies as 
opposed to direct trade strategies." Saucier, P. ‘New conditions for competition between 
Japanese and European firms’ in Burgenmeier, B. and J.L. Mucchielli (eds.) Multinationals 
and Europe 1992, Routledge, London, 1991. p.130. This is borne out by a Rank Xerox 
official who reported an unsympathetic hearing from the British government. The 
Government position viz-a-viz Japan was different from that of the firm.
132 Reich, Robert B. ‘Who is Us?’, Harvard Business Review, January/February, 1990, 
p.53-64.
133 Reported in ‘Europe and Japan: cooperation and conflict,’ conference proceedings, 
European University Institute, Fiesole, 1992, p.13. See also critiques by Stephen Thomsen 
and Geoffrey Wood, Financial Times, 13 July 1992, p.9.
134 Stephen Hymer ‘International Politics and International Economics: a radical 
approach’ in Frieden, Jeffrey A. and David A. Lake International Political Economy: 
perspectives on global Power and wealth. [Cited by Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global 
Political Economy, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1988, p.65.] John Stopford has used 
a similar logic: "The growing concentration of investment flows within the ‘triad’ markets 
of the USA, Europe and Japan - for quite understandable competitive reasons - affects the 
international division of labour and makes it more difficult for latecomer countries to break 
into the charmed circle of development." in Morgan et al, op.cit. p.179. Emphasis added.
While the extension of anti-dumping into FDI regulation is visible in the consumer electronics 
sector; the linkage between trade voluntary export restraint and ‘investment production 
restraint’ is more observable in the automobile sector. The 1991 automobile agreement 
between the Community and Japan (Commission and the MITI) is an important milestone 
since national import quotas are to be phased out (assuming no revision or superseding 
agreement) by 1999. Meanwhile, the ‘elements of consensus’ provide for a negotiated 
fluctuation in the quotas for those countries which are subject to them.’35
In the run-up to the agreement, the Japanese government and Japanese industry were 
vigorously opposed to the linking of Japanese production in the EC to imports in the 
voluntary quotas. Kenjiro Ishikawa of the Mitsubishi Research Institute wrote in October 
1990:
In the rush to draft a policy on auto imports from Japan, Brussels has thus far been 
bowing to pressure from protectionists and hardliners. They want the existing 
restrictions on imports from Japan to be made a part of the 1992 setup, and they also 
want the output from the Japanese plants in Europe to be counted as imports.136
As with the other jurisdictional arguments, much was at stake. Japanese industry realised that
insider status disarmed the Commission’s responses, while the Commission recognised the
full implications of a neo-liberal marketplace without centralised FDI regulation. The final
text did not include EC production in the quotas, however the de facto implementation of the
agreement did include such a link. The Japan Economic Review reported satisfaction of the
Japanese side:
What was obviously significant to many Japanese automobile makers exporting their 
products to the EC region concerning the new Japan-EC agreement was the fact that 
the agreement referred only to the automobile exports from Japan to the EC region, 
but not to any exports of Japanese motor vehicles produced in the US or other 
countries outside Japan.137
But the non-mention of transplants, and the official position that transplants were not to be 
formally discussed between the Commission and the MITI, masked the de facto necessity to 
consider local production as well as traditional imports. Following the 1993 round of talks,
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135 France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
136 The Japan Times, 22 October 1990.
137 The Japan Economic Review, September 15, 1991. p.8.
negotiator Robert Verrue of DGIII stated in response to a question concerning transplants: 
"The Community figures concern exports from Japan to each of the five individual markets... 
but we take all possible factors into account." The Commission did not have any "firm 
quantified transplant assumption"136 regarding transplants. Such a quantified position would 
not be permissible under the terms of the 1991 Agreement. However the Commission and 
the MIT1 were taking local production into account under other ‘possible factors.’ At a Press 
conference in Tokyo, Martin Bangemann made a point in defence of the new, slightly reduced 
Japanese quota that if transplants were added to Japanese imports there had been a total 
increase in the Japanese market share.139 MITI and the Commission are involved in an 
annual evaluation of the projected short-term European car market and an apportioning 
exercise on what the Japanese total share should be. MITI then divides up the Japanese quota 
with the manufacturers in Japan. The Commission’s response to Japanese production within 
the Community, which occurs with the collaboration of the Japanese government in a legally 
grey area of Commission competence, can be seen as a bi-laterally agreed acknowledgement 
that trade and investment are inextricable. The exercise of EC competence in this area is 
conducted via co-operative understanding with the MITI.140 The agreement expires in 1999.
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138 Robert Verrue, DGIII, press conference Tokyo 1 April 1993.
139 Martin Bangemann, EC Commission Vice-President, Industrial Affairs, press 
conference, Tokyo, 2 April 1993.
140 The regulation of FDI in this agreement is vague. Mark Mason writes that the 
agreement "apparently restricts both exports and foreign direct investment". ‘Elements of 
Consensus: Europe’s response to the Japanese automotive challenge’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol.31, No.4, December 1994. p.450. Any restraint on Japanese production 
is more by ‘gentleman’s agreement’ than the Commission’s authority over FDI matters. The 
lack of specific provisions is increasingly evident in major market access accords. These are 
now vigorously contested from the close of negotiations. A spectacular example occured after 
the 1993 Tokyo G-7 preliminary between the U.S. and Japan, concerning the meaning of 
‘quantitative indicators’. The U.S.-Japan automobile and auto-parts agreement of 28 June
1995 was followed by a series of conflicting interpretations, most incisively captured by a 
Japanese official’s comment that unilateral U.S. forecasts were "beyond the scope and 
responsibility of government." International Herald Tribune, 3 July 1995. p.10.
V.13 EC po l ic y  on  FDI A c c e ss  t o  J apan  and  FDI pr o m o t io n
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The appreciation that direct investment is becoming as important as international trade is at 
the heart of Commission policy towards Japan. This is particularly due to the perception that 
one of the most effective ways of dealing with the trade deficit is to tackle the investment 
imbalance between Japan and the Community [Ch.II].
Commission Vice President Andriessen outlined Commission policy in 1990:
1 believe that the Japanese Government has a special responsibility to encourage 
foreign investment and I welcome the effort it is making now. We are doing our 
share. For example, the EC Delegation in Tokyo has established a network of 12 
regional EC associations with access to the top echelons of local government, banking 
and business organisations, women’s circles, academia and the media. These regions 
profess a strong interest in having European companies based in their territory.141
The low propensity of the Japanese economy towards inbound investment has been noted.142
For the period before 1985, this did not present a particular concern for the U.S. or the EC.
However, with massively increased outbound FDI flows from Japan (trade supporting, trade
policy responsive and market seeking) the Commission and the U.S. government have begun
to target conditions for investment in Japan. By 1993, the Commission was still substantially
dissatisfied with progress in this regard. So too was the EBC (European Business
Community) - the combined European chambers of commerce in Tokyo. On his visit to
Tokyo in April 1993, Commission Vice-President Bangemann again pressed the issue.143
Although, a relatively new strategic area for the European Commission, in the context of
overall trade access to Asia, the role of investment support for European firms is becoming
a fertile area for Commission initiative.
141 Frans H JJ. Andriessen, Vice-President of the Commission of the European 
Communities. EC-Jap an  J o u rn a lists  C onference, Brighton, 20 September 1990.
142 See deAnne Julius, and more recently, The Economist, 16 July 1994 p.64.
143 EC Background Note, Tokyo Delegation, BN 6/93 8 April 1993.
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V.14 Japan’s EC policy
Given the preponderance of difficult economic diplomacy issues in the relationship between 
the EC and Japan: and at inter-agency level - between the Commission and MITI/MOF/MFA
- it is perhaps not surprising that the Japanese government and bureaucracy has an open 
preference for ‘high’ politics.144 Communiques, overtures, and general policy statements 
tend to stress cooperation and Japan’s leading role in ODA. However, economic diplomacy 
in the EC-Japan relationship has acquired the dynamics and urgencies of traditional high 
political affairs. It is unsurprising that any government would chose not to dwell on aspects 
of its external relations in which it is persistently criticised as unfair or permitting a system 
of unfairness.145 In EC-Japan affairs however, Japanese firms are to the fore.146
The civil service in Japan has provided a high degree of continuity in the formulation of 
national objectives. From 1955 until 1993 the country was governed by the Liberal 
Democratic Party, with a rapid turnover of Prime Ministers. The limitations of this office 
have been noted.147 Cross-ministerial LDP committees also played an important role in 
consensus forming up to 1993. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs not only conducted 
foreign policy but acted as a co-ordinator between the other groups which contribute to the 
formulation of foreign relations’ initiatives. These include the LDP, non-MFA ministries 
(notably MITI and the MOF), commercial and industrial organisations and individual leaders 
of industry and commerce. Diet members frequently travel abroad on research missions. 
Japanese interests are also represented by professional lobbyists and law firms in other
144 See discussion of the terms ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics in Ch.II.
145 For example, Jean Pierre Leng: "For a real and fundamental improvement in the 
climate of the bilateral relationship to take place, Japan will have to take the necessary steps 
to bring its economic structures and trade system into harmony with those of its partners." 
The Japan Times, 9 May 1990.
146 Mr. Yuji Hosoya, Deputy Director, International Business Affairs Division  ̂ Industrial 
Policy Bureau, MITI, stated with regard to Japanese firms’ activities in Europe: "We don’t 
have any targeting policy - its completely up to the Japanese companies." Interview, 16 June
1993.
147 Van Wolferen, Karel ‘The Japan Problem re-visited,’ Foreign Affairs, Fall 1990, 
vol.69, no.4.
countries. This is particularly true in the United States and to a lesser extent in Brussels. 
The Japan Foundation promotes Japanese culture abroad; and Japan was the largest donor of 
foreign aid to developing counties by the early 1990s. The variety of groups and individuals 
which forge the foreign relations positions of Japan has not impeded the efficient formulation 
and implementation of policies in the important area of trade and economic affairs. However, 
with regard to salient issues such as the Gulf War, Japan has experienced difficulty in 
formulating and implementing clear policies.
In Brussels, the Japanese mission deals mostly with DGI of the Commission. Specialization 
is a strong feature and commercial issues are treated on a sectoral basis, with different 
officials treating different policy areas. Japanese companies received support and information, 
particularly in relation to the 1992 single market programme. Officials from MITI and other 
ministries are present in the important Japanese embassies, consulates and delegations. The 
higher priority accorded to European relations in the period was experienced in government 
(in response to bi-lateral U.S. pressure) as well as firm relations.
Motono Moriyuki, chairman of a Japanese government committee on relations with Europe 
stressed the necessity for Japan to "seek more understanding in Asia and Europe in order to 
rebalance its relations"148 in light of frictions in the Japanese-US alliance. However, with 
the decline in new stocks of FDI, the economic opportunities in Asia, and receding US-Japan 
tension, Europe was assuming a lower priority in Japan’s external relations by the mid-1990s.
The ‘wedge between the member states’ thesis is well known in dealings with third 
parties.149 However, it is not, as suggested by William Nester, an overriding theme of the
202
148 The Irish Times, 19 November 1990, Japan supplement, p.4. [report FOURTH EC- 
Japan jo u r n a lis ts ’ conference, Brighton, 1990.]
149 Keld Hammering of the European Business Community Council stated in an interview: 
"The Japanese government is extremely clever at playing off one country and one business 
against another." Interview, Tokyo, 11 May 1993. The New York Times reported: "Michael 
B. Smith, who served'as deputy trade representative in the Reagan Administration said 
Japanese diplomats were eager ‘to find inconsistencies in the positions of different U.S. 
agencies and to drive a wedge in there.’" 24 November 1989, A.12. This is also an issue in 
relations between the U.S. states and Japanese firms.
Japanese approach to the EC. In fact, as the experience of firms has shown, the realization 
among Japanese firms by the early 1990s was that the 1992 programme presented a sound 
commercial opportunity. Mr. Teruhiko Mano, who led a Keidanren mission to Brussels even 
commented when asked about the UK opt-out of the Social Chapter in the Maastricht Treaty: 
"It [the Social Chapter] is a good way to investment - labour harmony is very important."150
Conclusion
The SEA competitiveness enhancement strategy was challenged by three developments. First 
was the 1980s global boom in FDI and the resultant presence of multiple cross-ownerships 
which have come to characterise international production. Secondly, the willingness of liberal 
member states to side with Japan in political economic bargains created an active counter­
force against the assumed bond between territoriality and competitiveness. Thirdly, European 
firms themselves frequently chose extra-European partners to enhance their competitiveness. 
Such alliances with extra-European firms may even be the key to an enhancement of 
European competitiveness. In which case the very concept of ‘competitiveness’ in terms of 
EC versus Japan, is in doubt.151 In terms of trade policy, and the de facto restrictions on 
inbound investment regulation, globalisation - a form of economic integration - poses 
dilemmas for political integration. In the European context, this has been represented most 
clearly in EC-Japan relations.
As Cynthia Day Wallace and John M. Kline have noted
.. governments have had problems linking the presumed national identity of a 
corporation with the actual distribution of business benefits that are of interest to 
governments. This change leads to major problems in assessing benefits and
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150 Interview, Tokyo, 7 April 1993.
151 Bourke, Thomas ‘EC-Japan Relations, 1985-1993: The Political Impact of Foreign 
Direct Investment on European Integration in the Liberal Market Era’ in The Shape of the 
New Europe, proceedings Columbia University, New York, April, 1994, p.85. Paul Krugman 
has questioned the usefulness of the concept of Competitiveness in ‘Competitiveness, a 
dangerous obsession,’ Foreign Affairs, Spring, 1994.
implementing government programs that are based on territorially defined goals.132 
In the case of the EC, this has been more the case at the ‘EC level’ than at state level. At 
interview, Mr. Alexis Jacquemin of the EC Commission Cellule de Prospective stated; "Local 
content will be diluted by alliances. That is the reality of the business world."153
Having chosen the market as the stimulant for enhancing the collective welfare of the EC, and 
having exposed the ‘design’ of that market to an open contest between conflicting economic 
philosophies, the role of an integrated EC approach to competitiveness stimulation and the 
role of a centralised authority in such matters has been challenged by external actors and their 
political economic alliances. This evolution overlaps precisely with a period of immense 
growth in global investment and the inauguration, negotiation and conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round, wherein states such as Japan pursued their agendas directly at global level.
The tension between regional and global levels of economic activity and regulation was 
discussed by Grahl and Teague. Writing in late 1989, these authors stated: "The 1992 
programme seems particularly to undermine the Community’s industrial identity since it 
promotes European unification by methods that actually advance this process of 
globalisation."154 The authors’ identification of this aspect of the conflict between political 
and economic integration was perceptive, particularly at a point when the GATT had yet to 
decide on the Japan-EC anti-dumping complaint.
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152 Wallace, Cynthia Day and John M. Kline EC 92 and Changing Global Investment 
Patterns. Vol. XIV, #10 Significant Issues Series, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington, D.C., 1992. pp.18/19. In a similar vein Seamus O’Cléireacain writes: 
'Transnational alliances, and direct foreign investment, blur the national identity of corporate 
identities. They also make life more difficult for interventionist policy makers not convinced 
of the benefits of trade liberalisation. Policy, makers accustomed to a world in which they 
could identify and support ‘national champions’ increasingly find that national champions 
have foreign alliances." ‘EC policies towards Japan: implications for US-EC relations’ in 
George N. Yannopoulos (ed.) Europe and America, 1992: US-EC economic relations and the 
single European market. Manchester University Press, 1991. p.82.
153 Interview, Brussels, 23 July 1992. A similar phenomenon was beginning to occur with 
EC voluntary export restraints, which could be circumvented by firm-firm bargains such as 
that between Toyota and Volkswagen. Asahi Evening News, 24 June 1987.
154 Grahl, John and Paul Teague 1992 - The Big Market, Lawrence & Wishart, London,
1990. p.142.
As with Agnelli’s view, the SEA approach - and the Cecchini analysis - assumed that there 
would be a global competitiveness dividend from the combining of EC firms - and state 
policies. We might refer to this as ‘internal Darwinism.’ But for European firms to improve 
their real levels of competitiveness, a measure of ‘external Darwinism’ was essential. Again, 
for those who, like Thatcher saw that internal and external liberalisation went hand in hand - 
there was little contradiction. Also logical was the dirigiste interpretation of the market 
programme which demanded external barriers to accompany internal liberalisation. But for 
the Commission, the advent of globalisation of production placed a query over its very ability 
to have any competitiveness enhancing role for European industry when the primary agent 
for enhanced competitiveness was the market itself.
This market was no longer an EC territorially-defined entity - nor an ‘internal’ market, but 
the more organic, de facto economically integrating market encompassing the EC, EFTA, the 
US, Canada, Japan and some other Asian/Pacific countries. There emerged a competing 
political ‘geography’ between these two spatial definitions of market. The drive to greater 
FDI and globalisation as a means of welfare seeking, is in direct competition with a 
centralised vision of competitiveness stimulation in western Europe.
While trade policy and its instruments can be used broadly as a part of industrial policy 
within the EC; FDI has a tendency to undermine trade instruments, and at EC Commission 
level, to undermine EC industrial policy itself. The European Commission proved unable to 
forestall the extension of benefits to external firms which had the capacity to internalise their 
operations. These firms had a vigorous input into this outcome: which in turn had origins in 
EC trade policy towards Japan in the late 1970s and early 1980s - a perceived necessity given 
the enormous competitiveness gains of Japanese industry from the 1960s onwards.
In ensuring the fairness of internal and external access to the emerging market, the EC came 
to resemble a ‘mini-GATT’ - rather than a tightly operated executive. This juncture was 
largely arrived at by a sophisticated interaction between firms, EC sub-states and EC states. 
The Japanese government did not play a leading role in the investment dynamic. 
Consequently there has not been a linked bargain regarding reciprocal investment access for
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European firms in Japan.155
206
The need for regulation of multi-national enterprises and capital remains. The seriously 
contested issue revolves around where - at which level of political authority - the power of 
such regulation should be centred. This problématique is posed thus by Milivoje Panic: 
"What exactly is the ‘area’ (meaning the grouping of independent national entities) most 
likely to enable its constituent units to pursue effectively the policies needed to achieve and 
sustain a high level of economic welfare? In other words, what is an optimum policy area 
in the 1990s?"156
This is a particularly pertinent issue in the context of the EC. The states retain a ‘total’ FDI 
relationship with Japan which includes incentives, bi-lateral negotiating, and if necessary, 
local content requirements. The Commission failed to establish a more assertive role vis-à-vis 
Japanese investment, and is now itself more captive to the neo-liberal philosophies of the 
British and Dutch governments - no longer seeking a stronger role in this domain. 
Reluctantly, and after the failure of ‘new zone’ attempts to regulate inbound FDI, the 
Commission could be said to have arrived at the position already anticipated by Saucier; "It 
is more likely that the Commission will lean towards laissez-faire rather than adopt a middle 
position if this implied taking active steps."157
Neven and Siotis favour the supra-national level for the formulation of FDI guidelines.
It is in the interest of each government to impose some barriers to foreign direct 
investments which source domestic technology but at the same time all countries 
would be better of if nobody intervened. This suggests that foreign direct investment
155 Felix Rohatyn stresses the political significance of such access: "This would be the 
time for US corporations to acquire stakes in Japanese companies. Such ownership would 
not only improve trade flows, but would create the kind of political influence that comes only 
from having an actual presence in a market." Rohatyn, Felix ‘World Capital: The need and 
the risks’ New York Review of Books, 14 July 1994. p.50 (emphasis added).
156 Panic, Milivoje, National Management of the International Economy, Macmillan, 
London, 1988, p.317. *
157 Saucier, P. ‘New Conditions for competition between Japanese and European firms’ 
in Burgenmeier, B. and J.L. Mucchielli (eds.) Multinationals and Europe 1992, Routledge, 
London, 1991. p.130.
might have to be regulated by a supra-national institution.158 
If the supra-national ‘solution’ is preferred, Panic’s question comes to the fore, and the choice 
in the case of the EC would be whether regulation is effective at the Community level or the 
global level.
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Interviewed in June 1993, James Moorhouse MEP, author of two reports on the Community’s
relations with Japan indicated that the EC level could still have an important role: "If any
foreign company wants to invest on a significant scale there should be a cost benefit analysis.
We should have criteria within the EC as a whole on inward investment."159 This position
claims for the EC level a clear role in FDI matters, and as such is quite different from the
‘hands off approach of Commissioner Brittan. Holland’s proposals in The European
Imperative [a report to the Commission of the European Communities] are similar to those
of Moorhouse, in that a viable role for the EC level again is envisaged.
Where possible, the Community should seek cooperative outcomes with Japan which 
recognize the success of Japanese flexible production, cooperation with labour, and 
constant innovation, rather than penalize Japanese firms for their own success. On the 
other hand, this cannot reasonably mean liberalisation under conditions of long-term 
asymmetric trade, nor ceding the innovation frontier in Europe to non-European 
firms.160
This statement reflects the depth of the challenge to political integration of the multi-national 
enterprise. The first half of this analysis appears to be exactly what the liberal member states 
and the vast majority of sub-states throughout the community have been doing for almost a 
decade. The second part of the statement recognizes the need for regulation - but the difficult
158 Neven, Damien and Georges Siotis ‘Foreign Direct Investment in the European 
Community: Some Policy Issues’ in the Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol.9, No.2, 
p.85.
159 Interview with Mr. James Moorhouse MEP, Tokyo, 1 June 1993. The European 
Parliament resolution on Trade Relations with Japan (Moorhouse Report) adopted 22 January 
1993 recommended the strengthening of competition policy with a view to minimising the 
"competitive granting of subsidies" para 55. Moorhouse reiterated his view on regulation in 
speech to the Council of the European Business Community, Tokyo, on 7 June 1993: "In 
Europe we must focus on the notion of common criteria for investment in the EC by foreign 
companies so as not to undermine the competitive base of the Community’s industrial 
infrastructure."
160 Holland, Stuart The European Imperative, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1993, p.77.
experience of the Commission in defending ‘European firms’ through trade and ‘new zone’ 
investment policy has failed to assert the power of political integration over economic 
integration.
Panic concludes that "..once economic problems assume global proportions there is really only 
one optimum policy area: the world."161 While the Commission encouraged member states 
"to follow a common line",162 FDI guidelines and new, technology-driven trade 
developments lay outside of Commission competence. The only remaining territorially-based 
strategy the Commission had for assisting ‘European’ industry through the market, was the 
‘all ships rising’ concept, under which external firms benefit equally from enhanced market 
efficiency. In this case greater cooperative benefit accrues to states which lobbied hardest for 
Japanese investment.163 There is thus a clear political reward for the pursuit of individual 
external economic policies. In such a globalising context, the role of the Commission - and 
regional political integration - becomes unclear. Unable to implement a Euro-competitiveness 
policy through the Single Market, and hesitant to embrace a liberal strategy in time to benefit 
more than a minority of member states - the Commission’s strategy became reactive and ad 
hoc precisely at a time when de jure strategies sought to strengthen the political union 
between member states.
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161 Panic, Milivoje National Management of the International Economy, Macmillan, 
London, 1988, p.326.
162 Commission of the European Communities .A Consistent and Global Approach: review 
of the Community’s relations with Japan, Communication of the Commission to the Council. 
p.8.
163 Peter Robson and Ian Wooton observe that "countries chosen for the production 
facilities will benefit from the increased employment opportunities." ‘The Transnational 
Enterprise and Regional Economic Integration’ Journal o f Common Market Studies, vol.31, 
No.l, March, 1993. p.86/87.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has analysed regional political integration in its global political economic context. 
The research focus emanated from, and was addressed in an analysis of EC-Japan relations 
in the period from 1985 to 1993. Specifically, this analysis concerned the relationship 
between the EC in its constitutional entirety and Japanese firms. The research treated both 
the political impact of Japanese direct investment on the European Community (1985-93) and 
the structure and functioning of the EC as revealed in its actions and reactions towards 
Japanese direct investment.
The methodology used in this study combined international political economy (IPE) and neo­
geopolitical (‘neo-Braudelian’) methodology. The principal theories examined were those 
relating to European integration, and globalisation. Economic diplomacy was evaluated in 
the broader and more complex context of concurrent, multi-level political economic 
bargaining. Such a multi-level approach provided an opportunity to evaluate regional political 
economic integration in the global system.
The order of the empirical chapters (on sub-states, states, and EC institutions) served to 
emphasise that Commission-MITI economic diplomacy takes place in the context of two other 
important strands of the relationship. The inclusion of states and sub-states was imperative 
to any causal understanding of change in EC-Japan relations.
That different levels of political authority had differing predispositions towards, and reactions 
to an important externality is evident from the empirical findings. In order to evaluate the 
integrative evolution of the Community in the period under review, relations between the 
three levels were examined. Evaluating the extent of political economic integration - in this 
case EC integration - is difficult since no ‘measurement’ criteria are commonly accepted. 
However in evaluating both the impact of Japanese FDI on the EC, and the structure of the 
EC itself as revealed in its encounter with the phenomenon of FDI; the primary theoretical 
issue concerning regional political integration and globalisation can be addressed.
FDI relations were not the preserve of any central authority within the Community. 
Implicitly, FDI represented a challenge to the effectiveness of supra-national industrial policy.
The states and their internal regions played more important interface roles with Japanese firms 
than Community-level institutions. This was the opposite situation to trade policy, where the 
legal competence of the Commission is preeminent.
F i c J  EC E xter n a l  t r a p e /FD I c o m pet en c ie s
T rade (a g r ee m e n t) FDI
COMPETENCE POWERS
EC MEMBER NO YES
STATES
EC C om m issio n  Yes  No
The increase in volume of Japanese investment came about as a result of the changing 
strategies of Japanese firms in the global economy. But EC policy itself (through anti­
dumping measures and the Single Market Programme) was an important causal factor in this 
development and its timing. Simultaneously to supra-national constitutional strategies to 
enhance competitiveness; various member states and sub-states were engaging global capital 
and production. Further, the outreach of states and sub-states during the era of single market 
construction, marked a shift from competitiveness confrontation to cooperation.
The evolution of the EC single market - from scepticism over the role of Japanese firms 
within Europe - to neo-liberal acceptance, was reflected in a hard-fought bargain between 
‘dirigiste’ and ‘neo-liberal’ forces within the Community. Bi-lateral relations between liberal 
states and Japanese firms (and sub-states and Japanese firms) played a central role in the 
evolution of the market in a liberal direction.
The primary strategic raison d ’être of the European Community in the mid-1980s was to 
address the problems of competitiveness and unemployment within its territories. The 
SEA/’92 initiative was a project to effect clearly envisaged gains. The execution of such a 
competitiveness-enhancement strategy required the enforcement of an exogenous/endogenous 
geopolitical distinction, which liberal states were reluctant or unwilling to institute. Such a 
distinction was also more suited to the ‘classical’ trade and trade deficit era of the 1960s and 
1970s, during which the geography of the Euro-Japan relationship was largely static in the
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absence of high-volume FDI. The concept of competitiveness as perceived to exist between 
the EC, the U.S. and Japan prior to the era of high-volume FDI became an anachronism, even 
as ‘neo-territorial’ projects such as the ’92 Programme, NAFTA and APEC were gaining 
momentum.
The EC member states played a central role in the evolution of the EC-Japan relationship. 
Although constrained in the pursuit of trade agreements, the EC member states were active 
in trade promotion and FDI policy. The FDI alliance of liberal Community member states 
with Japanese firms, was one of the critical determinants in setting the Single Market 
Programme on a liberal trajectory. The western European market area thus became a catalyst 
for developments in the broader global economy. Liberal states saw advantage in embracing 
the globalising economy - dirigiste states dismantled their state controls only reluctantly and 
incompletely.
EC sub-states adopted a positive disposition towards Japanese FDI - a global, de facto 
economic integrative phenomenon. FDI was embraced by EC sub-states primarily for the 
economic welfare and employment gains which it offered. Sub-state strategies were highly 
sensitive and responsive to the shift from trade to trade plus FDI in the EC-Japan 
relationship. While the Commission was drafting the SEA, which implied competitiveness- 
enhancement by exclusion - the regions were actively seeking external allies to enhance 
efficiency. Such activities of the sub-states (and liberal states) had a direct influence on the 
evolution of the Commission blueprint for the single European market.
This thesis finds a significant co-relation between increased levels of FDI and increased 
political tension between the constituent actors within a politically integrating bloc. The 
presence of Japanese and other TNCs presented the Community with a dilemma. The lack 
of an EC FDI legal competence presented an opportunity for liberal states to maintain their 
openness to global capital and production. A contest developed between, on one hand; 
Japanese firm-liberal member state (and sub-state) alliances; and on the other, the power of 
the Commission to conduct a uniform response to externalities.
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instruments. The pursuit of such a strategy implied that the embryonic single market was far 
from liberal until the power of globalisation and its accompanying exogenous/endogenous 
bargains made it so. The rise in global FDI exposed the incompleteness in the Commission’s 
set of external commercial policy instruments.
F ig J  Com m u n ity  co m pet en c ie s» FDI, and  in tern a l  p o l it ic a l  respo n se  t o  J a pa n ese  ca pita l , 1985-93
Figure 3 attempts lo capture the interactive complexity of EC m mmrrr.iai competencies; the role and political economic disposition of member 
stales and sub-states; and systemic tension caused by globalisation, exemplified by inbound Japanese direct investment, 1985-93. The iapan-EC 
FDI level, peaking over USS14bn. in 1989, is detailed in CHART 1, pJ7.
Trade competence FDI powers
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
The extension of anti-dumping duties to include component parts (1987) was condemned by 
GATT in 1990. When the free movement of goods principle was tested by UK-Nissan in 
1988/89, a liberal outcome was the only logical one in accord with SEA free movement of 
goods principles. Reinterpretation of ‘trade era’ rules of origin aimed at third country 
Japanese plants, was the period’s most divisive external commercial policy conflict within the 
Council. In the age of globalising production, the Commission struggled to enforce the 
geopolitical integrity of the EC itself. Member states refused to permit the Commission to 
extend the ‘totality’ of its external commercial powers, from trade competence to trade plus 
FDI competence.
The process-oriented nature of the concepts of ‘integration’ and ‘globalisation’ was noted at 
the outset. These two concepts do not, without qualification, describe actualities. Western 
Europe is not fully ‘integrated’ - the world is not fully ‘globalised’. This research project 
concerning the impact of an important externality on the European Community, affords an 
opportunity to evaluate both the theories and the phenomena to which they refer. Theories 
of European integration attempt to explain de jure, political economic, regional integration. 
Theories of globalisation attempt to explain de facto, economic globalisation.
Theories of European integration primarily evaluate the structure and evolution of the 
European Communities. However, in the course of evaluating such theories in light of the 
empirical results obtained - and viewing the EC in its constitutional entirety - some insights 
can also be obtained regarding the EC member states and regions.
The demise of state functions predicted by some functionalist theorists was not apparent in 
EC-Japan FDI relations.1 The SEA/’92 era in the development of the Community may be 
seen to have commenced with a Commission-initiated neofunctional response to issues of 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the U.S. and Japan. Both the Act and the ‘internal’ market 
programme can be viewed as attempts to strengthen the geopolitical integrity of the bloc. 
Functionalist logic implies that the state becomes less important as specific tasks are
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1 Mitrany, David The Functional Theory of Politics, Robertson for LSE, London, 1975. 
See pp.20-21 above.
undertaken. Within the Community however, the growing presence of Japanese firms 
highlighted liberal/dirigiste divisions in the Council and led to a state-centered response to 
global economic integration.
Neofunctionalism describes a more conscious handing over of powers to supranational 
authorities. While the member states delegated decision-making authority in the field of trade 
agreements (to DGI), the growth of globalised capital and productive volume and mobility, 
changed the regulatory relevance of this competence. Advances in globalisation, manifested 
by increasing FDI, outpaced the authority of the Commission. The Commission was thus 
forced to bargain with member states to address this ‘regulatory lag’ through the dubious 
extension of trade instruments. Political tension within the bloc was thus increased. States, 
with their residual powers of trade promotion and FDI bargaining and regulation, retained two 
highly powerful competencies with which to engage global economic forces. Further, the 
Commission was blocked from enhancing its FDI regulatory role, and had one ‘new zone’ 
attempt to extend its de facto competence to FDI (viz. anti-circumvention) condemned by 
GATT. In the 1991 EC-Japan automobile agreement, where the Commission has tentatively 
(and only until 1999) encroached upon FDI regulation, the Commission’s new ‘competence’ 
constitutes little more than an structured ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with the MITI. While 
neofunctionalism offers some insights into the evolution of the EC external trade competence, 
it is of little use in explaining the member states’ ‘Gaullist’ retention of power concerning 
FDI matters.
Functionalists recognised the value of liberal internationalism, but decried its lack of 
institutional structure. Ironically, the explanatory powers of both functionalism and 
neofunctionalism receded at a time when a form of neo-liberal internationalism - globalisation
- was offering cooperative alliances across the globe. Simultaneously, there was a lack of 
global ‘counter-veiling’ regulatory power in the system.
The strong role of states in the EC system has been stressed by inter-governmental theory 
which emphasises inter-state diplomacy within the Community. While inter-govemmentalism 
has strong explanatory potential; this research project points to two problems. The first of 
these is the common deficiency in EC scholarship of over-emphasis on endogenous forces:
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including endogenous states. Neo-Braudelian geopolitics which stresses the potential of 
externalities to ‘manipulate from without’ is a useful methodological corrective. Secondly, 
inter-govemmentalism does not sufficiently stress non-state or non-governmental actors. IPE 
provides valuable correctives to this defect by stressing that the important power interlocutors 
need not be states.
The EC has frequently been compared, explicitly or implicitly, to federations in the global 
system. The European Community is not a federation, nor does ‘ever closer union’ 
necessarily imply such a constitutional destination. Indeed, the importance attached to the 
‘four freedoms’ as a path to greater global competitiveness was partially inspired by perceived 
competitive advantages in the U.S. federal system. However, the Commission strategy has 
essentially been de jure. The free mobility of persons throughout Community territory could 
conceivably be an important counter-balance to inter-state and inter-regional tensions 
regarding FDI ‘loading’. However, the difficulty of attempting to enhance competitiveness 
through de jure measures is illustrated by the comparatively low level of such pan-EC 
mobility.
One area in which the literature on federalism has been helpful in analysing EC-Japan FDI 
affairs has been at the level of sub-states. The growing literature on federal states in the 
global system is of considerable value. This is not least because (like IPE) the literature on 
sub-states is critical of the IR focus on states. This thesis finds that sub-states play important 
external relations roles in non-federal, as well as federal systems. The EC literature on 
subsidiarity has largely and surprisingly, neglected the role of sub-states in EC-external 
relations. This is a significant defect, since the empirical survey in Chapter III finds a 
dynamic role for EC regions seeking to enhance local welfare through bargains made with 
extra-Community enterprises.
The bonds between states and sub-states have evolved in an innovative manner; responsive 
to global political economic opportunities. The relationship between states and sub-states is 
qualitatively different from that between the EC level and the member states. There is no 




Globalisation refers to the increased inter-connectedness of the systemic political economy, 
driven by financial, technological and information dynamics; and the systemic consequences 
thereof. Increased global trade and FDI are among the strongest manifestations of such 
globalisation. Various concepts of globalisation were discussed. These included historical 
concepts of world and regional economic spaces; literature on the development and 
organisation of large business organisations; and more recent concepts of contemporary 
globalisation.
Motion and de facto change were the hallmarks of Fernand Braudel’s work on the 
Mediterranean and his writings on early modern Europe.2 His emphasis on trans-territorial 
activity, driven by economic signals in an organically interconnected world has much 
relevance to late-20th century global phenomena such as FDI. To adopt Braudel’s 
terminology, the EC is a world-economy in the global economy of the world.1
A world-economy has three characteristics: a given geographical space; a pole or center; and 
three zones (central, intermediate and peripheral). The Community occupies a given 
geographical space, and has attempted to harness the resources of adjacent territories into an 
overall competitiveness advantage. In the age of greatly increased capital and productive 
mobility, this territory can be accessed by firms, rendering the exogenous-endogenous (or 
‘club’ function) less enforceable than during the era when trade was unaccompanied by high 
volumes of FDI. Although the EC does have a secretariat in Brussels - this does not 
correspond to Braudel’s concept of ‘pole’, historical examples of which were at various times; 
Venice, Amsterdam and London. Rather, the Community is multi-polar, reflecting the 
importance of economic centers such as London and Frankfurt, and the importance of its 
member states. Braudel’s ‘polar’ concept focused attention on evaluation of the 
Commission’s attempts to orchestrate member state positions vis-à-vis important externalities.
2 Braudel, Fernand The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip 
II, [1949]. Collins, London, 2 vols., 2nd ed., 1972. See pp.8-13 above.
3 Braudel, Fernand Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism. Trans. Patricia 
M. Ranum. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977. See p .ll above.
The question of the extent to which the Community could enforce the logic of the ‘internal’ 
market in competitiveness enhancement is effectively one of an attempt to establish a 
‘Braudelian pole’ in the European political economy. The system of economic, social, 
political and individual activity across borders which is Braudel’s economy of the world, 
eschews exogenous-endogenous divides so prevalent in IR theory, and admits the constant 
possibility that external forces can have profound effects on the evolution of systems. In 
particular, the use of Braudel’s concepts points to the uneven ‘jurisdictional fît’ between the 
regional political economic entity, and the increasingly global market. This geopolitical 
dimension is an important conceptual compliment to the methodology of international political 
economy.
Literature on the history and organisation of ‘big business’ examines the evolution of one of 
the primary forces for globalisation. It does so largely from an endogenous perspective - 
while the more recent contribution of IPE is concerned with the systemic context. By 
stressing the historical origins of FDI, various authors provide a useful counterweight to 
theories that globalisation and the challenge, or even threat of globalisation are entirely new. 
This thesis finds that although the state must bargain with transnational corporations; it is 
efficiently doing so. One of the proofs of this is the strong relationship between states and 
sub-states in external relations. Sub-states were frequently found to play coordinated state- 
auxiliary roles in both federal and non-federal systems. Business historians have pointed to 
the state-firm dynamic for some time. In this context, Vernon and Servan-Schreiber’s4 
concerns about the threat to state sovereignty were misplaced. However, this does not mean 
that FDI has no impact on the potential of supra-national authorities to nurture efficiencies 
from the bonds between states.
Coase’s concept of internalisation has clear trans-territorial applications.5 Inter-firm and 
intra-firm bonds are the facilitators of FDI. This research project, in examining the
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4 Vernon, Raymond Sovereignty at Bay: the multi-national spread of the U.S. enterprise, 
Longman, London, 1971. Servan-Schreiber, Jean Jacques Le défi américain, Denoel, Paris, 
1967. See p.103 above.
5 Coase, Ronald H. ‘The Nature of the Firm’ Economica, Vol. 4, London, 1937. pp.386- 
405. See p.27 above.
relationship between the EC (in its constitutional entirety) and Japanese firms, has analysed 
the nexus of two relational phenomena - regional integration and globalisation. Such inter- 
firm and intra-firm bonds are not only commercial. Strange has stressed that firm-firm and 
intra-firm bonds have political effects.6 In contrasting the efficiency of bonds between (and 
within) firms, with the bonds within the integrating bloc - an opportunity arises to address the 
core problématique concerning integration and globalisation.
Coase’s original concept of internalisation referred to commercial efficiencies. Since the 
activities of firms also have political affects, this thesis has attempted to apply the concept 
of internalisation to international relations. Should the agenda between two entities be 
predominantly political economic, and if FDI becomes an important element in such a 
relationship, the phenomenon here identified as the ‘internalisation of an external relationship’ 
can take place - effectively promoting global de facto cooperative integration.
At the outset, the European Community was characterised both as a structure and a strategy. 
Globalisation was defined in terms of the increased volume of transactions over territories 
since the mid-1970s, and the systemic consequences thereof. This analysis of relations 
between the European Community and Japan (1985-93) provides an opportunity to evaluate 
the extent of two forms of integration in which the EC and Japanese firms have been leading 
protagonists.
This research does not find an increase in the level of political integration in the European 
Community between 1985 and 1993. There is much evidence to suggest that the systemic 
political economic environment in which the Community exists is an even greater determinant 
of the Community’s destiny than at any previous time. This may seem ironic since the 
concept of ‘external federator’ has been applied to the Cold War period. Increased capital 
and FDI mobility have greatly undermined the exogenous-endogenous geopolitical distinction, 
as the EC is increasingly exposed to exogenous developments in commerce - its chosen area 
of greatest integration.
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6 Various works; see p.7, fn.3 above.
Even here however, the competence is far from complete and the regulatory ‘lag’ between 
trade policy and developments in global FDI has exposed deep commercial philosophical 
differences between member states. Nor did the ‘liberal settlement’ of the SEA blueprint 
mean the end of such differences. In effect, the prelude to the 1st of January 1993 was 
marked by belated attempts to reopen debate on freedom of movement, where external goods 
and capital were concerned. (Nor has single market liberalism precluded liberal-sceptic states 
from blocking the Commission extending its authority to negotiate vital non-merchandise 
issues in the WTO. Arguments pro and contra global social and environmental guidelines 
for production, are looming continuations of the liberal/dirigiste debate between member states 
in an era of incomplete Commission competence.)
The EC is not a pure inter-governmental system. States like France and Italy are evidently 
beholden to a more liberal regime than they envisaged whilst negotiating the Single European 
Act. There is no evidence of automatic functionalism revealed in this study - states have 
reinforced their trade and investment promotion functions in EC-Japan affairs and retain the 
bulk of FDI powers. Nor can the EC be described as a neofunctional entity when states resist 
greater Commission authority in the important sphere of FDI powers. While there appears 
to be a nascent ‘federalism’, even within centralised states like Spain and the UK, there is no 
evidence that the EC is moving, or at present capable of moving, towards a federal system.
A continuous theme throughout this synthesis has been the tension between European 
integration and firm globalisation. This is not a state-firm tension. Rather, it is a tension 
between firms which seek to extend their influence trans-territorially, and emergent schemes 
to improve bloc competitiveness through political economic integration. This thesis finds that 
de facto, economic integration as manifested by global FDI, undermines the construction of 
de jure, politically integrated regions.
This analysis of the Community’s experience with Japanese FDI suggests that different kinds 
of territorial governments react differently to the opportunities and challenges of trans- 
territorial firm activity. The EC, the member states and the sub-states are all territorial 
entities. This research suggests that whilst all three levels of administration must bargain with 
trans-national corporations; it is the supra-national level which finds its powers of
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coordination most challenged by the alliances between its constituent parts and external firms. 
For liberal states and sub-states, Japanese FDI can be seen to have posed a viable alternative 
to centralised EC (SEA/’92 programme) competitiveness stimulants. The presence of 
Japanese firms within the Community is a challenge to the relationship between 
competidveness-enhancement measures and territoriality. This conclusion does not preclude 
the possibility that regional economic integration (throughout Europe) and global economic 
integration may be mutually supportive. Nor does it preclude that ultimate gains from the 
market might accrue to all participants. Such an outcome however, would further undermine 
the ‘competitiveness’ function of an EC-level secretariat.
The elusive locus of ‘guardianship’ of the economic interest emerges as a major theme on the 
European side of EC-Japan affairs. The investment dynamic in fact reveals that the notion 
of political guardianship of economic interest has as many constitutional implications as the 
‘liberal’ versus ‘dirigiste’ debate. Precisely at the point when the Commission acquired full 
legal competence over trade matters, the increase in FDI and the globalisation of production 
challenged the EC-external commercial frontier - admitting a greater role for globalisation 
processes in the evolution of the European economy. Competitiveness-enhancement was 
becoming ever difficult to manage in the globalising environment into which the ’92 
programme was born. The increasingly global dimensions of investment and finance blurred 
the member/non-member distinction precisely at a time when the Commission elected the 
market as the site for enhancing its political economic fortunes. The ‘internal market’ was 
proven to be an oxymoron as the club and market became indistinguishable. But the 
increasingly liberal market - fully accepted by the Commission by 1993, had a destiny of its 
own. Or rather, had a destiny which was charted by external as well as internal actors.
The EC is a quasi-legal structure, whose most distinguishing characteristic from a global 
perspective, is not so much its power, but its lack thereof. The EC is more than a collection 
of states. However the extent to which it is so, depends upon the period and the realm of 
competence in question. The SEA/’92 initiative was intended to enhance the global standing 
of the Community, but in the absence of a constitutional settlement regarding external 
commercial competence, the dividend was questionable from the outset. A settlement does 
not mean that the EC would cease to evolve, but that a sense of priority on important matters
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might be guided by principles strong enough to over-ride the sum of conflictual bargains. 
This in turn, does not imply that bargains - even conflictual or lowest common denominator 
ones - are inefficient. However, the means of attempting to solve an essentially constitutional 
question - the dearth of EC-level FDI regulatory power - by ad hoc reinterpretations and 
GATT-contrary applications of trade instruments, was an inefficient means of enhancing the 
stature of the Community in one of its most crucial relations. In its relations with Japan and 
Japanese FDI, the EC member states once more postponed constitutional settlement. But on 
this occasion - unlike the Council’s refusal to endorse the authority of the Commission to 
negotiate with Japan in the early 1960s - the alternative welfare enhancement of global 
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